--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@aspectlylabs/mikka/v/0.0.348" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@aspectlylabs/mikka/v/0.0.348.md" package: "@aspectlylabs/mikka" report_status: "published" title: "@aspectlylabs/mikka@0.0.348 npm security report" verdict: "clean" version: "0.0.348" --- # @aspectlylabs/mikka@0.0.348 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Allowed — no malicious behavior detected** — No malicious behavior detected. 12 low-signal pattern(s) reviewed. - **Verdict:** Clean - **Product-default install policy:** Allow - **Firewall policy:** No policy match - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** None published - **Selected version:** 0.0.348 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: clean; recommendation: mark clean. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. The flagged credential flow is a provider proxy used for an assigned agent run. Its destination comes from the provider credential, is restricted to HTTPS, and redirects are rejected; the reviewed source showed no unrelated credential exfiltration or malicious automatic action. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Clean - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 90.0% - **Started:** 2026-11-02T23:23:32.414Z - **Finished:** 2026-11-02T23:24:18.061Z - **Download time:** 505 ms - **Static scan time:** 5595 ms - **AI review time:** 39546 ms - **Total time:** 45647 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** No attack was identified; the reviewed credential flow supports agent runs using the configured model provider. - **Trigger:** A model credential is used when an agent run starts. - **Impact:** No unrelated credential exposure or harmful action was identified. - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-11-02T23:24:18.061Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** The broker sends requests to the configured HTTPS provider origin, or to Anthropic/OpenAI defaults, and disallows redirects. - **Rationale:** The flagged credential flow is a provider proxy used for an assigned agent run. Its destination comes from the provider credential, is restricted to HTTPS, and redirects are rejected; the reviewed source showed no unrelated credential exfiltration or malicious automatic action. - **Network endpoints:** https://api.anthropic.com, https://api.openai.com/v1 ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Clean - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Recommended action:** mark\_clean - **Intent class:** Benign - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for AI clean decision:** Provider URLs must use HTTPS and cannot include embedded credentials, query strings, or fragments., The API-key broker uses the credential’s configured origin, or Anthropic/OpenAI defaults, and rejects redirects., The broker flow starts as part of an agent run that has an assigned model credential., The manifest describes a local daemon for running agents through the user’s own CLIs and declares no lifecycle scripts., Hosted child processes reject unexpected credential-bearing environment variables. - **Evidence against:** The package runs agents and uses network requests and subprocesses as part of its stated purpose., The flagged credential and command paths have ordinary run, provider, or daemon-management contexts; no unrelated credential collection or destination was identified. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @aspectlylabs/mikka@0.0.348. - Review the evidence and your use of @aspectlylabs/mikka@0.0.348 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** github-credentials.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L7: import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto' L8: import { spawn } from 'node:child_process' L9: import { pathToFileURL } from 'node:url' ``` ### 2. High: Shell - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** mikka.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references shell execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L4612: ai: "7.0.142", L4613: execa: "10.1.1", L4614: pino: "10.4.0", ``` ### 3. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 4. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 5. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 6. High: Same File Env Network Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** mikka.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L6401: assertSafeId("run id", runId); L6402: const common = resolve4(await worktreeGitDir(repoPath, worktree), "..", ".."); L6403: if (basename(common) !== ".git") throw new Error(`${repoPath} is not a standard clone`); ... L6412: } L6413: async function pinnedGit(repoPath, worktree, env = process.env) { L6414: const gitDir = await worktreeGitDir(repoPath, worktree); L6415: const workTree = realpathSync4(worktree); L6416: return (args, extra, options) => execa3("git", [...SAFE_GIT, ...args], { L6417: cwd: workTree, ``` ### 7. High: Credential Redirect Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** main.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. main.js: writeFileSync as writeFileSync2 writeFileSync "runtime-home/.claude/.credentials.json", "runtime-home/.codex/auth.json", "native-home/.claude/.credentials.json", "native-home/.codex/auth.json" "/root/.claude/.credentials.json", "/root/.codex/auth.json", ``` ### 8. High: Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 82.0% - **Path:** agents/native-container.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L7: // its node. The model is reached only through that broker. L8: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L9: import { dirname } from "node:path"; L10: import { createServer, request as httpRequest } from "node:http"; L11: import { mkdirSync } from "node:fs"; ... L14: const fail = () => { L15: process.stderr.write("native_runtime_unavailable\n"); L16: process.exit(1); ``` ### 9. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 10. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 11. Low: Copyleft License - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package manifest declares a copyleft-style license. ### 12. Low: Ai Review Evidence - **Category:** Ai Review - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** main.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Provider URLs must use HTTPS and cannot include embedded credentials, query strings, or fragments. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript var credentialKey = z15.string().min(1).max(4096).refine((value) => !/[\r\n\0]/.test(value)); var credentialBaseUrl = z15.url().max(500).refine((value) => { const url = new URL(value); return url.protocol === "https:" && !url.username && !url.pas ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** No - **Dependencies:** 10 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 0 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 10 ### Published dependency entries - @agentclientprotocol/sdk 1.9.0 (Dependency) - @anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk 0.3.305 (Dependency) - ai 7.0.142 (Dependency) - execa 10.1.1 (Dependency) - pino 10.4.0 (Dependency) - proper-lockfile 4.1.2 (Dependency) - rotating-file-stream 3.2.10 (Dependency) - simple-git 4.0.2 (Dependency) - vscode-jsonrpc 9.0.3 (Dependency) - zod 4.6.7 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @aspectlylabs/mikka - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 0.0.348 - **License:** AGPL-3.0-only - **Version published:** 2026-11-02T23:20:56.120Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-10-31T00:10:42.964Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-11-05T03:52:25.334Z - **Known versions:** 307 - **Latest version:** 0.0.456 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Local Mikka daemon: runs agents through the user's own CLIs - **Maintainers:** alexj11324 - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=24 - **Artifact files:** 43 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 2,625,485 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 2 - **Attestations:** Yes - **Provenance:** https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()