registry / @aspectlylabs/mikka / 0.0.365
@aspectlylabs/mikka@0.0.365
Local Mikka daemon: runs agents through the user's own CLIs
AI Security Review
scanned 2d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe suspicious credential-routing and process-execution hints resolve to ordinary agent execution and provider API forwarding. The reviewed broker validates HTTPS, limits request paths, and rejects redirects; no unrelated credential destination or malicious behavior was found.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
A user starts the daemon or a run using a configured model credential.
Impact
Model credentials are used for the requested agent run and are not redirected to an unrelated host in the reviewed flow.
Mechanism
The broker forwards model requests to the standard provider endpoint or the credential's explicitly configured HTTPS provider URL; the CLI receives its expected credential environment variable.
AI rationale
The suspicious credential-routing and process-execution hints resolve to ordinary agent execution and provider API forwarding. The reviewed broker validates HTTPS, limits request paths, and rejects redirects; no unrelated credential destination or malicious behavior was found.
Evidence
main.js
Network endpoints3
api.anthropic.comapi.openai.comcredential-configured HTTPS provider URL
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 92.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- The manifest describes a local daemon that runs agents through the user's own CLIs; it has no install lifecycle scripts.
- The API key broker defaults to Anthropic and OpenAI API endpoints and permits only their expected request paths.
- A custom provider URL is supplied by the credential and must use HTTPS without embedded username or password.
- The broker sends the key to that selected API origin and rejects redirects.
- For Claude, the credential and provider URL are passed to the Claude CLI as its expected environment variables.
Evidence against
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
CopyleftLicense
Source & flagged code
6 flaggedgithub-credentials.mjsView file
7import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto'
L8: import { spawn } from 'node:child_process'
L9: import { pathToFileURL } from 'node:url'
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
github-credentials.mjsView on unpkg · L7mikka.jsView file
4625ai: "7.0.142",
L4626: execa: "10.1.1",
L4627: pino: "10.4.0",
High
6446assertSafeId("run id", runId);
L6447: const common = resolve4(await worktreeGitDir(repoPath, worktree), "..", "..");
L6448: if (basename(common) !== ".git") throw new Error(`${repoPath} is not a standard clone`);
...
L6457: }
L6458: async function pinnedGit(repoPath, worktree, env = process.env) {
L6459: const gitDir = await worktreeGitDir(repoPath, worktree);
L6460: const workTree = realpathSync4(worktree);
L6461: return (args, extra, options) => execa3("git", [...SAFE_GIT, ...args], {
L6462: cwd: workTree,
Findings
5 High2 Medium5 Low
HighChild Processgithub-credentials.mjs
HighShellmikka.js
HighSame File Env Network Executionmikka.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistencemain.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationagents/native-container.mjs
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowCopyleft License
LowSuspicious Lifecycle Evidencepackage.json
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @aspectlylabs/mikka@0.0.365.
See all versions of @aspectlylabs/mikka for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @aspectlylabs/mikka@0.0.365 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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