registry / @aspectlylabs/mikka / 0.0.405
@aspectlylabs/mikka@0.0.405
Local Mikka daemon: runs agents through the user's own CLIs
AI Security Review
scanned 1d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe source shows agent execution and model credential handling tied to user-configured services, with credential filtering and a restricted local broker. The routing hints about an unofficial credential gateway are not supported by the inspected code.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
Users invoke the mikka CLI or use its exported daemon APIs to run agents.
Impact
No malicious impact identified in the reviewed source.
Mechanism
Agent subprocesses receive filtered environments; model credentials are routed to the selected HTTPS provider through a restricted broker.
AI rationale
The source shows agent execution and model credential handling tied to user-configured services, with credential filtering and a restricted local broker. The routing hints about an unofficial credential gateway are not supported by the inspected code.
Network endpoints2
api.anthropic.comapi.openai.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 91.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- The manifest defines the CLI and module exports, with no lifecycle scripts.
- Model credentials are validated and passed to the selected provider URL over HTTPS.
- The API-key broker uses the standard Anthropic/OpenAI endpoints and limits forwarded requests to model API paths.
- The native adapter rejects provider secrets in its environment and accepts only a broker placeholder.
- Child-process environments exclude common provider credentials, cloud credentials, tokens, and secrets.
Evidence against
- The package intentionally launches agent CLIs and brokers model requests as part of its daemon functionality.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
CopyleftLicense
Source & flagged code
6 flaggedgithub-credentials.mjsView file
7import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto'
L8: import { spawn } from 'node:child_process'
L9: import { pathToFileURL } from 'node:url'
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
github-credentials.mjsView on unpkg · L7mikka.jsView file
4637ai: "7.0.142",
L4638: execa: "10.1.1",
L4639: pino: "10.4.0",
High
6566assertSafeId("run id", runId);
L6567: const common = resolve4(await worktreeGitDir(repoPath, worktree), "..", "..");
L6568: if (basename(common) !== ".git") throw new Error(`${repoPath} is not a standard clone`);
...
L6577: }
L6578: async function pinnedGit(repoPath, worktree, env = process.env) {
L6579: const gitDir = await worktreeGitDir(repoPath, worktree);
L6580: const workTree = realpathSync4(worktree);
L6581: return (args, extra, options) => execa3("git", [...SAFE_GIT, ...args], {
L6582: cwd: workTree,
Findings
5 High2 Medium5 Low
HighChild Processgithub-credentials.mjs
HighShellmikka.js
HighSame File Env Network Executionmikka.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistencemain.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationagents/native-container.mjs
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowCopyleft License
LowSuspicious Lifecycle Evidencepackage.json
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @aspectlylabs/mikka@0.0.405.
See all versions of @aspectlylabs/mikka for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @aspectlylabs/mikka@0.0.405 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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