--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@astralcore/aura-wb/v/1.0.23" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@astralcore/aura-wb/v/1.0.23.md" package: "@astralcore/aura-wb" report_status: "published" title: "@astralcore/aura-wb@1.0.23 npm security report" verdict: "malicious" version: "1.0.23" --- # @astralcore/aura-wb@1.0.23 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Blocked & quarantined** — Remote code execution and data exfiltration from the bot host; optional message metadata disclosure to Telegram. - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Product-default install policy:** Block - **Firewall policy:** Matched malicious - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Remote Code Execution - **Selected version:** 1.0.23 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) A package-author-controlled WhatsApp identity is an install-independent privileged principal. It can remotely read/write project files and restart all PM2 apps on a paired bot host. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 99.0% - **Started:** 2026-08-09T13:49:09.698Z - **Finished:** 2026-08-09T13:50:05.255Z - **Download time:** 253 ms - **Static scan time:** 518 ms - **AI review time:** 54785 ms - **Total time:** 55557 ms ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** A package-author-controlled WhatsApp identity is an install-independent privileged principal. It can remotely read/write project files and restart all PM2 apps on a paired bot host. - **Trigger:** A hard-coded creator identity sends creator commands to the running paired WhatsApp bot. - **Impact:** Remote code execution and data exfiltration from the bot host; optional message metadata disclosure to Telegram. - **Evidence paths:** config/index.js, src/commands/parser.js, src/commands/messageHandler.js, src/commands/filemanager.js, src/commands/creator.js, start.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-08-09T13:50:05.255Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** hard-coded remote creator backdoor with file write and process restart - **Attack narrative:** After a user pairs and runs the bot, the package treats fixed developer-controlled WhatsApp identities as creator on every install. Those identities bypass creator-plugin access checks, can use filemanager commands to retrieve or overwrite files under the resolved shared project root, then invoke \`pm2 restart all\` to run replaced code. This is an unconsented remote administrative backdoor. - **Rationale:** Source establishes an install-independent remote privileged identity plus reachable file-write and restart capabilities. This is concrete remote code execution behavior, not a scanner-only inference. - **Files touched:** config/index.js, src/commands/parser.js, src/commands/messageHandler.js, src/commands/filemanager.js, src/commands/creator.js, start.js - **Network endpoints:** https://api.telegram.org/bot${TG\_TOKEN}/sendMessage ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 99.0% - **Recommended action:** publish\_block - **Intent class:** Malware - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for:** config/index.js hard-codes creator WhatsApp identities independent of installer configuration., parser.js marks messages from those identities as isCreator on every installation., messageHandler.js explicitly permits that hard-coded creator to run creator plugins on any installed bot., filemanager.js lets creator commands read, overwrite, and archive files across the resolved shared project root., creator.js lets the same remote identity run \`pm2 restart all\`, executing newly written project code., start.js can send message previews and sender numbers to a fixed Telegram chat when its token variable is set. - **Evidence against:** preinstall only acts on Termux and installs declared native build prerequisites., No install-time credential harvesting or external AI-agent configuration mutation was found. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.preinstall = node scripts/ensure-termux-deps.js || exit 0 ``` ### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.preinstall = node scripts/ensure-termux-deps.js || exit 0 ``` ### 3. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 4. High: High Secret - **Category:** Secrets - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** src/commands/tools.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package contains a high-severity secret pattern. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript patternName = google_api_key severity = high line = 509 matchedText = const ur...)}`; ``` ### 5. Medium: Dynamic Require - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** start.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic require/import behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: 'use strict'; L2: require('dotenv').config({ path: require('path').join(__dirname, 'config.env') }); L3: ``` ### 6. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 7. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 8. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 9. Critical: Credential Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** start.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: 'use strict'; L2: require('dotenv').config({ path: require('path').join(__dirname, 'config.env') }); L3: ... L55: const cfg = require('./config'); L56: const axios = require('axios'); L57: const path = require('path'); ... L257: // ── Channel ad-reply contextInfo (looks like sent from channel) ── L258: const _CHANNEL_URL = process.env.AUTO_JOIN_CHANNEL || 'https://whatsapp.[redacted]'; L259: const _CHANNEL_THUMB = global.SL_AURA_THUMB || AURA_THUMB_PATH; ... L263: title: 'SL AURA', L264: body: '® ASTRAL CORE', L265: thumbnailUrl: _CHANNEL_THUMB, ``` ### 10. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** start.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> start.js L1: 'use strict'; L2: require('dotenv').config({ path: require('path').join(__dirname, 'config.env') }); L3: ... L55: const cfg = require('./config'); L56: const axios = require('axios'); L57: const path = require('path'); ... L257: // ── Channel ad-reply contextInfo (looks like sent from channel) ── L258: const _CHANNEL_URL = process.env.AUTO_JOIN_CHANNEL || 'https://whatsapp.[redacted]'; L259: const _CHANNEL_THUMB = global.SL_AURA_THUMB || AURA_THUMB_PATH; ... L263: title: 'SL AURA', L264: body: '® ASTRAL CORE', L265: thumbnailUrl: _CHANNEL_THUMB, ``` ### 11. High: Trigger Reachable Credential Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** start.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches credential exfiltration behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable credential exfiltration chain: manifest.main -> start.js L1: 'use strict'; L2: require('dotenv').config({ path: require('path').join(__dirname, 'config.env') }); L3: ... L55: const cfg = require('./config'); L56: const axios = require('axios'); L57: const path = require('path'); ... L257: // ── Channel ad-reply contextInfo (looks like sent from channel) ── L258: const _CHANNEL_URL = process.env.AUTO_JOIN_CHANNEL || 'https://whatsapp.[redacted]'; L259: const _CHANNEL_THUMB = global.SL_AURA_THUMB || AURA_THUMB_PATH; ... L263: title: 'SL AURA', L264: body: '® ASTRAL CORE', L265: thumbnailUrl: _CHANNEL_THUMB, ``` ### 12. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 13. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 14. High: Ships High Entropy Blob - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** src/media/startup\_voice.ogg - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships high-entropy non-source blobs. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text path = src/media/startup_voice.ogg kind = high_entropy_blob sizeBytes = 387966 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 15. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 16. Medium: Wildcard Dependency - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package manifest contains a wildcard dependency. ### 17. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** src/commands/extra\_media.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @astralcore/aura-wb@1.0.22 matchedPath = src/commands/extra_media.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGFzdHJhbGNvcmUvYXVyYS13Yg:1.0.22 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 18. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** src/commands/tools.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @astralcore/aura-wb@1.0.22 matchedPath = src/commands/tools.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGFzdHJhbGNvcmUvYXVyYS13Yg:1.0.22 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 19. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** src/commands/myfunc2.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @astralcore/aura-wb@1.0.22 matchedPath = src/commands/myfunc2.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGFzdHJhbGNvcmUvYXVyYS13Yg:1.0.22 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 20. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** src/commands/sticker.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @astralcore/aura-wb@1.0.22 matchedPath = src/commands/sticker.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGFzdHJhbGNvcmUvYXVyYS13Yg:1.0.22 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 21. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** src/commands/unity\_dl.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @astralcore/aura-wb@1.0.22 matchedPath = src/commands/unity_dl.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGFzdHJhbGNvcmUvYXVyYS13Yg:1.0.22 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 22. High: Secret Pattern - **Category:** Secrets - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** src/commands/tools.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Google API key in src/commands/tools.js Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript patternName = google_api_key severity = high line = 509 matchedText = const ur...)}`; ``` ### 23. High: Secret Pattern - **Category:** Secrets - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** src/commands/extra\_media.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Google API key in src/commands/extra\_media.js Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript patternName = google_api_key severity = high line = 33 matchedText = const ur...)}`; ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** preinstall - **Dependencies:** 33 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 0 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 33 ### Published dependency entries - @ffmpeg-installer/ffmpeg latest (Dependency) - @ffprobe-installer/ffprobe latest (Dependency) - @hapi/boom ^10.0.0 (Dependency) - @whiskeysockets/baileys ^6.7.21 (Dependency) - adm-zip ^0.5.10 (Dependency) - axios ^1.6.0 (Dependency) - chalk ^4.1.2 (Dependency) - cheerio ^1.0.0-rc.12 (Dependency) - crypto-js ^4.2.0 (Dependency) - dotenv ^16.3.1 (Dependency) - file-type ^16.5.4 (Dependency) - fluent-ffmpeg ^2.1.2 (Dependency) - form-data ^4.0.0 (Dependency) - fs-extra ^11.2.0 (Dependency) - google-translate-api-x ^10.7.1 (Dependency) - google-tts-api ^2.0.2 (Dependency) - gtts ^0.2.1 (Dependency) - jimp ^1.6.1 (Dependency) - moment-timezone ^0.5.43 (Dependency) - mongoose ^8.0.0 (Dependency) - node-cache ^5.1.2 (Dependency) - node-cron ^3.0.3 (Dependency) - node-fetch ^2.7.0 (Dependency) - node-webpmux ^3.1.0 (Dependency) - nodemailer ^6.9.0 (Dependency) - pdfkit ^0.15.0 (Dependency) - pino ^8.16.0 (Dependency) - play-dl ^1.9.7 (Dependency) - qrcode ^1.5.3 (Dependency) - qrcode-terminal ^0.12.0 (Dependency) - sharp ^0.33.0 (Dependency) - xml2js ^0.6.2 (Dependency) - yt-search ^2.10.4 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @astralcore/aura-wb - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 1.0.23 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-08-09T13:46:50.034Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-08-06T02:34:29.396Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-08-11T04:43:33.816Z - **Known versions:** 20 - **Latest version:** 1.0.28 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** AURA — WhatsApp bot (npm/yarn package build) - **Author:** ASTRAL CORE - **Keywords:** whatsapp-bot, aura, astral-core, baileys - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=18.0.0 - **Artifact files:** 101 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 6,327,710 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]()