registry / @astralcore/aura-wb / 1.0.4

@astralcore/aura-wb@1.0.4

AURA — WhatsApp bot (npm/yarn package build)

AI Security Review

scanned 9d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

On normal CLI runtime, the package connects to its bundled external MongoDB and stores WhatsApp authentication material. It also has a fixed-recipient Telegram notification path for WhatsApp metadata and message previews.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

Run aura-wb and pair a WhatsApp account.

Impact

A package-controlled shared database can receive reusable WhatsApp credentials and signal keys; Telegram telemetry can disclose phone identifiers and message previews.

Mechanism

Off-device persistence and telemetry of WhatsApp session data.

Attack narrative

The CLI collects a phone number, then start.js connects using the bundled MongoDB configuration. Its Mongo auth-state adapter writes Baileys credentials and signal keys to that remote database on credential updates. Separately, reaction notifications construct a Telegram message containing sender phone information and a message preview for a fixed chat recipient when a management token is present.

Rationale

The hardcoded remote credential store is reached by the normal pairing path and persists sensitive WhatsApp authentication state without user-provided database configuration. This is concrete credential exfiltration, not a scanner-only inference.

Evidence

package.jsonbin/run.jsstart.jsconfig/index.jssrc/commands/index.jssrc/telegram/notify.js

Network endpoints2

unity-free.pc6vkvw.mongodb.net

The package is a WhatsApp (Baileys) bot whose default configuration in config/index.js points MONGODB_URI at a hardcoded shared Atlas cluster (mongodb+srv://unity-free:unity-free@unity-free.pc6vkvw.mongodb.net) with credentials embedded in the source. When an installer starts the bot without overriding MONGODB_URI, useMongoDBAuthState() in src/commands/index.js writes the full Baileys `creds` and signal `keys` — the noise key, signal identity key, registration, and session keys that grant complete control of the installer's WhatsApp account — to that author-controlled database. src/commands/boostWatcher.js opens on 'connection open' and polls the same shared MongoDB every 20 seconds for BoostJob documents, then drives followNewsletter, newsletterReactMessage, and readMessages against the installer's paired WhatsApp session for each job. Because the DB credentials are shared and hardcoded, anyone with the source (including the author) can read every installer's WhatsApp session material and enqueue jobs that command every installer's WhatsApp identity to follow, react to, or view arbitrary channels. Additional install-time and command paths in start.js, src/commands/boost.js, and src/telegram/notify.js post host information (os.platform, os.arch, process.env) to api.telegram.org/bot<redacted>/sendMessage using a hardcoded owner chat_id 7752365037, providing the author install-time notifications on every deployment. A Google Tenor API key is also embedded in src/commands/extra_media.js.

@astralcore/aura-wb@1.0.4

AI Security Review

OSV Corroboration

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Source & flagged code