registry / @aswless_854771076/ai_short_studio_cli / 0.1.63
@aswless_854771076/ai_short_studio_cli@0.1.63
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AI Security Review
scanned 11d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiStatic source inspection confirms an automatic postinstall that adds this package’s own bundled skills to the user’s Codex skills directory. This is a concrete agent extension lifecycle risk, but the inspected code does not establish an unconsented broad control hijack or another malicious attack.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
Installing the package through npm, unless the skip flag is set or the script detects a local package install.
Impact
The package adds its own skills to the user’s agent environment, enabling those instructions to be available in future agent sessions.
Mechanism
The hook copies bundled skill files into the Codex skills directory, while skipping current installations and avoiding unmanaged or modified targets without force.
AI rationale
Static source inspection confirms an automatic postinstall that adds this package’s own bundled skills to the user’s Codex skills directory. This is a concrete agent extension lifecycle risk, but the inspected code does not establish an unconsented broad control hijack or another malicious attack.
Evidence
package.jsonscripts/postinstall.mjsdist/skill/skill-manager.js
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 91.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- package.json runs scripts/postinstall.mjs during installation.
- The postinstall runs unless skipped by an environment flag or detected as a local package install, then installs bundled skills under the Codex skills directory by default.
- The skill manager targets ~/.codex/skills for Codex and copies bundled skill files into that location.
- The bundled CLI skill describes operation of this package’s own CLI and tells agents to ask before updating the skill.
- Google login uses a loopback callback and exchanges the returned authorization code with the authentication client.
- Bootstrap fetches configuration from a caller-provided base URL.
Evidence against
- The install hook does not configure an unrelated agent or grant broad control over another tool; it installs this package’s own bundled skills.
- The skill installation code skips already current skills and avoids replacing unmanaged or modified targets without force.
- Inspected authentication and bootstrap code show package-aligned login and service configuration flows, with no credential exfiltration identified.
Behavioral surface
Source & flagged code
6 flagged · loading sourcepackage.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkg•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs
Medium
Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgdist/skill/skill-manager.jsView file
1Install-time code directly mutates a foreign AI-agent control surface:
L12: export function defaultSkillsRoot(target) {
L13: return join(homedir(), target === 'codex' ? '.codex' : '.agents', 'skills');
L14: }
...
L41: const backup = `${target}.backup-${process.pid}`;
L42: await mkdir(dirname(target), { recursive: true });
L43: await rm(temporary, { recursive: true, force: true });
L44: await cp(bundledSkillPath(name), temporary, { recursive: true });
L45: await writeFile(join(temporary, MANIFEST), `${JSON.stringify({ packageVersion, checksum }, null, 2)}\n`, 'utf8');
Write operation from dist/skill/sk[redacted]:
L12: export function defaultSkillsRoot(target) {
L13: return join(homedir(), target === 'codex' ? '.codex' : '.agents', 'skills');
L14: }
...
L41: const backup = `${target}.backup-
Findings
1 Critical4 High4 Medium4 Low
CriticalAi Agent Control Hijackdist/skill/skill-manager.js
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
HighTrigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutationdist/skill/skill-manager.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/auth/google-oauth.js
HighPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/preflight.js
MediumAmbiguous Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @aswless_854771076/ai_short_studio_cli@0.1.63.
See all versions of @aswless_854771076/ai_short_studio_cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @aswless_854771076/ai_short_studio_cli@0.1.63 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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