@atlasauth/embed@0.10.0
AI Security Review
scanned 13d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe inspected bundle implements browser authentication flows and sends device and interaction telemetry to the frontend API supplied through embed configuration. I found no unrelated credential recipient, unrequested account mutation, or install-time behavior.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json declares no lifecycle scripts and depends on the Atlas design and client packages.
- The widget sends user-entered sign-up data and authentication-flow requests to its configured frontend API; the inspected callers cover sign-in, sign-up, recovery, passkey, and second-factor flows.
- Authentication telemetry contains device and interaction data and is sent to the configured frontend API. The API origin comes from embed configuration, and credentialed requests use that same configured base URL.
- The supporting source implements OAuth popup handling, user-triggered social sign-in, sign-out observation, MFA rendering, and design helpers.
Source & flagged code
7 flaggedBrowser source reuses an authenticated session to collect identity data and mutate account settings while reporting externally.
dist/embed.jsView on unpkg · L1The widget sends user-entered sign-up data and authentication-flow requests to its configured frontend API; the inspected callers cover sign-in, sign-up, recovery, passkey, and second-factor flows.
dist/embed.jsView on unpkg · L4Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @atlasauth/embed@0.10.0.
See all versions of @atlasauth/embed for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @atlasauth/embed@0.10.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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