@atlasauth/embed@0.11.0
AI Security Review
scanned 12d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe flagged credential and account-related code participates in widget-driven authentication, and the signup caller sends entered form data and policy acceptances to the client API. The reviewed manifest and runtime excerpts do not establish a malicious install hook, unrelated credential transfer, or unrequested account mutation.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest points to the package entrypoint, lists the two authentication dependencies, and has no install lifecycle script.
- Sign-up sends the supplied email, password, and consent data to the client sign-up route; its helper and caller pass through user form values and policy acceptances.
- The widget gates sign-up on policy consent and renders policy acceptance as a user-facing step; other inspected flows handle MFA, CAPTCHA, sign-in, recovery, and SSO.
- The inspected dependency code exports UI helpers, provides popup OAuth result relaying, and watches for sign-out messages from another tab.
Source & flagged code
7 flaggedBrowser source reuses an authenticated session to collect identity data and mutate account settings while reporting externally.
dist/embed.jsView on unpkg · L1Sign-up sends the supplied email, password, and consent data to the client sign-up route; its helper and caller pass through user form values and policy acceptances.
dist/embed.jsView on unpkg · L7Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @atlasauth/embed@0.11.0.
See all versions of @atlasauth/embed for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @atlasauth/embed@0.11.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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