@atlasauth/embed@0.13.0
AI Security Review
scanned 11d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe manifest has no install hook, and the reviewed runtime calls are part of user-directed authentication and policy flows. Telemetry uses the caller-configured frontend API, and the inspected source did not establish an unrelated credential transfer or account action.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest points to the module entry and lists only build, typecheck, and test scripts; it has no install lifecycle hook.
- The inspected runtime paths support the sign-in widget: requests handle user-submitted authentication, policy acceptance, SSO, recovery, and passkey flows.
- After authentication, the widget sends device and interaction summaries to the configured frontend API; the destination comes from caller configuration.
- The inspected dependencies list build, typecheck, and test scripts without install hooks; their reviewed entrypoints provide rendering and authentication helpers.
Source & flagged code
7 flaggedBrowser source reuses an authenticated session to collect identity data and mutate account settings while reporting externally.
dist/embed.jsView on unpkg · L1The inspected runtime paths support the sign-in widget: requests handle user-submitted authentication, policy acceptance, SSO, recovery, and passkey flows.
dist/embed.jsView on unpkg · L7Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @atlasauth/embed@0.13.0.
See all versions of @atlasauth/embed for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @atlasauth/embed@0.13.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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