@atlasauth/embed@0.2.1
AI Security Review
scanned 21d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection found no malicious behavior. Authentication submissions go through the configured frontend API, and the bundled telemetry is consistent with device and bot-detection reporting.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest points to the widget module and declares only build, typecheck, and test scripts; it has no install lifecycle hook.
- The inspected authentication callers submit form, social-provider, reset, and passkey data through the widget’s configured frontend API.
- The bundled recorder gathers device details and aggregate interaction metrics, then sends telemetry to the configured frontend API; the inspected telemetry payload does not include form values.
Source & flagged code
8 flaggedBrowser source reuses an authenticated session to collect identity data and mutate account settings while reporting externally.
dist/embed.jsView on unpkg · L1A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.
dist/widget/social.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @atlasauth/embed@0.2.1.
See all versions of @atlasauth/embed for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @atlasauth/embed@0.2.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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