registry / @atlasauth/embed / 0.4.0
@atlasauth/embed@0.4.0
AI Security Review
scanned 20d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe scanner’s account-hijack hint is not supported by the inspected behavior: authentication uses the configured client API, and the reporting code sends telemetry to that same configured API. The manifest has no install hook, and no concrete attack behavior was identified.
Static reason
No blocking static signals were detected.
Trigger
The widget sends telemetry during sign-in, sign-up, and social sign-in flows.
Impact
The inspected source does not establish disclosure to an unrelated recipient or account-setting changes.
Mechanism
The bundle collects device and interaction signals and posts them to the configured API’s client telemetry route.
AI rationale
The scanner’s account-hijack hint is not supported by the inspected behavior: authentication uses the configured client API, and the reporting code sends telemetry to that same configured API. The manifest has no install hook, and no concrete attack behavior was identified.
Network endpoints3
/v1/client/telemetry/v1/client/sign_ins/passkey/begin/v1/client/sign_ins/passkey/finish
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 93.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- package.json points to the widget module and defines no install lifecycle hook.
- The widget client uses the configured frontend API for authentication requests; sign-in, reset, social, and passkey flows submit through that client.
- Passkey assertions are obtained through WebAuthn and sent to the client passkey finish route; passkey sign-in is offered through the widget UI.
- The standalone bundle sends device and interaction telemetry to the configured frontend API’s client telemetry route; sign-in and sign-up flows invoke it as best-effort telemetry.
Evidence against
Behavioral surface
HighEntropyStringsPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
8 flaggeddist/embed.jsView file
1"use strict";(()=>{var Lo=Object.create;var tt=Object.defineProperty;var Fo=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var Mo=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var No=Object.getPrototypeOf,Uo=Object...
L2: .atlas-embed-root {
...
L370: @keyframes atlas-embed-pulse { 0%,100% { opacity: 0.4; } 50% { opacity: 1; } }
L371: `;function to(e=document){var n;if(e.querySelector(`style[data-${eo}]`))return;let t=e.createElement("style");t.setAttribute(`data-${eo}`,""),t.textContent=jr,((n=e.head)!=null?n:e...
High
Browser Session Account Hijack
Browser source reuses an authenticated session to collect identity data and mutate account settings while reporting externally.
dist/embed.jsView on unpkg · L1dist/widget/social.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file
•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 1
High
Semantic Analysis Limited
A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.
dist/widget/social.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkgFindings
2 High10 Low
HighBrowser Session Account Hijackdist/embed.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/widget/social.js#virtual:normalized:round1
LowScripts Present
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
LowSuspicious Lifecycle Evidencepackage.json
LowSuspicious Lifecycle Evidencepackage.json
LowAi Review Evidencedist/client.js
LowAi Review Evidencedist/standalone.js
LowAi Review Evidencedist/widget.js
LowAi Review Evidencedist/widget/passkey.js
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @atlasauth/embed@0.4.0.
See all versions of @atlasauth/embed for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @atlasauth/embed@0.4.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.