registry / @atlasauth/embed / 0.5.0
@atlasauth/embed@0.5.0
AI Security Review
scanned 20d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe manifest has no install hook, and the inspected runtime callers connect authentication requests to widget flows and user actions. Telemetry uses the configured frontend API and contains device and interaction measurements; no concrete attack behavior was established.
Static reason
No blocking static signals were detected.
Trigger
The widget starts or submits an authentication flow, or the user selects a passkey, social provider, or sign-up action.
Impact
No unrelated credential transfer, account mutation, or install-time behavior was established.
Mechanism
The runtime uses its configured frontend API for authentication and telemetry requests; the inspected telemetry payload contains a recorder snapshot rather than submitted field values.
AI rationale
The manifest has no install hook, and the inspected runtime callers connect authentication requests to widget flows and user actions. Telemetry uses the configured frontend API and contains device and interaction measurements; no concrete attack behavior was established.
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 92.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- package.json points to the module entry and contains no install lifecycle hook.
- Authentication and sign-up flows send telemetry using the widget's configured frontend API and publishable key.
- The telemetry payload contains device metadata and a behavior recorder snapshot; the inspected recorder comment says it captures counts and timings, not field content.
- The inspected flagged callers connect passkey, form, OAuth, SSO, reset, and sign-up paths to user actions or authentication flow handling.
Evidence against
Behavioral surface
HighEntropyStringsPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
8 flaggeddist/embed.jsView file
1"use strict";(()=>{var Nr=Object.create;var tt=Object.defineProperty;var Ur=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var Br=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var Wr=Object.getPrototypeOf,Hr=Object...
L2: .atlas-embed-root {
...
L370: @keyframes atlas-embed-pulse { 0%,100% { opacity: 0.4; } 50% { opacity: 1; } }
L371: `;function sr(e=document){var n;if(e.querySelector(`style[data-${or}]`))return;let t=e.createElement("style");t.setAttribute(`data-${or}`,""),t.textContent=Qo,((n=e.head)!=null?n:e...
High
Browser Session Account Hijack
Browser source reuses an authenticated session to collect identity data and mutate account settings while reporting externally.
dist/embed.jsView on unpkg · L1dist/widget/social.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file
•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 1
High
Semantic Analysis Limited
A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.
dist/widget/social.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkgFindings
2 High10 Low
HighBrowser Session Account Hijackdist/embed.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/widget/social.js#virtual:normalized:round1
LowScripts Present
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
LowSuspicious Lifecycle Evidencepackage.json
LowSuspicious Lifecycle Evidencepackage.json
LowAi Review Evidencedist/widget/passkey.js
LowAi Review Evidencedist/widget/passkey.js
LowAi Review Evidencedist/widget/social.js
LowAi Review Evidencedist/widget/render.js
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @atlasauth/embed@0.5.0.
See all versions of @atlasauth/embed for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @atlasauth/embed@0.5.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.