@atlasauth/embed@0.5.1
AI Security Review
scanned 19d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe manifest has no install lifecycle hook, and runtime requests use the explicitly configured frontend API for authentication and recovery. Social login is user-initiated, and the inspected source shows no unrelated credential transfer or account mutation.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json points to the module entry and lists build, typecheck, and test scripts; it has no install lifecycle hook.
- The bundle sends API requests through its configured frontend API with the publishable key and included credentials; callers supply that API through widget configuration.
- The targeted callers handle sign-in, sign-up, recovery, verification, provider authentication, passkeys, and rendering through authentication state or UI flows.
- Social authentication starts from provider button interactions.
- Authentication submission sends device and interaction telemetry to the configured frontend API; the source shows device identifiers and browser characteristics.
Source & flagged code
8 flaggedBrowser source reuses an authenticated session to collect identity data and mutate account settings while reporting externally.
dist/embed.jsView on unpkg · L1The bundle sends API requests through its configured frontend API with the publishable key and included credentials; callers supply that API through widget configuration.
dist/embed.jsView on unpkg · L1Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @atlasauth/embed@0.5.1.
See all versions of @atlasauth/embed for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @atlasauth/embed@0.5.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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