@atlasauth/embed@0.5.2
AI Security Review
scanned 19d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe manifest has no install lifecycle hook, and the inspected runtime calls match the package’s authentication widget behavior. The credential-related caller locations resolve to authentication flows using configured API values; no concrete attack behavior was found.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json points to dist/index.js and defines build, typecheck, and test scripts, with no install lifecycle hook; dist/index.js exports the widget API.
- dist/embed.js sends authentication requests through the configured frontend API, and configuration requires a publishable key and frontend API value.
- The reviewed runtime locations implement sign-in, sign-up, recovery, reset, provider authentication, and session completion flows.
- The passkey button starts authentication from a user click.
Source & flagged code
8 flaggedBrowser source reuses an authenticated session to collect identity data and mutate account settings while reporting externally.
dist/embed.jsView on unpkg · L1dist/embed.js sends authentication requests through the configured frontend API, and configuration requires a publishable key and frontend API value.
dist/embed.jsView on unpkg · L1Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @atlasauth/embed@0.5.2.
See all versions of @atlasauth/embed for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @atlasauth/embed@0.5.2 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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