@atlasauth/embed@0.6.0
AI Security Review
scanned 16d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe flagged credential references are part of the widget’s authentication and recovery flows, and the shared client targets the configured frontend API. The manifest has no install hook, and the inspected runtime behavior establishes no unrelated recipient or account action.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json declares only build, typecheck, and test scripts; no install lifecycle hook is present.
- The shared HTTP client sends requests to its configured frontend API and includes browser credentials, consistent with the widget’s authentication role.
- Flagged bundle locations are in signup, sign-in, recovery, OAuth, passkey, and form handling paths; they show no unrelated credential recipient.
- The social sign-in starts on a button click, and the message listener accepts only a matching Atlas OAuth acknowledgment.
Source & flagged code
7 flaggedBrowser source reuses an authenticated session to collect identity data and mutate account settings while reporting externally.
dist/embed.jsView on unpkg · L1Flagged bundle locations are in signup, sign-in, recovery, OAuth, passkey, and form handling paths; they show no unrelated credential recipient.
dist/embed.jsView on unpkg · L1Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @atlasauth/embed@0.6.0.
See all versions of @atlasauth/embed for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @atlasauth/embed@0.6.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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