@atlasauth/embed@0.7.0
AI Security Review
scanned 14d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe credential transport and its widget callers support ordinary, user-triggered authentication through the configured client, while the inspected manifests show no install hooks. The flagged runtime behavior did not establish an unrelated recipient or unrequested account action.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The package and inspected runtime dependency manifests contain no install lifecycle hooks; their scripts are build, typecheck, and test tasks.
- The sign-up transport sends submitted email and password to the client sign-up API, and the widget caller supplies entered values.
- Inspected widget call sites initiate sign-in, sign-up, password-reset, passkey, and social-auth flows through client APIs or user-submitted forms.
- The inspected dependency code handles sign-out state, OAuth popup messaging, captcha flow, design exports, and UI rendering.
Source & flagged code
7 flaggedBrowser source reuses an authenticated session to collect identity data and mutate account settings while reporting externally.
dist/embed.jsView on unpkg · L1The sign-up transport sends submitted email and password to the client sign-up API, and the widget caller supplies entered values.
dist/embed.jsView on unpkg · L1Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @atlasauth/embed@0.7.0.
See all versions of @atlasauth/embed for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @atlasauth/embed@0.7.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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