--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@atlashub/smartstack-cli/v/5.14.0" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@atlashub/smartstack-cli/v/5.14.0.md" package: "@atlashub/smartstack-cli" report_status: "published" title: "@atlashub/smartstack-cli@5.14.0 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "5.14.0" --- # @atlashub/smartstack-cli@5.14.0 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged as agent extension risk** — Allowed by default with warning: install-time first-party agent extension setup was detected. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Warn-only agent extension risk - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Agent extension lifecycle risk - **Selected version:** 5.14.0 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. No concrete malicious chain was found: postinstall only prints guidance and the credentialed network request is to Anthropic. The explicit installer still creates a recurring agent extension that accesses OAuth credentials, so warn under the extension lifecycle policy. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 88.0% - **Started:** 2026-08-26T06:16:54.022Z - **Finished:** 2026-08-26T06:18:14.138Z - **Download time:** 1269 ms - **Static scan time:** 12329 ms - **AI review time:** 66518 ms - **Total time:** 80116 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** The explicit \`ss install\` flow deploys a Claude Code status-line extension. Its detached refresher reads Claude OAuth credentials and queries the official Anthropic usage API for quota data. - **Trigger:** User runs \`ss install\`; then Claude Code invokes the configured status-line command. - **Impact:** A local OAuth token is disclosed to api.anthropic.com for an authenticated usage request; it is not sent to an unrelated host. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, scripts/postinstall.js, dist/index.js, templates/scripts/statusline/index.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-08-26T06:18:14.138Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** First-party Claude status-line setup with OAuth usage polling. - **Rationale:** No concrete malicious chain was found: postinstall only prints guidance and the credentialed network request is to Anthropic. The explicit installer still creates a recurring agent extension that accesses OAuth credentials, so warn under the extension lifecycle policy. - **Files touched:** ~/.claude/.credentials.json, ~/.claude/settings.json, ~/.claude/scripts/statusline/index.js, ~/.claude/cache/smartstack-usage.json - **Network endpoints:** https://api.anthropic.com/api/oauth/usage ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 88.0% - **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn - **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for warning:** Status-line template reads Claude OAuth credentials., It sends that bearer token to Anthropic's usage endpoint., User-invoked install configures a recurring Claude status-line command. - **Evidence against:** postinstall only prints Windows PATH guidance., The network host is api.anthropic.com, not a third-party gateway., Installer preserves a foreign status line unless forced. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @atlashub/smartstack-cli@5.14.0. - Review the evidence and your use of @atlashub/smartstack-cli@5.14.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js || exit 0 ``` ### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js || exit 0 ``` ### 3. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs. ### 4. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 5. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L970: var EventEmitter2 = require("events").EventEmitter; L971: var childProcess = require("child_process"); L972: var path3 = require("path"); ``` ### 6. High: Shell - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** templates/skills/uat/cli/uat-run/execute.ts - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references shell execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```typescript L166: const boot = spawnSync('ss', ['dev', 'up', '--json'], { L167: shell: true, L168: encoding: 'utf-8', ``` ### 7. Medium: Dynamic Require - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic require/import behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L8: var __hasOwnProp = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty; L9: var __commonJS = (cb, mod) => function __require() { L10: return mod || (0, cb[__getOwnPropNames(cb)[0]])((mod = { exports: {} }).exports, mod), mod.exports; ``` ### 8. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 9. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 10. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 11. High: Same File Env Network Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** templates/scripts/statusline/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L34: const os = require('os'); L35: const https = require('https'); L36: L37: // ---- ANSI (honors NO_COLOR) ------------------------------------------------ L38: const NO_COLOR = !!process.env.NO_COLOR; L39: const paint = (code, s) => (NO_COLOR ? String(s) : `\x1b[${code}m${s}\x1b[0m`); ... L45: const red = (s) => paint('31', s); L46: // 256-color palette for the L1 gauges (matches the previous PowerShell line). L47: const green2 = (s) => paint('38;5;46', s); ``` ### 12. Critical: Credential Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L39: * Constructs the CommanderError class L40: * @param {number} exitCode suggested exit code which could be used with process.exit L41: * @param {string} code an id string representing the error ... L970: var EventEmitter2 = require("events").EventEmitter; L971: var childProcess = require("child_process"); L972: var path3 = require("path"); ... L1019: this._outputConfiguration = { L1020: writeOut: (str) => process11.stdout.write(str), L1021: writeErr: (str) => process11.stderr.write(str), ... L1055: * @returns {Command[]} L1056: * @private L1057: */ ``` ### 13. High: Credential Redirect Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/index.js: var fs$writeFile = fs17.writeFile; fs17.writeFile = writeFile; function writeFile(path3, data, options, cb) { return go$writeFile(path3, data, options, cb); function go$writeFile(path4, data2, options2, cb2, startTime) { return fs$writeFile(path4, data2, options2, function(err) { enqueue([go$writeFile, [path4, data2, options2, cb2], err, startTime || Date.now(), Date.now()]); "writeFile" ``` ### 14. High: Entrypoint Foreign Package Code Overwrite - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Manifest-reachable source overwrites another installed package with package-defined remote behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Manifest-reachable source resolves another installed package, overwrites its runtime code, and injects package-defined remote behavior. dist/index.js: // node_modules/commander/lib/error.js "node_modules/commander/lib/error.js"(exports2) { // node_modules/commander/lib/argument.js "node_modules/commander/lib/argument.js"(exports2) { // node_modules/commander/lib/help.js "node_modules/commander/lib/help.js"(exports2) { // node_modules/commander/lib/option.js "node_modules/commander/lib/option.js"(exports2) { ``` ### 15. High: Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 82.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L39: * Constructs the CommanderError class L40: * @param {number} exitCode suggested exit code which could be used with process.exit L41: * @param {string} code an id string representing the error ... L970: var EventEmitter2 = require("events").EventEmitter; L971: var childProcess = require("child_process"); L972: var path3 = require("path"); ... L1019: this._outputConfiguration = { L1020: writeOut: (str) => process11.stdout.write(str), L1021: writeErr: (str) => process11.stderr.write(str), ... L1055: * @returns {Command[]} L1056: * @private L1057: */ ``` ### 16. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> dist/index.js L39: * Constructs the CommanderError class L40: * @param {number} exitCode suggested exit code which could be used with process.exit L41: * @param {string} code an id string representing the error ... L970: var EventEmitter2 = require("events").EventEmitter; L971: var childProcess = require("child_process"); L972: var path3 = require("path"); ... L1019: this._outputConfiguration = { L1020: writeOut: (str) => process11.stdout.write(str), L1021: writeErr: (str) => process11.stderr.write(str), ... L1055: * @returns {Command[]} L1056: * @private L1057: */ ``` ### 17. High: Trigger Reachable Credential Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches credential exfiltration behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable credential exfiltration chain: manifest.main -> dist/index.js L39: * Constructs the CommanderError class L40: * @param {number} exitCode suggested exit code which could be used with process.exit L41: * @param {string} code an id string representing the error ... L970: var EventEmitter2 = require("events").EventEmitter; L971: var childProcess = require("child_process"); L972: var path3 = require("path"); ... L1019: this._outputConfiguration = { L1020: writeOut: (str) => process11.stdout.write(str), L1021: writeErr: (str) => process11.stderr.write(str), ... L1055: * @returns {Command[]} L1056: * @private L1057: */ ``` ### 18. High: Runtime Package Install - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 86.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L39459: try { L39460: const res = (0, import_child_process.spawnSync)("npm install --no-audit --no-fund --loglevel=error", { L39461: cwd: skillsDir, ``` ### 19. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 20. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 21. Medium: Ships Build Helper - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** scripts/health-check.sh - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```shell path = scripts/health-check.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 4542 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 22. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 23. High: Semantic Analysis Limited - **Category:** Scanner Coverage - **Confidence:** 100.0% - **Path:** templates/skills/development/testing/ui-test/cli/build-manifest/index.ts - **Public source:** [View source]() A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```typescript stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 3 ``` ### 24. Critical: Previous Version Dangerous Delta - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 93.0% - **Path:** templates/scripts/statusline/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @atlashub/smartstack-cli@5.10.0 matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:5.10.0 similarity = 0.708 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall, prepublishOnly - **Dependencies:** 11 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 12 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 11 ### Published dependency entries - axios ^1.7.0 (Dependency) - chalk ^5.3.0 (Dependency) - cli-table3 ^0.6.3 (Dependency) - commander ^12.0.0 (Dependency) - fs-extra ^11.2.0 (Dependency) - glob ^13.0.1 (Dependency) - handlebars ^4.7.8 (Dependency) - inquirer ^9.2.12 (Dependency) - jsonwebtoken ^9.0.3 (Dependency) - ora ^8.0.1 (Dependency) - zod ^3.25.0 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @atlashub/smartstack-cli - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 5.14.0 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-08-26T06:02:16.701Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-02T16:54:49.577Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-10-29T09:10:04.017Z - **Known versions:** 15 - **Latest version:** 5.26.1 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** SmartStack Claude Code automation toolkit - GitFlow, EF Core migrations, prompts and more - **Author:** SmartStack - **Maintainers:** atashub - **Keywords:** smartstack, claude, claude-code, gitflow, efcore, entity-framework, migrations, cli, automation, anthropic, dotnet, prompts - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=18.0.0 - **Artifact files:** 1087 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 15,947,645 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]()