@aui.io/apollo@0.1.86
Apollo CLI — author, test and operate Apollo-1 agents from your terminal (scriptable CLI + interactive TUI)
AI Security Review
scanned 14d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe default postinstall can modify user shell startup files and create a persistent hook, so a warning is warranted. The inspected changes are limited to Apollo shell integration and do not establish a concrete malicious chain.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The package postinstall automatically runs shell setup.
- Shell setup appends an Apollo shell-init eval line to existing zsh/bash startup files, unless CI or APOLLO_NO_SHELL_SETUP=1 is set.
- The startup hook runs the Apollo shell integration in future shells; this creates persistence, though it is limited to shell startup files and is described as auto-cd integration.
- The other postinstall helper only repairs missing OpenTUI dependencies, using package-declared dependency versions.
- Inspected identity client calls send OTP and login requests through its HTTP client; no unrelated recipient is shown.
- The flagged IDE launcher starts the selected editor for the checkout directory.
Source & flagged code
11 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references dynamic require/import behavior.
bin/apollo.jsView on unpkg · L10Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @aui.io/apollo@0.1.86.
See all versions of @aui.io/apollo for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @aui.io/apollo@0.1.86 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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