Installation details are disclosed to an external analytics collector without affirmative installer consent.
What to do: remove this version and, if it ran, rotate the credentials it could reach. Remediation↓
AI security review
scanned · by lpm-firewall-ai
Source inspection confirms an automatic postinstall telemetry path to scarf.sh with an opt-out-only default and installation metadata in the request. This is an unconsented installation disclosure, so the package should be blocked.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
Installing the package with npm, which triggers the @scarf/scarf postinstall hook.
Mechanism
The hook runs report.js, assembles platform, architecture, Node version, and dependency information, and sends it in an HTTP request to scarf.sh.
Attack narrative
Installing the package triggers @scarf/scarf's postinstall reporter. The package enables top-level reporting, and the reporter defaults its parent package to opt-in; absent an explicit opt-out, it sends installation metadata to scarf.sh. The payload includes platform, architecture, Node version, and dependency information. The reporter's notice describes the tracking but does not require affirmative consent on this default branch.
The package directly depends on @scarf/scarf and sets allowTopLevel to true.
@scarf/scarf runs report.js from its postinstall hook.
The reporter defaults its parent package to defaultOptIn true; that branch proceeds unless the root package opted out, without requiring affirmative consent.
The reporter builds installation data containing platform, architecture, Node version, and dependency information, then posts it to the default scarf.sh endpoint.
When report.js runs as its main module, it calls reportPostInstall().
Evidence against
The reporter supports opt-outs and removes some package names, versions, and paths before sending its payload.
Avoid installing @aviaviavi/org2@0.5.2. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.