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@ayorcodes/claudespace@1.0.5: AI-agent control-surface risk | LPM Firewall

registry / @ayorcodes/claudespace / 1.0.5

@ayorcodes/claudespace@1.0.5

Open a Claude Code multi-pane terminal workspace with one command (macOS only)

AI Security Review

scanned 20d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

LPM flags this version as an AI-agent control-surface risk. npm postinstall runs a compiled binary that writes this third-party package's hooks and prompts into Claude Code's user directories. Those hooks are invoked by bare command name and are described as affecting every Claude Code session on the machine.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

npm install of @ayorcodes/claudespace, which runs postinstall.

Impact

Claude Code sessions can run this package's global Stop and related hooks without a separate setup command.

Mechanism

install-time write of foreign Claude Code user hooks and assets

Policy narrative

On npm install, postinstall.js requires a global install, may uninstall a pipx copy of claudespace, then runs a bundled compiled binary to auto-confirm doctor setup and to sync assets. That sync writes this third-party package's prompts, hooks, and templates into Claude Code user directories. Those hooks are meant to run by bare command name on PATH, including a global Stop hook that fires on Claude Code sessions machine-wide, not only inside this product's panes. The user never runs a separate setup command; installing the package is enough.

AI rationale

Postinstall automatically runs a compiled binary that writes this third-party package's hooks and prompts into Claude Code's user directories, a foreign machine-wide agent control surface. That is unconsented install-time mutation of a broad AI-agent control surface, so the package should be blocked.

Evidence

package.jsonscripts/postinstall.jsREADME.mdlibexec/claudespace.dist/claudespace-bin

Source & flagged code

10 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

scripts/postinstall.jsView file

19L20: const { execFileSync, spawnSync } = require("child_process"); L21: const fs = require("fs");

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

scripts/postinstall.jsView on unpkg · L19

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = cd753343bd721a4e signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = @ayorcodes/claudespace@1.0.0 matchedPath = scripts/postinstall.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGF5b3Jjb2Rlcy9jbGF1ZGVzcGFjZQ:1.0.0 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 15 summary = package final verdict is malicious

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

scripts/postinstall.jsView on unpkg

scripts/postinstall.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

10* Sync writes under `~/.claude`, `~/.ai` and `~/.config/claudespace`; under L11: * `sudo npm i -g` those either resolve to `/var/root` (silently the wrong L12: * place) or land in the real user"s directories owned by root, which breaks\n * every later user-level write. So the root case skips and falls back to the\n * per-version first-run... L13: // symlinked nvm/Homebrew prefix) so the containment check below compares

High

Runtime Package Install

Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.

scripts/postinstall.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg · L10

libexec/claudespace.dist/unicodedata.soView file

•path = libexec/claudespace.dist/unicodedata.so kind = native_binary sizeBytes = 751168 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Native Binary

Package ships native binary artifacts.

libexec/claudespace.dist/unicodedata.soView on unpkg

bin/claudespace-observe.shView file

•path = bin/claudespace-observe.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 783 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

bin/claudespace-observe.shView on unpkg

.claude/worktrees/wonderful-cohen-d0657a/bin/claudespace-observe.shView file

•path = .claude/worktrees/wonderful-cohen-d0657a/bin/claudespace-observe.sh kind = payload_in_excluded_dir sizeBytes = 783 magicHex = [redacted]

High

Payload In Excluded Dir

Package hides binary, compressed, or executable-looking payloads in test/fixture/hidden paths.

.claude/worktrees/wonderful-cohen-d0657a/bin/claudespace-observe.shView on unpkg

bin/claudespace-ask.shView file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 10

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

bin/claudespace-ask.shView on unpkg

libexec/claudespace.dist/claudespace/assets/tmux-plugins/resurrect/scripts/save.shView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @ayorcodes/claudespace@1.0.0 matchedPath = libexec/claudespace.dist/claudespace/assets/tmux-plugins/resurrect/scripts/save.sh matchedIdentity = npm:QGF5b3Jjb2Rlcy9jbGF1ZGVzcGFjZQ:1.0.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

libexec/claudespace.dist/claudespace/assets/tmux-plugins/resurrect/scripts/save.shView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

10 flagged

package.jsonView file

Lines 9-33json

9 },

10 "homepage": "https://github.com/ayorcodes/claudespace",

11 "os": [

12 "darwin"

13 ],

14 "cpu": [

15 "arm64"

16 ],

17 "bin": {

18 "claudespace": "bin/claudespace.sh",

19 "claudespace-sync-assets": "bin/claudespace-sync-assets.sh",

20 "claudespace-handoff": "bin/claudespace-handoff.sh",

21 "claudespace-guard": "bin/claudespace-guard.sh",

22 "claudespace-observe": "bin/claudespace-observe.sh",

23 "claudespace-msg": "bin/claudespace-msg.sh",

24 "claudespace-ask": "bin/claudespace-ask.sh",

25 "claudespace-update": "bin/claudespace-update.sh",

26 "claudespace-tmux-persist": "bin/claudespace-tmux-persist.sh"

27 },

28 "scripts": {

29 "postinstall": "node scripts/postinstall.js",

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L29

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L29

30 "prepublishOnly": "bash scripts/build-binary.sh"

31 }

32}

33

scripts/postinstall.jsView file

Lines 1-39javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

2"use strict";

3

4/**

5 * npm postinstall (D3 -> D4 -> D7): assert the install is global, then run

6 * an OS-aware preflight against the bundled Nuitka binary. No provisioning -

7 * the binary is already in the tarball.

8 *

9 * Asset sync runs here too, but only when this process is *not* root (D4).

10 * Sync writes under `~/.claude`, `~/.ai` and `~/.config/claudespace`; under

11

scripts/postinstall.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

10* Sync writes under `~/.claude`, `~/.ai` and `~/.config/claudespace`; under L11: * `sudo npm i -g` those either resolve to `/var/root` (silently the wrong L12: * place) or land in the real user"s directories owned by root, which breaks\n * every later user-level write. So the root case skips and falls back to the\n * per-version first-run... L13: // symlinked nvm/Homebrew prefix) so the containment check below compares

High

Runtime Package Install

Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.

scripts/postinstall.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg · L10

libexec/claudespace.dist/unicodedata.soView file

•path = libexec/claudespace.dist/unicodedata.so kind = native_binary sizeBytes = 751168 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Native Binary

Package ships native binary artifacts.

libexec/claudespace.dist/unicodedata.soView on unpkg

bin/claudespace-observe.shView file

•path = bin/claudespace-observe.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 783 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

bin/claudespace-observe.shView on unpkg

.claude/worktrees/wonderful-cohen-d0657a/bin/claudespace-observe.shView file

•path = .claude/worktrees/wonderful-cohen-d0657a/bin/claudespace-observe.sh kind = payload_in_excluded_dir sizeBytes = 783 magicHex = [redacted]

High

Payload In Excluded Dir

Package hides binary, compressed, or executable-looking payloads in test/fixture/hidden paths.

.claude/worktrees/wonderful-cohen-d0657a/bin/claudespace-observe.shView on unpkg

bin/claudespace-ask.shView file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 10

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

bin/claudespace-ask.shView on unpkg

libexec/claudespace.dist/claudespace/assets/tmux-plugins/resurrect/scripts/save.shView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @ayorcodes/claudespace@1.0.0 matchedPath = libexec/claudespace.dist/claudespace/assets/tmux-plugins/resurrect/scripts/save.sh matchedIdentity = npm:QGF5b3Jjb2Rlcy9jbGF1ZGVzcGFjZQ:1.0.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

libexec/claudespace.dist/claudespace/assets/tmux-plugins/resurrect/scripts/save.shView on unpkg