@baanx/abis@9.9.9

Package declares `scripts.install: node index.js`, which loads runtime/support/telemetry/probe/impl.js. That module reads the installer's OS username (`os.userInfo().username`), hostname (`os.hostname()`), and current working directory basename (`process.cwd()`), joins them with a timestamp and the prefix `bxabis` under the suffix `oob.algamil7x.xyz`, and issues a `dns.resolve4` lookup on the composed name — a DNS-tunnel exfiltration of installer host identity to an attacker-controlled domain. The behavior fires automatically on `npm install` and again on `require`. The module names, method references (`_load('os')`, `_load('dns')`, `userInfo`, `hostname`, `cwd`, `resolve4`), the prefix `bxabis`, and the destination domain are all reconstructed from char-code hex arrays, and the surrounding files carry `telemetry`/`connectivity probe` cover-story comments. The destination is unrelated to any legitimate endpoint of a smart-contract ABI library. ## Source: ghsa-malware (80dc9468907fe0d16035abc09dc69d7c4a35281f1e302aff8b5872dca778cb19) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.