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@babylonjs-toolkit/agent@1.1.51: AI-agent control-surface risk | LPM Firewall

registry / @babylonjs-toolkit/agent / 1.1.51

@babylonjs-toolkit/agent@1.1.51

Installs the Babylon Toolkit Desktop Agent for Claude Code, Codex, GitHub Copilot, Gemini CLI and Antigravity.

AI Security Review

scanned 2d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

LPM flags this version as an AI-agent control-surface risk. Global npm installation automatically changes foreign AI-agent instructions and Codex network permissions without a consent prompt.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

Global npm installation with lifecycle scripts enabled.

Impact

Subsequent agent sessions inherit package-supplied instructions and expanded network permissions.

Mechanism

The postinstall hook invokes the global installer, which writes default agent instruction files and enables Codex network access.

Policy narrative

During global installation, npm runs the postinstall hook. It invokes the installer without requesting consent, modifying shared instruction files for multiple AI agents and enabling network access in Codex configuration. The installed persona directs future agents to fetch a remote reference and adopt it as authoritative guidance. The local-install guard and backups limit exposure but do not authorize these global control changes.

AI rationale

Inspected source establishes unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign, broad AI-agent control surfaces, meeting the blocking policy. The verdict rests on the executable installation chain rather than scanner similarity labels.

Evidence

package.jsonscripts/postinstall.jslib/targets.jslib/install.jslib/codex-config.jslib/persona.jspersona.md~/.agents/AGENTS.md

Source & flagged code

15 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

lib/bridge/service.jsView file

17Trigger-reachable persistence chain: scripts.postinstall -> scripts/postinstall.js -> lib/doctor.js -> lib/bridge/service.js L17: const path = require('path'); L18: const { spawnSync, spawn: nodeSpawn } = require('child_process'); L19: ... L25: /** What the service copy carries — the package minus the skills payload the bridge never reads. */ L26: const PACKAGE_PARTS = ['package.json', 'bin', 'lib']; L27: const BOOTSTRAP_ATTEMPTS = 5; ... L29: /** L30: * @typedef {{ code: number|null, stdout: string, stderr: string }} ExecResult L31: * @typedef {(file: string, args: string[]) => ExecResult} ServiceExec ... L276: fs.writeFileSync(registration, launchdPlist({ argv, path: pathEnv, home: deps.home, logFile: paths.logFile }), { mode: 0o644 }); L277: exec('launchctl', ['bootout', `gui/${uid}/${

High

Trigger Reachable Persistence

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

lib/bridge/service.jsView on unpkg · L17

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @babylonjs-toolkit/agent@1.1.48 matchedPath = lib/bridge/service.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:1.1.48 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

lib/bridge/service.jsView on unpkg

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = 9e764c0eb6cdbb14 signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = @babylonjs-toolkit/agent@1.1.48 matchedPath = lib/bridge/service.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:1.1.48 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 35 summary = package final verdict is malicious

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

lib/bridge/service.jsView on unpkg

17const path = require('path'); L18: const { spawnSync, spawn: nodeSpawn } = require('child_process'); L19: ... L25: /** What the service copy carries — the package minus the skills payload the bridge never reads. */ L26: const PACKAGE_PARTS = ['package.json', 'bin', 'lib']; L27: const BOOTSTRAP_ATTEMPTS = 5; ... L29: /** L30: * @typedef {{ code: number|null, stdout: string, stderr: string }} ExecResult L31: * @typedef {(file: string, args: string[]) => ExecResult} ServiceExec ... L276: fs.writeFileSync(registration, launchdPlist({ argv, path: pathEnv, home: deps.home, logFile: paths.logFile }), { mode: 0o644 }); L277: exec('launchctl', ['bootout', `gui/${uid}/${LAUNCHD_LABEL}`]); // not loaded yet is fine L278: // `bootout` returns before launchd has finished tearing the old instance

Medium

Install Persistence

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

lib/bridge/service.jsView on unpkg · L17

lib/targets.jsView file

1Install-time code directly mutates a foreign AI-agent control surface: L20: default: true, L21: global: { skills: '~/.claude/skills', instructions: '~/.claude/CLAUDE.md' }, L22: project: { skills: '.claude/skills', instructions: 'CLAUDE.md' }, L23: }, ... L27: default: true, L28: global: { skills: '~/.agents/skills', instructions: '~/.agents/AGENTS.md' }, L29: project: { skills: '.agents/skills', instructions: 'AGENTS.md' }, L30: }, ... L34: default: true, L35: global: { skills: null, instructions: '~/.codex/AGENTS.md', config: '~/.codex/config.toml' }, L36: project: { skills: null, instructions: 'AGENTS.md', config: '.codex/config.toml' }, L37: }, Write operation from lib/bridge/config.js: L90: function writeSettings(settings, file = bridgeConfigPath()) { L91: fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(fi

Critical

Ai Agent Control Hijack

Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel.

lib/targets.jsView on unpkg · L1

skills/bt-atlas/scripts/preview.pyView file

•path = skills/bt-atlas/scripts/preview.py kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 2478 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

skills/bt-atlas/scripts/preview.pyView on unpkg

lib/diskinfo/report.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 1

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

lib/diskinfo/report.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

lib/bridge/unity/discover.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @babylonjs-toolkit/agent@1.1.48 matchedPath = lib/bridge/unity/discover.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:1.1.48 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

lib/bridge/unity/discover.jsView on unpkg

lib/bridge/blender/discover.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @babylonjs-toolkit/agent@1.1.48 matchedPath = lib/bridge/blender/discover.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:1.1.48 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

lib/bridge/blender/discover.jsView on unpkg

lib/diskinfo/report.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @babylonjs-toolkit/agent@1.1.48 matchedPath = lib/diskinfo/report.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:1.1.48 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

lib/diskinfo/report.jsView on unpkg

lib/selfupdate.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @babylonjs-toolkit/agent@1.1.48 matchedPath = lib/selfupdate.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:1.1.48 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

lib/selfupdate.jsView on unpkg

lib/bridge/unity/ops.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @babylonjs-toolkit/agent@1.1.48 matchedPath = lib/bridge/unity/ops.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:1.1.48 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

lib/bridge/unity/ops.jsView on unpkg

lib/kill/ports.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @babylonjs-toolkit/agent@1.1.48 matchedPath = lib/kill/ports.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:1.1.48 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

lib/kill/ports.jsView on unpkg