--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@bfrs/agentic-components/v/0.8.6" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@bfrs/agentic-components/v/0.8.6.md" package: "@bfrs/agentic-components" report_status: "published" title: "@bfrs/agentic-components@0.8.6 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "0.8.6" --- # @bfrs/agentic-components@0.8.6 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged as agent extension risk** — Allowed by default with warning: install-time first-party agent extension setup was detected. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Warn-only agent extension risk - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Agent extension lifecycle risk - **Selected version:** 0.8.6 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. The postinstall hook makes unconsented project-level changes to agent guidance and build scripts, creating residual agent integration risk. The inspected behavior is first-party library setup and does not establish a concrete attack warranting a block. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 91.0% - **Started:** 2026-10-17T01:54:31.819Z - **Finished:** 2026-10-17T01:55:18.739Z - **Download time:** 1797 ms - **Static scan time:** 2987 ms - **AI review time:** 42135 ms - **Total time:** 46920 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** The install hook automatically changes consumer agent guidance files and build scripts. This is a first-party setup behavior, but it alters project-level agent instructions and build behavior without an affirmative consent check. - **Trigger:** Package installation runs the postinstall hook; setup is skipped only by a specific environment variable or when the source guidance file is absent. - **Impact:** Consumer agent instructions and build commands are changed during installation. The inspected source does not establish credential theft, data exfiltration, or remote execution. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, scripts/postinstall.cjs - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-10-17T01:55:18.739Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** The hook copies its guidance file, appends a reference to AGENTS.md or CLAUDE.md, and adds a lint script while prefixing selected build scripts with its lint command. - **Rationale:** The postinstall hook makes unconsented project-level changes to agent guidance and build scripts, creating residual agent integration risk. The inspected behavior is first-party library setup and does not establish a concrete attack warranting a block. - **Files touched:** package.json, scripts/postinstall.cjs, BFRS\_AGENTIC\_COMPONENTS.md ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 91.0% - **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn - **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability - **False-positive risk:** Medium - **Evidence for warning:** package.json runs scripts/postinstall.cjs during installation., The postinstall hook proceeds in an installed package unless the skip variable is set; this is an opt-out, not an affirmative consent check., The hook appends a reference to package-provided guidance in consumer AGENTS.md or CLAUDE.md files., It also changes consumer package scripts by adding a lint command and prefixing selected build scripts with a lint guard., The package describes this as installing agent references and wiring its lint guard into the consuming project. - **Evidence against:** The inspected hook copies first-party component-library guidance and configures a related lint guard; it does not show credential collection, network transfer, or remote code execution. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @bfrs/agentic-components@0.8.6. - Review the evidence and your use of @bfrs/agentic-components@0.8.6 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.cjs ``` ### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.cjs ``` ### 3. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 4. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 5. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 6. Critical: Ai Agent Control Hijack - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** scripts/postinstall.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L35: const agentFileGroups = [ L36: ["AGENTS.md", "agents.md"], L37: ["CLAUDE.md", "claude.md"] L38: ]; ... L63: if (!fs.existsSync(filePath)) { L64: fs.writeFileSync(filePath, `${referenceLine}\n`, "utf8"); L65: return "created"; ... L72: L73: fs.writeFileSync(filePath, `${ensureTrailingNewline(existing)}\n${referenceLine}\n`, "utf8"); L74: return "updated"; ... L133: L134: fs.writeFileSync(packageJsonPath, `${JSON.stringify(pkg, null, 2)}\n`, "utf8"); ``` ### 7. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 8. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 9. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 10. High: Semantic Analysis Limited - **Category:** Scanner Coverage - **Confidence:** 100.0% - **Path:** dist/fonts.css - **Public source:** [View source]() A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```css stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 2 ``` ### 11. Medium: Suspicious Lifecycle Evidence - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 91.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() package.json runs scripts/postinstall.cjs during installation. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json "postinstall": "node scripts/postinstall.cjs", "dev": "vite --host 0.0.0.0", "build": "npm run build:lib && npm run build:custom-elements && npm run build:demo", "build ``` ### 12. Medium: Suspicious Lifecycle Evidence - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 91.0% - **Path:** scripts/postinstall.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() The postinstall hook proceeds in an installed package unless the skip variable is set; this is an opt-out, not an affirmative consent check. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript const skipSetup = process.env.BFRS_AGENTIC_COMPONENTS_SKIP_SETUP === "1"; const packageJsonFileName = "package.json"; const lintScriptName = "check:bfrs-agentic-lint"; const lintSc ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall - **Dependencies:** 15 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 4 - **Development dependencies:** 23 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 19 ### Published dependency entries - @phosphor-icons/react ^2.1.10 (Dependency) - @radix-ui/react-checkbox ^1.3.3 (Dependency) - @radix-ui/react-dialog ^1.1.15 (Dependency) - @radix-ui/react-dropdown-menu ^2.1.16 (Dependency) - @radix-ui/react-popover ^1.1.15 (Dependency) - @radix-ui/react-radio-group ^1.3.8 (Dependency) - @radix-ui/react-select ^2.2.6 (Dependency) - @radix-ui/react-switch ^1.2.6 (Dependency) - @radix-ui/react-tabs ^1.1.13 (Dependency) - @radix-ui/react-tooltip ^1.2.8 (Dependency) - class-variance-authority ^0.7.1 (Dependency) - clsx ^2.1.1 (Dependency) - postcss ^8.4.49 (Dependency) - tailwind-merge ^3.3.1 (Dependency) - typescript ^5.7.2 (Dependency) - @emotion/react ^11.0.0 (PeerDependency) - @emotion/styled ^11.0.0 (PeerDependency) - react \>=18.2.0 (PeerDependency) - react-dom \>=18.2.0 (PeerDependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @bfrs/agentic-components - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 0.8.6 - **License:** ISC - **Version published:** 2026-10-12T09:33:17.153Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-01T16:29:22.870Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-10-21T10:19:34.773Z - **Known versions:** 24 - **Latest version:** 0.8.8 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Shiprocket agentic component library and documentation showcase. - **Author:** Shiprocket - **Maintainers:** ajit-shiprocket, ashigupta007 - **Keywords:** Shiprocket - **Artifact files:** 773 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 13,855,339 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 2 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()