AI Security Review
scanned 7h ago · by lpm-firewall-aiRuntime wallet discovery installs a browser message listener that accepts a specific third-party origin and dynamically evaluates its message body. This creates remote code execution in the host application's browser context if that origin or its delivered content is compromised.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- `dist/index.cjs.js` registers a `message` handler accepting `RABET/INSTALL` from `https://mobile.rabet.io`.
- That handler executes `e.data.message` with `new Function(...)` before removing itself.
- The handler is reached during wallet discovery invoked by `createConfig`, not only by an explicit wallet-install command.
- `package.json` has no `preinstall`, `install`, `postinstall`, or `bin` hook.
- Clipboard calls are user UI actions: copy output and paste a recipient address.
- No `child_process` import, filesystem harvesting, agent-config writes, or shell execution was found.
- `process.env` and `.exec()` matches occur in bundled semver/regex code, not package execution logic.
- Network requests support documented wallet/auth/asset features (`api.blux.cc` and Blux CDN).
Source & flagged code
4 flagged · loading sourceSource reads and rewrites clipboard contents matching cryptocurrency wallet addresses.
dist/index.cjs.jsView on unpkg · L1A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.
dist/index.cjs.jsView on unpkgA single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.
dist/index.cjs.jsView on unpkg · L27Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.
dist/index.cjs.jsView on unpkg · L34