--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@bobfrankston/rmfmail/v/1.2.184" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@bobfrankston/rmfmail/v/1.2.184.md" package: "@bobfrankston/rmfmail" report_status: "published" title: "@bobfrankston/rmfmail@1.2.184 npm security report" verdict: "malicious" version: "1.2.184" --- # @bobfrankston/rmfmail@1.2.184 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Blocked & quarantined** — Exposes email addresses, mail-server settings, and potentially IMAP passwords to rmf39.aaz.lt. - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Product-default install policy:** Block - **Firewall policy:** Matched malicious - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Credential Exfiltration - **Selected version:** 1.2.184 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) The Android runtime silently transmits account diagnostics to a third-party log endpoint. The transmitted IMAP object can contain user credentials. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 99.0% - **Started:** 2026-07-29T09:38:04.446Z - **Finished:** 2026-07-29T09:39:00.407Z - **Download time:** 1009 ms - **Static scan time:** 10076 ms - **AI review time:** 44874 ms - **Total time:** 55961 ms ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** The Android runtime silently transmits account diagnostics to a third-party log endpoint. The transmitted IMAP object can contain user credentials. - **Trigger:** Opening the Android/web client without the desktop bridge and initializing configured accounts - **Impact:** Exposes email addresses, mail-server settings, and potentially IMAP passwords to rmf39.aaz.lt. - **Evidence paths:** client/index.html, client/android-bootstrap.bundle.js, packages/mailx-store-web/android-bootstrap.js, package.json, bin/postinstall.js, bin/mcp-server.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-07-29T09:39:00.407Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** automatic remote logging of account metadata and serialized IMAP configuration - **Attack narrative:** On Android/web startup, index.html loads the bundled Android bootstrap. Its automatic vlog calls submit account email and serialized IMAP configuration to rmf39.aaz.lt; serialized IMAP configuration may include the password field. The endpoint and transfer are unrelated to mail-provider operation and occur silently during account setup. - **Rationale:** This is a concrete, automatic credential and account-data exfiltration path, not merely a suspicious primitive. The install hook itself is benign, but runtime behavior warrants blocking the package. - **Files touched:** client/index.html, client/android-bootstrap.bundle.js, packages/mailx-store-web/android-bootstrap.js - **Network endpoints:** https://rmf39.aaz.lt/logit/ ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 99.0% - **Recommended action:** publish\_block - **Intent class:** Malware - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for:** client/index.html imports android-bootstrap.bundle.js when no desktop bridge exists., client/android-bootstrap.bundle.js sends vlog data to rmf39.aaz.lt., Android startup logs email and JSON.stringify(account.imap), which can include IMAP passwords., Remote logging is silent and automatic during Android account initialization. - **Evidence against:** package.json postinstall only creates local workspace-package symlinks., MCP server is an explicit user-invoked local CLI and uses loopback daemon tokens. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node bin/postinstall.js ``` ### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node bin/postinstall.js ``` ### 3. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 4. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** bin/mailx.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L54: import net from "node:net"; L55: import { execSync } from "node:child_process"; L56: import { ports } from "@bobfrankston/miscinfo"; ``` ### 5. High: Shell - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** bin/mailx.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references shell execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L217: // reg.exe value for `\"path\" \"%1\"` — double-backslash escapes for L218: // cmd.exe's shell layer, which strips one level before the value reaches L219: // reg.exe. Quoting %1 keeps `?` and `&` from being eaten by cmd before ``` ### 6. Low: Eval - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 45.0% - **Path:** client/app.bundle.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L10585: try { L10586: const fn = new Function(`return (async () => (${code}))();`); L10587: let v = await fn(); ``` ### 7. Medium: Dynamic Require - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** bin/lean-accounts.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic require/import behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L136: if (fs.existsSync(path.join(dir, "package.json"))) { L137: const mod = await import(pathToFileURL(path.join(dir, "lib", "esm", "main.js")).href).catch(() => null) || L138: await import("jsonc-parser").catch(() => null); ``` ### 8. Low: Weak Crypto - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 64.0% - **Path:** bin/build-bundles.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L5: * mailx's msger custom protocol routes every fetch through one IPC channel L6: * (Rust → daemon stdin → response → stdout), so an ES module import cascade L7: * pays a multi-second roundtrip per file. With ~17 client-side modules each ... L148: logLevel: "info", L149: // .wasm files are inlined as base64 data URLs so the runtime can L150: // decode → Uint8Array → pass as initSqlJs({ wasmBinary }), bypassing L151: // sql.js's fetch(...) of the .wasm. Android WebView refuses to L152: // compile WASM fetched from file:// (even with AllowFileAccess / ``` ### 9. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 10. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 11. Medium: Install Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** bin/mailx.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L53: import os from "node:os"; L54: import net from "node:net"; L55: import { execSync } from "node:child_process"; L56: import { ports } from "@bobfrankston/miscinfo"; ... L196: // (shipped in the npm package) to the per-app location below. L197: const __perAppBin = path.join(process.env.LOCALAPPDATA || "", "rmfmail", "bin"); L198: const __rmfmailtoExe = path.join(__perAppBin, "rmfmailto.exe"); ... L217: // reg.exe value for `\"path\" \"%1\"` — double-backslash escapes for L218: // cmd.exe's shell layer, which strips one level before the value reaches L219: // reg.exe. Quoting %1 keeps `?` and `&` from being eaten by cmd before ... L355: // Linux pickers read Name= from the .desktop file directly. L356: if (process.platform === "linux") { ``` ### 12. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 13. High: Copied Package Dependency Bridge - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 83.0% - **Path:** bin/lean-accounts.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package metadata claims a different repository identity while copied source loads a runtime dependency bridge. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript package = @bobfrankston/rmfmail; repositoryIdentity = mailx; dependency = jsonc-parser L137: const mod = await import(pathToFileURL(path.join(dir, "lib", "esm", "main.js")).href).catch(() => null) || L138: await import("jsonc-parser").catch(() => null); L139: if (mod) { parseJsonc = mod.parse; break; } ``` ### 14. High: Cross File Remote Execution Context - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 72.0% - **Path:** bin/mailx.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Cross-file remote execution chain: bin/mailx.js spawns bin/popout-server.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L53: import os from "node:os"; L54: import net from "node:net"; L55: import { execSync } from "node:child_process"; L56: import { ports } from "@bobfrankston/miscinfo"; ... L196: // (shipped in the npm package) to the per-app location below. L197: const __perAppBin = path.join(process.env.LOCALAPPDATA || "", "rmfmail", "bin"); L198: const __rmfmailtoExe = path.join(__perAppBin, "rmfmailto.exe"); ... L217: // reg.exe value for `\"path\" \"%1\"` — double-backslash escapes for L218: // cmd.exe's shell layer, which strips one level before the value reaches L219: // reg.exe. Quoting %1 keeps `?` and `&` from being eaten by cmd before ... L355: // Linux pickers ``` ### 15. High: Runtime Package Install - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 86.0% - **Path:** bin/mailx.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L2629: clearInstanceFile(); L2630: const { spawn: spawnChild } = await import("child_process"); L2631: const child = spawnChild("rmfmail", [], { detached: true, stdio: "ignore", shell: true, windowsHide: true }); ... L2644: } L2645: // Auto-update action: run npm install then restart L2646: if (req._action === "performUpdate") { ``` ### 16. Medium: Protestware - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 90.0% Package source has broad protestware-like patterns that need review. ### 17. Low: Obfuscated - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 60.0% Package source has low-confidence obfuscation-like patterns. ### 18. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 19. Low: Telemetry - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references telemetry or analytics APIs. ### 20. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 21. Medium: Ships Native Binary - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** bin/rmfshare.exe - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships native binary artifacts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text path = bin/rmfshare.exe kind = native_binary sizeBytes = 3824128 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 22. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 23. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** bin/mailx.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @bobfrankston/rmfmail@1.2.182 matchedPath = bin/mailx.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGJvYmZyYW5rc3Rvbi9ybWZtYWls:1.2.182 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 24. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** bin/mailx.ts - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```typescript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @bobfrankston/rmfmail@1.2.182 matchedPath = bin/mailx.ts matchedIdentity = npm:QGJvYmZyYW5rc3Rvbi9ybWZtYWls:1.2.182 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 25. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** bin/build-rmfmailto-exe.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @bobfrankston/rmfmail@1.2.182 matchedPath = bin/build-rmfmailto-exe.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGJvYmZyYW5rc3Rvbi9ybWZtYWls:1.2.182 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 26. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** bin/build-rmfshare-exe.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @bobfrankston/rmfmail@1.2.182 matchedPath = bin/build-rmfshare-exe.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGJvYmZyYW5rc3Rvbi9ybWZtYWls:1.2.182 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 27. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** bin/share-target.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @bobfrankston/rmfmail@1.2.182 matchedPath = bin/share-target.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGJvYmZyYW5rc3Rvbi9ybWZtYWls:1.2.182 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall - **Dependencies:** 27 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 3 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 27 ### Published dependency entries - @bobfrankston/iflow-direct ^0.1.59 (Dependency) - @bobfrankston/mailx-host ^0.1.13 (Dependency) - @bobfrankston/mailx-imap ^0.1.134 (Dependency) - @bobfrankston/mailx-store-web ^0.1.59 (Dependency) - @bobfrankston/mailx-sync ^0.1.27 (Dependency) - @bobfrankston/miscinfo ^1.0.15 (Dependency) - @bobfrankston/msger ^0.1.406 (Dependency) - @bobfrankston/node-tcp-transport ^0.1.10 (Dependency) - @bobfrankston/oauthsupport ^1.0.34 (Dependency) - @bobfrankston/rmf-tiny ^0.1.41 (Dependency) - @bobfrankston/smtp-direct ^0.1.9 (Dependency) - @bobfrankston/tcp-transport ^0.1.8 (Dependency) - @capacitor/android ^8.3.0 (Dependency) - @capacitor/cli ^8.3.0 (Dependency) - @capacitor/core ^8.3.0 (Dependency) - dictionary-en ^4.0.0 (Dependency) - express ^4.21.0 (Dependency) - harper.js ^2.4.0 (Dependency) - html-to-docx ^1.8.0 (Dependency) - jsonc-parser ^3.3.1 (Dependency) - mailparser ^3.7.2 (Dependency) - mammoth ^1.12.0 (Dependency) - nodemailer ^7.0.0 (Dependency) - nspell ^2.1.5 (Dependency) - quill ^2.0.3 (Dependency) - sql.js ^1.14.1 (Dependency) - tinymce ^8.5.0 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @bobfrankston/rmfmail - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 1.2.184 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-07-28T13:32:55.827Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-01T04:46:34.920Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-08-14T13:36:07.515Z - **Known versions:** 119 - **Latest version:** 1.2.259 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Local-first email client with IMAP sync and standalone native app - **Author:** Bob Frankston - **Keywords:** email, imap, smtp, mail-client, webview - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=24.2.0 - **Artifact files:** 848 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 30,879,036 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()