--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@botbuddy/cli/v/1.64.1" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@botbuddy/cli/v/1.64.1.md" package: "@botbuddy/cli" report_status: "published" title: "@botbuddy/cli@1.64.1 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "1.64.1" --- # @botbuddy/cli@1.64.1 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged — allowed with a warning** — Allowed by default policy, but 13 finding(s) warrant review before installing. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Telemetry warning (can be blocked) - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Telemetry - **Selected version:** 1.64.1 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. A user-run \`bb wait\` with malformed conditions automatically sends bounded diagnostics to the package’s relay using an existing credential. The event is minimized and does not expose secrets, but the runtime telemetry has no user-facing disclosure or opt-out, so this warrants a warning rather than a publish block. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 94.0% - **Started:** 2026-10-31T13:21:11.471Z - **Finished:** 2026-10-31T13:23:12.782Z - **Download time:** 1015 ms - **Static scan time:** 3810 ms - **AI review time:** 116485 ms - **Total time:** 121311 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** Automatic setup-error telemetry is sent when wait conditions are invalid. - **Trigger:** A user runs \`bb wait\` with invalid condition syntax and a usable profile or binding bearer. - **Impact:** Tenant attribution and diagnostic categories are sent to the vendor service without a user-facing disclosure or opt-out; the event omits credentials and raw condition text. - **Evidence paths:** src/wait.mjs, src/wait-core.mjs - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-10-31T13:23:12.782Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** The CLI posts a minimized error event to \`/sensor-ingest\` on \`BOTBUDDY\_RELAY\_URL\`, defaulting to \`https://api.bot-buddy.ai/functions/v1\`. - **Rationale:** A user-run \`bb wait\` with malformed conditions automatically sends bounded diagnostics to the package’s relay using an existing credential. The event is minimized and does not expose secrets, but the runtime telemetry has no user-facing disclosure or opt-out, so this warrants a warning rather than a publish block. - **Network endpoints:** https://api.bot-buddy.ai/functions/v1/sensor-ingest, BOTBUDDY\_RELAY\_URL + /sensor-ingest ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn - **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability - **False-positive risk:** Medium - **Evidence for warning:** Invalid \`bb wait\` condition syntax triggers a setup-error report automatically., The report posts to \`/sensor-ingest\` on the configured relay and uses an existing bearer in the Authorization header., The event contains bounded error diagnostics; condition details are reduced to attempted types and parse-error categories, excluding raw condition text and values. - **Evidence against:** The package manifest has no lifecycle scripts., The staging-pool LaunchAgent setup is behind an explicit \`install\` subcommand, which requires a tenant and checks that the caller is human., The telemetry is limited to diagnostic fields and does not include the bearer in the request body. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @botbuddy/cli@1.64.1. - Review the evidence and your use of @botbuddy/cli@1.64.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** src/update-check.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L16: import { readFileSync } from "node:fs"; L17: import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L18: import { homedir } from "node:os"; ``` ### 2. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 3. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 4. Medium: Install Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** src/staging-pool/refresh-runtime.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L26: const jobPath = join(app, "job.mjs"); L27: async function owned(path, directory = false, privateFile = false) { L28: const info = await fs.lstat(path); ... L42: const before = await configBytes(); L43: const installed = validateInstalledConfig(JSON.parse(before)); L44: const previous = installed.poolBinding; ... L61: const rows = await fetchRegisteredPools({ L62: exec: (file, args, callOptions) => exec(process.execPath, [file, ...args], callOptions), L63: botbuddyBin: cliEntry, env, tenant, poolId, preserveAgentContext: true, requireTenantMatch: true, ... L125: await fs.rename(configTemp, configPath); L126: return { ok: true, command: "refresh-runtime", tenant, poolId, runtimeVersion: metadata.version, runtimeSha256: contentDigest, personaAliases: Object.keys(next.personas), producer: ``` ### 5. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 6. High: Same File Env Network Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** src/pw/daemon.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L2: import net from "node:net"; L3: import { createRequire } from "node:module"; ... L7: import { normaliseLane } from "./args.mjs"; L8: export const daemonDir = (env = process.env) => env.BB_PW_DAEMON_DIR || join(homedir(), ".botbuddy", "pw-daemon"); L9: export function resolveCliBin(env = process.env) { if (env.BB_PW_CLI_BIN) return { cmd: "node", args: [env.BB_PW_CLI_BIN] }; const require = createRequire(import.meta.url); const p... ``` ### 7. High: Trigger Reachable Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** src/staging-pool/cli.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> bin/botbuddy.mjs -> src/commands.mjs -> src/staging-pool/cli.mjs L21: L22: import { execFile } from "node:child_process"; L23: import * as nodeFs from "node:fs/promises"; ... L32: import { assessPoolHealth, healthReasons } from "./health.mjs"; L33: import { buildLaunchAgentPlist, createLaunchctl } from "./launchd.mjs"; L34: import { createEnvFilePasswordSource } from "./password-source.mjs"; ... L85: L86: export function exitCodeFor(error) { L87: if (error instanceof MintRefusedError || error?.code === "persona_not_allowed") return 2; ... L224: */ L225: export function resolveInstalledPool({ home = homedir(), poolId = null, tenantHint = null } = {}) { L226: const installed = listInstalledPools(home).filter((pool) => !pool.installed.err ``` ### 8. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 9. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 10. Medium: Ships Native Binary - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** daemon/bin/darwin-arm64/botbuddy-daemon - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships native binary artifacts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text path = daemon/bin/darwin-arm64/botbuddy-daemon kind = native_binary sizeBytes = 12596546 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 11. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 75.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 12. High: Semantic Analysis Limited - **Category:** Scanner Coverage - **Confidence:** 100.0% - **Path:** src/agent-credential-store.mjs\#virtual:normalized:round1 - **Public source:** [View source]() A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 9 ``` ### 13. High: Previous Version Dangerous Delta - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 93.0% - **Path:** src/pw/staging-auth.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @botbuddy/cli@1.64.0 matchedIdentity = npm:QGJvdGJ1ZGR5L2NsaQ:1.64.0 similarity = 0.958 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** No - **Dependencies:** 2 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 0 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 2 ### Published dependency entries - @playwright/cli 0.1.17 (Dependency) - playwright 1.62.0-alpha-1783623505000 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @botbuddy/cli - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 1.64.1 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-10-31T13:17:22.343Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-08-28T06:07:02.047Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-11-05T00:56:12.825Z - **Known versions:** 159 - **Latest version:** 1.64.14 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** BotBuddy — Swarm coordination CLI for multi-agent workflows - **Maintainers:** botbuddy-jo - **Keywords:** mcp, agents, swarm, cli, coordination - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=20.0.0 - **Artifact files:** 148 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 28,857,406 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 2 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]()