registry / @brrew/projectbridge / 0.3.25
@brrew/projectbridge@0.3.25
ProjectBridge remote host agent CLI
AI Security Review
scanned 20d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe network, metadata, and command-execution signals correspond to the package's remote host agent behavior. The inspected source requires an operator-selected server and gates host control and persistence behind explicit setup or consent.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
A user runs the CLI's remote command or explicitly requests persistent service setup.
Impact
The inspected behavior supports enrolled host management and does not establish an unconsented recipient, action, or persistence trigger.
Mechanism
The CLI requires a configured server and validates its URL; remote host control requires local enablement, and host mutations require explicit confirmation.
AI rationale
The network, metadata, and command-execution signals correspond to the package's remote host agent behavior. The inspected source requires an operator-selected server and gates host control and persistence behind explicit setup or consent.
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 90.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- The manifest exposes a CLI and has no install lifecycle hook; its only script is for testing.
- The CLI requires an explicitly selected server, validates HTTPS except for localhost, and sends requests to that configured destination.
- Enrollment obtains and stores a device credential through a dashboard approval flow; heartbeat and task requests send it to the saved server.
- The CLI sends identifying host metadata as part of enrollment and remote-agent requests, consistent with its remote host management function.
- Remote host control is locally disabled by default, can be enabled through an explicit command, and host mutations require explicit confirmation.
- Persistent service setup is reached through explicit CLI commands; managed runtime installation invokes npm with scripts ignored.
Evidence against
- The agent sends host metadata and supports remote tasks, including shell and file operations, so this is a sensitive capability; source gates control operations behind local enablement and mutation confirmation.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcess
Source & flagged code
6 flaggedbin/projectbridge.jsView file
6const path = require('node:path');
L7: const { spawn } = require('node:child_process');
L8: const { setTimeout: sleep } = require('node:timers/promises');
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
bin/projectbridge.jsView on unpkg · L6137const script="$ErrorActionPreference='Stop';$b=Get-CimInstance Win32_BIOS;$c=Get-CimInstance Win32_ComputerSystem;$o=Get-CimInstance Win32_OperatingSystem;[pscustomobject]@{manufac...
L138: const r=spawnSync('powershell.exe',['-NoProfile','-NonInteractive','-Command',script],{encoding:'utf8',timeout:3500,windowsHide:true});if(!r.error&&r.status===0){const x=JSON.parse...
L139: }
...
L150: if (credential) headers.Authorization = 'Bearer ' + credential;
L151: const response = await fetch(new URL(route, base), { method: body === undefined ? 'GET' : 'POST', headers,
L152: body: body === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(body), signal: controller.signal, redirect: 'error' });
L153: const text = await response.text();
High
Command Output Exfiltration
Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.
bin/projectbridge.jsView on unpkg · L1376const path = require('node:path');
L7: const { spawn } = require('node:child_process');
L8: const { setTimeout: sleep } = require('node:timers/promises');
...
L12:
L13: const VERSION = require('../package.json').version;
L14: const ENV_SERVER = process.env.PROJECTBRIDGE_SERVER ? process.env.PROJECTBRIDGE_SERVER.replace(/\/$/, '') : null;
L15: let installToolConsent = null;
...
L19: function terminalColor(code, value) {
L20: return process.stdout.isTTY && !process.env.NO_COLOR ? '\u001b[' + code + 'm' + value + '\u001b[0m' : value;
L21: }
...
L42: console.log(' ' + ok('ProjectBridge authenticated'));
L43: console.log(' ' + ok('Host: ' + os.hostname()));
Findings
5 High4 Medium5 Low
HighChild Processbin/projectbridge.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationbin/projectbridge.js
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitybin/projectbridge.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationbin/projectbridge.js
HighTrigger Reachable Persistencelib/lifecycle.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumInstall Persistencelib/lifecycle.js
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @brrew/projectbridge@0.3.25.
See all versions of @brrew/projectbridge for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @brrew/projectbridge@0.3.25 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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