This package appears in our research on the malicious Baileys forks, with how it works, the full package list and what to do if you installed it.
Blocked by malware advisory
OpenSSF/OSV malware advisory MAL-2026-18812 identifies this version as malicious and supplies the Firewall block. LPM AI assessed this version as clean; the assessments disagree.
What to do: remove this version and, if it ran, rotate the credentials it could reach. Remediation↓
OpenSSF/OSV malicious advisory
published · by OpenSSF/OSV
OpenSSF/OSV advisory MAL-2026-18812 confirms this npm version as malicious.
Advisory
MAL-2026-18812
Source
OpenSSF Malicious Packages via OSV
Summary
Malicious code in @bufferstudio/baileys-natsu (npm)
Details
@bufferstudio/baileys-natsu is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that silently subscribes the installer's own WhatsApp account to WhatsApp Channels chosen by the publisher. When the socket connects, code in lib/Socket/index.js sends the WhatsApp w:mex FOLLOW query for the channel ID(s) 120363430188538810@newsletter (stored as base64 strings), using the victim's authenticated session and without telling them. Same behaviour as the PhantomSub family (MAL-2026-17342).
LPM's AI review found this version clean. That disagrees with the OpenSSF/OSV advisory, which supplies the block.
The package’s inspected network activity connects to WhatsApp or fetches media supplied by a message, and auth files stay under the caller-supplied folder. The encoded newsletter target is followed only when the caller explicitly enables autoFollowNewsletter.
Static reason
No blocking static signals were detected.
Trigger
Connection starts when the application calls the socket with authentication or QR output enabled; media fetches and auth-file operations occur when their exported helpers are called.
Impact
Normal WhatsApp client activity; no unrelated credential collection or transmission was found in the inspected paths.
Mechanism
Connects to WhatsApp, optionally follows a newsletter when configured, fetches message media, and stores auth data in the supplied folder.
wss://web.whatsapp.com/ws/chatweb.whatsapp.comMessage-provided mediaContent.url or mediaContent.directPath
Independent scan evidence
public snapshot
AI called this Clean at 91.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
The manifest identifies this as a WhatsApp Web API library and has no install lifecycle scripts.
The socket connects to WhatsApp’s WebSocket endpoint.
Newsletter following runs only when autoFollowNewsletter is set and credentials identify a user; the setting is exposed in the socket configuration type.
The auth helper reads and writes credentials under the caller-supplied folder.
Media downloading fetches a URL from the message being downloaded.
Evidence against
The socket source contains an encoded newsletter identifier, but following it is gated by the explicit autoFollowNewsletter setting.
Behavioral surface
SourceCrypto · Filesystem · Network · Web socket
Supply chainURL strings
ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.
Scanned 30 files · 359 KB of source
1 external domain referenced
web.whatsapp.com
Oversized source lightweight scan
WAProto/index.js4.23 MB file, sampled 256 KB
No sampled risky behavior triggered.
Findings
5 high · 3 medium · 4 low
Where they are, most severe file first. Code opens a file's flagged lines, with their evidence, below.
Newsletter following runs only when autoFollowNewsletter is set and credentials identify a user; the setting is exposed in the socket configuration type.
Avoid installing @bufferstudio/baileys-natsu@1.2.2. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.