---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@c4a/context-cli/v/0.7.35"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@c4a/context-cli/v/0.7.35.md"
package: "@c4a/context-cli"
report_status: "published"
title: "@c4a/context-cli@0.7.35 npm security report"
verdict: "policy_finding"
version: "0.7.35"
---

# @c4a/context-cli@0.7.35 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Soft block: AI-agent control surface** — Warn by default; block when configured. Foreign user agent control files for Claude, Codex, and Cursor are created or rewritten as a side effect of installing the package globally.

- **Verdict:** AI-agent control-surface policy finding
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn by default; block when configured
- **Firewall policy:** Warn by default
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Soft block: AI-agent control surface
- **Selected version:** 0.7.35
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This finding concerns changes to an AI agent's instructions or configuration without explicit user action. It does not by itself establish malware intent. The CLI warns by default and blocks when configured for this policy.

AI assessment: malicious; recommendation: publish block. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

LPM flags this version as an AI-agent control-surface risk. A global npm install runs postinstall, which launches plugin install for Claude, Codex, and Cursor. That command writes user-level agent plugin configuration and skill directories without a separate plugin command.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Malicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 86.0%
- **Started:** 2026-09-22T17:00:40.636Z
- **Finished:** 2026-09-22T17:02:37.982Z
- **Download time:** 1008 ms
- **Static scan time:** 10412 ms
- **AI review time:** 105925 ms
- **Total time:** 117346 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** A global npm install runs postinstall, which launches plugin install for Claude, Codex, and Cursor. That command writes user-level agent plugin configuration and skill directories without a separate plugin command.

- **Trigger:** npm postinstall when npm\_config\_global is set or CONTEXT\_CLI\_AUTO\_PLUGIN\_INSTALL is 1.

- **Impact:** Foreign user agent control files for Claude, Codex, and Cursor are created or rewritten as a side effect of installing the package globally.

- **Evidence paths:** package.json, scripts/postinstall.mjs, cli.js

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-09-22T17:02:37.982Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** scripts/postinstall.mjs spawnSyncs the bundled cli.js with plugin install. The default agent is all, which installs a user-scoped Claude plugin, enables a Codex plugin in config.toml, copies a Cursor user plugin, and materializes provider skills under home agent directories.

- **Attack narrative:** On a global npm install, postinstall starts the bundled CLI with plugin install and no agent flag. The command treats the target as all and registers this package in the user Claude plugin scope, enables it in the Codex config file, copies a Cursor user plugin, and writes skills under the home agent skill directories. Local and CI installs are skipped, but the global path does not require a separate plugin command. Installing the package therefore mutates several foreign agent control surfaces.

- **Rationale:** The postinstall hook automatically runs a broad plugin install into Claude, Codex, and Cursor user configuration during a global package install. That is unconsented lifecycle mutation of foreign agent control surfaces, so the package should be blocked.

- **Files touched:** .claude, plugins/cache, .claude/skills, .codex, config.toml, .cursor/plugins/local, .agents/skills, .agents

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Malicious

- **Confidence:** 86.0%

- **Recommended action:** publish\_block

- **Intent class:** Malware

- **False-positive risk:** Low

- **Evidence for policy risk:** package.json postinstall runs scripts/postinstall.mjs on install., A global npm install or CONTEXT\_CLI\_AUTO\_PLUGIN\_INSTALL spawns the bundled CLI as plugin install without a separate user plugin command., plugin install defaults the agent target to all, which selects claude, codex, and cursor., That install path registers a user-scoped Claude plugin, writes Codex config.toml, copies a Cursor user plugin, and materializes skills under home agent directories.

- **Evidence against:** CI, re-entry, CONTEXT\_CLI\_SKIP\_PLUGIN\_INSTALL, and ordinary local dependency installs skip the plugin refresh., The package is an agent-integration CLI, and the same plugin install command is also exposed for an explicit user run., Refresh failures are logged and the hook does not download a remote payload.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @c4a/context-cli@0.7.35.

- Avoid installing @c4a/context-cli@0.7.35. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.

## Public findings

### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@c4a/context-cli@0.7.35/package.json>)

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs
```

### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@c4a/context-cli@0.7.35/package.json>)

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs
```

### 3. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 4. High: Child Process
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** scripts/postinstall.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@c4a/context-cli@0.7.35/scripts/postinstall.mjs>)

Package source references child process execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L7: 
L8: import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
L9: import { existsSync, realpathSync } from "node:fs";
```

### 5. High: Shell
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%

Package source references shell execution.

### 6. Medium: Dynamic Require
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** parserEntryWorker.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@c4a/context-cli@0.7.35/parserEntryWorker.js>)

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L29: var __esm = (fn, res) => () => (fn && (res = fn(fn = 0)), res);
L30: var __require = /* @__PURE__ */ createRequire(import.meta.url);
L31: var require = __require;
```

### 7. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 8. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 9. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 10. Critical: Dns Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 88.0%
- **Path:** cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@c4a/context-cli@0.7.35/cli.js>)

Source appears to send environment or credential material through DNS lookups.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L35: class CommanderError extends Error {
L36: constructor(exitCode, code, message) {
L37: super(message);
...
L610: var EventEmitter = __require("events").EventEmitter;
L611: var childProcess = __require("child_process");
L612: var path = __require("path");
...
L655: this._outputConfiguration = {
L656: writeOut: (str) => process2.stdout.write(str),
L657: writeErr: (str) => process2.stderr.write(str),
...
L2781: return false;
L2782: const base64 = header.replace(/-/g, "+").replace(/_/g, "/").padEnd(header.length + (4 - header.length % 4) % 4, "=");
L2783: const decoded = JSON.parse(atob(base64));
```

### 11. High: Cross File Remote Execution Context
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 72.0%
- **Path:** cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@c4a/context-cli@0.7.35/cli.js>)

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Cross-file remote execution chain: cli.js spawns browser/diagrams.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution.
L35: class CommanderError extends Error {
L36: constructor(exitCode, code, message) {
L37: super(message);
...
L610: var EventEmitter = __require("events").EventEmitter;
L611: var childProcess = __require("child_process");
L612: var path = __require("path");
...
L655: this._outputConfiguration = {
L656: writeOut: (str) => process2.stdout.write(str),
L657: writeErr: (str) => process2.stderr.write(str),
...
L2781: return false;
L2782: const base64 = header.replace(/-/g, "+").replace(/_/g, "/").padEnd(header.length + (4 - header.length % 4) % 4, "=");
L2783: const decoded = JSON.parse(atob(base64));
```

### 12. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@c4a/context-cli@0.7.35/cli.js>)

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> cli.js
Reachable file contains a blocking source-risk pattern.
```

### 13. High: Runtime Package Install
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 86.0%
- **Path:** scripts/postinstall.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@c4a/context-cli@0.7.35/scripts/postinstall.mjs>)

Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L42: "Claude plugin installed without a global context CLI. Install it with:",
L43: `  npm install -g @c4a/context-cli@${version}`,
L44: ],
...
L49: const lookup = process.platform === "win32"
L50: ? spawnSync("where", ["context"], { stdio: "ignore" })
L51: : spawnSync("sh", ["-c", "command -v context"], { stdio: "ignore" });
```

### 14. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 15. Low: Telemetry
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references telemetry or analytics APIs.

### 16. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 17. Medium: Ships Wasm Module
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** wasm/tree-sitter.wasm
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@c4a/context-cli@0.7.35/wasm/tree-sitter.wasm>)

Package ships WebAssembly modules.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
path = wasm/tree-sitter.wasm
kind = wasm_module
sizeBytes = 186526
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 18. Medium: Oversized Source File
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** browser/diagrams.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@c4a/context-cli@0.7.35/browser/diagrams.js>)

Package contains source files above the normal full-analysis size ceiling.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
path = browser/diagrams.js
kind = oversized_source_file
sizeBytes = 4207607
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 19. Medium: Oversized Cli Entrypoint
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 80.0%
- **Path:** cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@c4a/context-cli@0.7.35/cli.js>)

Package contains an oversized executable-looking CLI entrypoint.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
path = cli.js
kind = oversized_cli_entrypoint
sizeBytes = 4603997
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 20. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 21. High: Semantic Analysis Limited
- **Category:** Scanner Coverage
- **Confidence:** 100.0%
- **Path:** cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@c4a/context-cli@0.7.35/cli.js>)

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_path_work_budget_exceeded; limitedFiles = 1
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall
- **Dependencies:** 32
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 0
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 32

### Published dependency entries
- @c4a/agent-graph 0.3.0 (Dependency)
- @c4a/context 0.7.35 (Dependency)
- @c4a/extract 0.7.35 (Dependency)
- @c4a/extract-contract 0.7.35 (Dependency)
- @c4a/extract-go 0.7.35 (Dependency)
- @c4a/extract-mdx 0.7.35 (Dependency)
- @c4a/extract-proto 0.7.35 (Dependency)
- @c4a/extract-rush 0.7.35 (Dependency)
- @c4a/extract-sql 0.7.35 (Dependency)
- @c4a/extract-style 0.7.35 (Dependency)
- @c4a/extract-thrift 0.7.35 (Dependency)
- @c4a/extract-ts 0.7.35 (Dependency)
- @mermaid-js/layout-elk 0.2.0 (Dependency)
- commander ^11.0.0 (Dependency)
- fast-xml-parser ^5.10.1 (Dependency)
- handlebars ^4.7.8 (Dependency)
- ink ^5.0.0 (Dependency)
- jiti ^2.7.0 (Dependency)
- mdast-util-to-string ^4.0.0 (Dependency)
- mermaid 11.12.0 (Dependency)
- react ^18.3.1 (Dependency)
- remark-gfm ^4.0.1 (Dependency)
- remark-mdx ^3.1.1 (Dependency)
- remark-parse ^11.0.0 (Dependency)
- remark-stringify ^11.0.0 (Dependency)
- sharp ^0.35.3 (Dependency)
- typescript ^5.5.4 (Dependency)
- unified ^11.0.5 (Dependency)
- vitepress 1.6.4 (Dependency)
- web-tree-sitter ^0.20.8 (Dependency)
- yaml ^2.5.1 (Dependency)
- zod ^3.23.8 (Dependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** @c4a/context-cli
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 0.7.35
- **License:** MIT
- **Version published:** 2026-09-22T10:01:02.951Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-07-11T12:28:03.022Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-10-01T06:05:11.204Z
- **Known versions:** 44
- **Latest version:** 0.7.43
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** Local runtime and Agent integration for traceable knowledge production
- **Keywords:** cli, knowledge, context, claude-code, claude-plugin
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=20
- **Artifact files:** 837
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 16,478,129 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** Yes

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@c4a/context-cli/v/0.7.35>)
- [Repository](<https://github.com/context4ai/context.git>)
- [Homepage](<https://github.com/context4ai/context#readme>)
- [Issues](<https://github.com/context4ai/context/issues>)
