registry / @caeliq/llms / 1.0.58
@caeliq/llms@1.0.58
A universal LLM API transformation server
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiStatic hints originate largely from bundled provider SDKs and legitimate proxy features. Source inspection found no lifecycle execution, stealthy exfiltration, remote payload execution, or unconsented agent-control mutation.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
Caller creates/starts the server and sends requests using configured providers or output handlers.
Impact
Configured request data and credentials are sent only to configured or vendor provider endpoints.
Mechanism
Explicit LLM-provider proxying and optional OAuth refresh/webhook reporting.
AI rationale
Static hints originate largely from bundled provider SDKs and legitimate proxy features. Source inspection found no lifecycle execution, stealthy exfiltration, remote payload execution, or unconsented agent-control mutation.
Evidence
package.jsondist/esm/server.mjsdist/esm/server.mjs.mapREADME.md
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 95.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
Evidence against
- package.json has no preinstall/install/postinstall hooks.
- Entrypoints export a server library; importing does not call start().
- OAuth token reads/refreshes are only in configured provider flows and target declared vendor endpoints.
- Webhook output requires an explicit URL configuration.
- The only package-owned child-process call reads macOS version for a configured Codex client header.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
6 flaggeddist/esm/server.mjsView file
7`:case"\u2028":case"\u2029":return J(),"";case"\r":return J(),jr()===`
L8: `&&J(),"";case"1":case"2":case"3":case"4":case"5":case"6":case"7":case"8":case"9":throw $e(J());case void 0:throw $e(J())}return J()}function fA(){let t="",e=jr();if(!Ze.isHexDigit...
L9: `+s;T=R.join(O),k=`{
...
L13: `+s+T+`,
L14: `+C+"]"}return o.pop(),s=C,R}}});var Nd=V((MB,Xy)=>{var gA=Vy(),mA=Yy(),yA={parse:gA,stringify:mA};Xy.exports=yA});var S_=V((Wj,lT)=>{lT.exports={"0":"\u2080","1":"\u2081","2":"\u2...
L15: `)||n,code:s,status:o},e.data.error)}return Object.assign({message:n,code:s,status:o},e.data.error)}}return{message:n,code:e.status,status:e.statusText}}};Nt.GaxiosError=Xd;functio...
L16: `).join(`
...
L49: `+y+"}":"{"+C.join(",")+"}",n=y,S}}typeof Yb.stringify!="function"&&(Yb.stringify=function(f
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/esm/server.mjsView on unpkg · L760${S}
L61: `+await t.crypto.sha256DigestHex(m),y=await MO(t.crypto,t.securityCredentials.secretAccessKey,i,t.region,n),C=await Ci(t.crypto,y,b),_=`${Gw} Credential=${t.securityCredentials.acc...
L62: To learn more about authentication and Google APIs, visit:
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
dist/esm/server.mjsView on unpkg · L60Findings
2 Critical4 High3 Medium3 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/esm/server.mjs
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/cjs/server.cjs
HighChild Processdist/esm/server.mjs
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/esm/server.mjs
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/esm/server.mjs
HighCloud Metadata Accessdist/esm/server.mjs
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @caeliq/llms@1.0.58.
See all versions of @caeliq/llms for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @caeliq/llms@1.0.58 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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