--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@caeliq/llms/v/1.0.61" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@caeliq/llms/v/1.0.61.md" package: "@caeliq/llms" report_status: "published" title: "@caeliq/llms@1.0.61 npm security report" verdict: "clean" version: "1.0.61" --- # @caeliq/llms@1.0.61 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Allowed — no malicious behavior detected** — No malicious behavior detected. 15 low-signal pattern(s) reviewed. - **Verdict:** Clean - **Product-default install policy:** Allow - **Firewall policy:** No policy match - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** None published - **Selected version:** 1.0.61 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: clean; recommendation: mark clean. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. Scanner matches arise from a bundled LLM gateway and its dependencies. Direct inspection found no lifecycle execution or concrete malicious chain; the agent-related writes are explicit runtime bridge setup in a managed workspace. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Clean - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 93.0% - **Started:** 2026-08-18T06:17:18.939Z - **Finished:** 2026-08-18T06:18:13.035Z - **Download time:** 510 ms - **Static scan time:** 4307 ms - **AI review time:** 49277 ms - **Total time:** 54096 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** No confirmed malicious attack surface. The package is a configurable LLM gateway; its optional Cursor bridge writes restrictive hooks only in its managed workspace during runtime use. - **Trigger:** A user configures and invokes the Cursor SDK bridge through the exported server. - **Impact:** Configured providers receive routed requests and credentials needed for their selected authentication flow; no unconsented install/import behavior was found. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, dist/cjs/server.cjs, README.md - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-08-18T06:18:13.035Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** Configured LLM request routing and optional managed-workspace Cursor bridge. - **Rationale:** Scanner matches arise from a bundled LLM gateway and its dependencies. Direct inspection found no lifecycle execution or concrete malicious chain; the agent-related writes are explicit runtime bridge setup in a managed workspace. - **Files touched:** workspaceDir/.cursor/hooks/deny-builtin.cjs, workspaceDir/.cursor/hooks.json, workspaceDir/AGENTS.md ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Clean - **Confidence:** 93.0% - **Recommended action:** mark\_clean - **Intent class:** Benign - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for AI clean decision:** The optional Cursor SDK bridge writes executable deny hooks and a workspace AGENTS.md. - **Evidence against:** package.json has no lifecycle scripts., Entrypoint exports server APIs; it does not start a server on import., Hook creation is limited to the Cursor bridge workspace and denies built-in tools., Network and environment references implement the documented, configured LLM-provider gateway and OAuth flows., No evidence of credential harvesting, unrelated exfiltration, remote payload loading, or install-time mutation was found. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @caeliq/llms@1.0.61. - Review the evidence and your use of @caeliq/llms@1.0.61 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/esm/server.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L111: ${g} L112: `+await t.crypto.sha256DigestHex(h),_=await Rj(t.crypto,t.securityCredentials.secretAccessKey,i,t.region,r),k=await ka(t.crypto,_,C),b=`${Kv} Credential=${t.securityCredentials.acc... L113: To learn more about authentication and Google APIs, visit: ``` ### 2. Medium: Dynamic Require - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/cjs/server.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic require/import behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L51: return {tonumber(current), ttl} L52: `;function ta(t,e,n,r="fastify-rate-limit-"){this.continueExceeding=t,this.exponentialBackoff=e,this.redis=n,this.key=r,this.redis.rateLimit||this.redis.defineCommand("rateLimit",{... L53: `?(Wr++,cn=0):t?cn+=t.length:cn++,t&&(ou+=t.length),t}var ow={default(){switch(xe){case" ":case"\v":case"\f":case" ":case"\xA0":case"\uFEFF":case` ``` ### 3. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 4. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 5. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 6. High: Same File Env Network Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/esm/server.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L100: `+_+"}":"{"+k.join(",")+"}",r=_,g}}typeof nE.stringify!="function"&&(nE.stringify=function(d,f,p){var h;if(r="",o="",typeof p=="number")for(h=0;h) Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: var XR=Object.create;var Sp=Object.defineProperty;var QR=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var ZR=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var eD=Object.getPrototypeOf,tD=Object.prototype.hasOwnPr... L2: -- Key to operate on ... L58: `:case"\u2028":case"\u2029":return Y(),"";case"\r":return Y(),ir()===` L59: `&&Y(),"";case"1":case"2":case"3":case"4":case"5":case"6":case"7":case"8":case"9":throw He(Y());case void 0:throw He(Y())}return Y()}function gO(){let t="",e=ir();if(!rt.isHexDigit... L60: `+s;E=A.join(x),w=`{ ... L64: `+s+E+`, L65: `+k+"]"}return o.pop(),s=k,A}}});var Yp=G((lH,BC)=>{var _O=FC(),bO=MC(),CO={parse:_O,stringify:bO};BC.exports=CO});var hk=G((k3,I1)=>{I1.exports={"0":"\u2080","1":"\u2081","2":"\u2... L66: `)||r,code:s,status:o},e.data.error)}return Object.assign({message:r,code:s,stat ``` ### 8. High: Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 82.0% - **Path:** dist/esm/server.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L100: `+_+"}":"{"+k.join(",")+"}",r=_,g}}typeof nE.stringify!="function"&&(nE.stringify=function(d,f,p){var h;if(r="",o="",typeof p=="number")for(h=0;h) Source reaches cloud instance metadata or link-local credential endpoints. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: var XR=Object.create;var Sp=Object.defineProperty;var QR=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var ZR=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var eD=Object.getPrototypeOf,tD=Object.prototype.hasOwnPr... L2: -- Key to operate on ... L58: `:case"\u2028":case"\u2029":return Y(),"";case"\r":return Y(),ir()===` L59: `&&Y(),"";case"1":case"2":case"3":case"4":case"5":case"6":case"7":case"8":case"9":throw He(Y());case void 0:throw He(Y())}return Y()}function gO(){let t="",e=ir();if(!rt.isHexDigit... L60: `+s;E=A.join(x),w=`{ ... L64: `+s+E+`, L65: `+k+"]"}return o.pop(),s=k,A}}});var Yp=G((lH,BC)=>{var _O=FC(),bO=MC(),CO={parse:_O,stringify:bO};BC.exports=CO});var hk=G((k3,I1)=>{I1.exports={"0":"\u2080","1":"\u2081","2":"\u2... L66: `)||r,code:s,status:o},e.data.error)}return Object.assign({message:r,code:s,stat ``` ### 10. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/cjs/server.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> dist/cjs/server.cjs L1: "use strict";var OD=Object.create;var jc=Object.defineProperty;var PD=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var ID=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var FD=Object.getPrototypeOf,ND=Object.proto... L2: -- Key to operate on ... L58: `:case"\u2028":case"\u2029":return Y(),"";case"\r":return Y(),pr()===` L59: `&&Y(),"";case"1":case"2":case"3":case"4":case"5":case"6":case"7":case"8":case"9":throw qe(Y());case void 0:throw qe(Y())}return Y()}function VO(){let t="",e=pr();if(!it.isHexDigit... L60: `+s;E=A.join(x),w=`{ ... L64: `+s+E+`, L65: `+k+"]"}return o.pop(),s=k,A}}});var wh=G((i6,lw)=>{var QO=aw(),ZO=uw(),eP={parse:QO,stringify:ZO};lw.exports=eP});var Kk=G((QH,V1)=>{V1.exports={"0":"\u2080","1":"\u2081","2":"\u2... L66: `)||r,code:s,statu ``` ### 11. High: Trigger Reachable Credential Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/cjs/server.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches credential exfiltration behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable credential exfiltration chain: manifest.main -> dist/cjs/server.cjs L1: "use strict";var OD=Object.create;var jc=Object.defineProperty;var PD=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var ID=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var FD=Object.getPrototypeOf,ND=Object.proto... L2: -- Key to operate on ... L58: `:case"\u2028":case"\u2029":return Y(),"";case"\r":return Y(),pr()===` L59: `&&Y(),"";case"1":case"2":case"3":case"4":case"5":case"6":case"7":case"8":case"9":throw qe(Y());case void 0:throw qe(Y())}return Y()}function VO(){let t="",e=pr();if(!it.isHexDigit... L60: `+s;E=A.join(x),w=`{ ... L64: `+s+E+`, L65: `+k+"]"}return o.pop(),s=k,A}}});var wh=G((i6,lw)=>{var QO=aw(),ZO=uw(),eP={parse:QO,stringify:ZO};lw.exports=eP});var Kk=G((QH,V1)=>{V1.exports={"0":"\u2080","1":"\u2081","2":"\u2... ``` ### 12. High: Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/cjs/server.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: manifest.main -> dist/cjs/server.cjs L100: `+_+"}":"{"+k.join(",")+"}",r=_,g}}typeof FE.stringify!="function"&&(FE.stringify=function(d,f,p){var h;if(r="",o="",typeof p=="number")for(h=0;h=22.19.0 - **Artifact files:** 192 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 8,137,860 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** Yes - **Provenance:** https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()