registry / @caelo-cms/mcp-server / 0.10.36

@caelo-cms/mcp-server@0.10.36

MCP servers for Caelo CMS: `caelo_chat` (talk to Caelo's own AI) and the admin-scoped Power-MCP (the full chat-runner tool catalogue, driven by your own agent). Lets Claude Code (or any MCP-aware client) drive a Caelo install from outside the browser.

AI Security Review

scanned 13d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The source shows no install-time execution or package-controlled credential recipient. The flagged network and file operations are consistent with explicitly invoked export and opt-in IAP access to the operator-configured admin service.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

The operator invokes the export command, or configures CAELO_IAP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT and makes an admin request on an IAP-protected install.

Impact

No confirmed credential theft or other attack surface was established in the inspected flows.

Mechanism

Export fetches context from the configured admin API and writes it locally; IAP mode sends a Google access token to Google IAM Credentials to sign a JWT whose audience is derived from the configured admin URL, then uses that JWT for admin requests.

AI rationale

Evidence

CLAUDE.md.claude/skills/<slug>/SKILL.md

Network endpoints1

iamcredentials.googleapis.com

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Clean at 96.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for AI clean decision

The manifest exposes the server entrypoint and has only a prepublishOnly build hook, with no install-time hook.
The export path fetches the operator’s Caelo context and writes it to files only when the user invokes the export command; skill slugs are checked before creating skill paths.
IAP signing is opt-in through CAELO_IAP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT, creates an audience from the configured admin URL, and sends the access token to Google IAM Credentials to sign a JWT for that audience.
The signed JWT is then used as an authorization header for requests to the configured admin URL.

Evidence against

Behavioral surface

Source

EnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

Manifest

CopyleftLicense

scanned 9 file(s), 39.9 KB of source, external domains: admin.example.com, iamcredentials.googleapis.com, www.googleapis.com

Source & flagged code

3 flagged

dist/ingress-auth.jsView file

Lines 8-48javascript

8 * runs, so the shim has to satisfy both gates: IAP first, Caelo second

9 * (CLAUDE.md §11.B — IAP stays the first line of defense).

10 *

11 * Cloud Run native IAP uses a Google-managed OAuth client, which does not

12 * allow programmatic access with user tokens. What it does accept is a

13 * JWT signed by an allowlisted service account (Google's documented

14 * "service account JWT" path): `iss`/`sub` = the SA, `aud` = the admin

15 * origin with a path wildcard, signed via the IAM Credentials `signJwt`

16 * API. The provisioner creates that SA (`caelo-mcp@<project>`), allowlists

17 * it on IAP and lets every IAP-allowlisted operator impersonate it, so the

18 * operator's own `gcloud auth application-default login` is all the shim

19 * needs — no service-account keys on laptops (CLAUDE.md §11.C).

20 *

21 * Active only when `CAELO_IAP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT` is set (the admin's

22 * /security/mcp page puts it into the `claude mcp add` command on IAP

23 * installs); otherwise requests go out exactly as before.

24 */

25import { GoogleAuth } from "google-auth-library";

26/** Signed JWTs live at most 1 hour; refresh a minute before expiry. */

27const TOKEN_LIFETIME_S = 3600;

28const REFRESH_MARGIN_S = 60;

29/** `https://admin.example.com/anything` → `https://admin.example.com/*` (the JWT `aud`). */

30export function iapAudience(adminUrl) {

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

dist/ingress-auth.jsView on unpkg · L28

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

dist/ingress-auth.jsView on unpkg · L28

31 return `${new URL(adminUrl).origin}/*`;

32}

33async function adcAccessToken() {

34 const auth = new GoogleAuth({ scopes: ["https://www.googleapis.com/auth/cloud-platform"] });

35 const token = await auth.getAccessToken();

36 if (!token)

37 throw new Error("Application Default Credentials returned no access token");

38 return token;

39}

40export function createIngressAuth(env, deps = {}) {

41 const configured = env.CAELO_IAP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT?.trim();

42 if (!configured)

43 return null;

44 const serviceAccount = configured;

45 if (!env.CAELO_ADMIN_URL)

46 throw new Error("CAELO_IAP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT is set but CAELO_ADMIN_URL is not");

47 const audience = iapAudience(env.CAELO_ADMIN_URL);

48 const getAccessToken = deps.getAccessToken ?? adcAccessToken;

package.jsonView file

Lines 1-34json

2 "name": "@caelo-cms/mcp-server",

3 "version": "0.10.36",

4 "private": false,

5 "license": "MPL-2.0",

Source & flagged code

3 flagged · loading source

dist/ingress-auth.jsView file

28const REFRESH_MARGIN_S = 60; L29: /** `https://admin.example.com/anything` → `https://admin.example.com/*` (the JWT `aud`). */ L30: export function iapAudience(adminUrl) { ... L66: headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${accessToken}`, "content-type": "application/json" }, L67: body: JSON.stringify({ L68: payload: JSON.stringify({ ... L77: if (!res.ok) { L78: const detail = await res.text().catch(() => ""); L79: throw new Error(`IAP: could not sign an access token as ${serviceAccount} (HTTP ${res.status}). ` + ... L103: let processIngress; L104: /** Ingress headers for this process, configured from `process.env` on first use. */ L105: export async function ingressHeaders() {

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

dist/ingress-auth.jsView on unpkg · L28

28Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> dist/index.js -> dist/admin-server.js -> dist/http.js -> dist/ingress-auth.js L28: const REFRESH_MARGIN_S = 60; L29: /** `https://admin.example.com/anything` → `https://admin.example.com/*` (the JWT `aud`). */ L30: export function iapAudience(adminUrl) { ... L66: headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${accessToken}`, "content-type": "application/json" }, L67: body: JSON.stringify({ L68: payload: JSON.stringify({ ... L77: if (!res.ok) { L78: const detail = await res.text().catch(() => ""); L79: throw new Error(`IAP: could not sign an access token as ${serviceAccount} (HTTP ${res.status}). ` + ... L103: let processIngress; L104: /** Ingress headers for this process, configured from `process.env` on first use. */ L105: export async function ingressHeaders

Findings

2 Critical3 Medium7 Low

CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/ingress-auth.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/ingress-auth.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts

LowScripts Present

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

LowCopyleft License

LowAi Review Evidencepackage.json

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @caelo-cms/mcp-server@0.10.36.

See all versions of @caelo-cms/mcp-server for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @caelo-cms/mcp-server@0.10.36 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-10 16:48:16.032Z (UTC).

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