registry / @caelo-cms/mcp-server / 0.10.38

@caelo-cms/mcp-server@0.10.38

MCP servers for Caelo CMS: `caelo_chat` (talk to Caelo's own AI) and the admin-scoped Power-MCP (the full chat-runner tool catalogue, driven by your own agent). Lets Claude Code (or any MCP-aware client) drive a Caelo install from outside the browser.

AI Security Review

scanned 11d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Static source inspection found no malicious behavior: the reported credential flow is Google IAP authentication scoped to the configured admin, while file export is an explicit user-invoked feature. The manifest has no install lifecycle hook, and the inspected export target does not show hidden agent configuration mutation.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

The export flow runs when the user invokes the export command; IAP signing runs when requests need authorization and the service-account setting is present.

Impact

No unrelated credential disclosure, hidden agent configuration change, or unconsented install-time action was established.

Mechanism

The code signs a JWT for the configured Caelo admin origin using Google's IAM Credentials API, and sends the Caelo token and IAP authorization to that admin URL. Export writes context returned by that admin into the selected output directory.

AI rationale

Evidence

dist/export.js

Network endpoints1

iamcredentials.googleapis.com

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Clean at 94.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for AI clean decision

package.json has no install lifecycle hook; its only publish hook runs the TypeScript build.
The export feature fetches live context and writes generated agent files only when the user invokes the export command.
The IAP helper uses a configured service account and the Caelo admin URL as the JWT audience.
The Google access token is sent to Google's IAM Credentials API to sign that JWT.
The shared HTTP client sends the Caelo token and IAP authorization to the configured admin URL.

Evidence against

The flagged credential flow is for Google IAP authentication to the configured Caelo admin, not a transfer to an unrelated recipient.
The export target describes explicitly generated files from the authenticated admin's live context; it does not establish hidden agent configuration mutation.

Behavioral surface

Source

EnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

Source & flagged code

3 flagged

dist/ingress-auth.jsView file

Lines 8-48javascript

8 * runs, so the shim has to satisfy both gates: IAP first, Caelo second

9 * (CLAUDE.md §11.B — IAP stays the first line of defense).

10 *

11 * Cloud Run native IAP uses a Google-managed OAuth client, which does not

12 * allow programmatic access with user tokens. What it does accept is a

13 * JWT signed by an allowlisted service account (Google's documented

14 * "service account JWT" path): `iss`/`sub` = the SA, `aud` = the admin

15 * origin with a path wildcard, signed via the IAM Credentials `signJwt`

16 * API. The provisioner creates that SA (`caelo-mcp@<project>`), allowlists

17 * it on IAP and lets every IAP-allowlisted operator impersonate it, so the

18 * operator's own `gcloud auth application-default login` is all the shim

19 * needs — no service-account keys on laptops (CLAUDE.md §11.C).

20 *

21 * Active only when `CAELO_IAP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT` is set (the admin's

22 * /security/mcp page puts it into the `claude mcp add` command on IAP

23 * installs); otherwise requests go out exactly as before.

24 */

25import { GoogleAuth } from "google-auth-library";

26/** Signed JWTs live at most 1 hour; refresh a minute before expiry. */

27const TOKEN_LIFETIME_S = 3600;

28const REFRESH_MARGIN_S = 60;

29/** `https://admin.example.com/anything` → `https://admin.example.com/*` (the JWT `aud`). */

30export function iapAudience(adminUrl) {

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

dist/ingress-auth.jsView on unpkg · L28

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

dist/ingress-auth.jsView on unpkg · L28

31 return `${new URL(adminUrl).origin}/*`;

32}

33async function adcAccessToken() {

34 const auth = new GoogleAuth({ scopes: ["https://www.googleapis.com/auth/cloud-platform"] });

35 const token = await auth.getAccessToken();

36 if (!token)

37 throw new Error("Application Default Credentials returned no access token");

38 return token;

39}

40export function createIngressAuth(env, deps = {}) {

41 const configured = env.CAELO_IAP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT?.trim();

42 if (!configured)

43 return null;

44 const serviceAccount = configured;

45 if (!env.CAELO_ADMIN_URL)

46 throw new Error("CAELO_IAP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT is set but CAELO_ADMIN_URL is not");

47 const audience = iapAudience(env.CAELO_ADMIN_URL);

48 const getAccessToken = deps.getAccessToken ?? adcAccessToken;

package.jsonView file

Lines 13-47json

13 "bugs": "https://github.com/caelo-cms/caelo-cms/issues",

14 "type": "module",

15 "main": "./dist/index.js",

16 "types": "./dist/index.d.ts",

17 "bin": {

Source & flagged code

3 flagged · loading source

dist/ingress-auth.jsView file

28const REFRESH_MARGIN_S = 60; L29: /** `https://admin.example.com/anything` → `https://admin.example.com/*` (the JWT `aud`). */ L30: export function iapAudience(adminUrl) { ... L66: headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${accessToken}`, "content-type": "application/json" }, L67: body: JSON.stringify({ L68: payload: JSON.stringify({ ... L77: if (!res.ok) { L78: const detail = await res.text().catch(() => ""); L79: throw new Error(`IAP: could not sign an access token as ${serviceAccount} (HTTP ${res.status}). ` + ... L103: let processIngress; L104: /** Ingress headers for this process, configured from `process.env` on first use. */ L105: export async function ingressHeaders() {

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

dist/ingress-auth.jsView on unpkg · L28

28Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> dist/index.js -> dist/admin-server.js -> dist/http.js -> dist/ingress-auth.js L28: const REFRESH_MARGIN_S = 60; L29: /** `https://admin.example.com/anything` → `https://admin.example.com/*` (the JWT `aud`). */ L30: export function iapAudience(adminUrl) { ... L66: headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${accessToken}`, "content-type": "application/json" }, L67: body: JSON.stringify({ L68: payload: JSON.stringify({ ... L77: if (!res.ok) { L78: const detail = await res.text().catch(() => ""); L79: throw new Error(`IAP: could not sign an access token as ${serviceAccount} (HTTP ${res.status}). ` + ... L103: let processIngress; L104: /** Ingress headers for this process, configured from `process.env` on first use. */ L105: export async function ingressHeaders

Findings

2 Critical3 Medium7 Low

CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/ingress-auth.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/ingress-auth.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts

LowScripts Present

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

LowCopyleft License

LowSuspicious Lifecycle Evidencepackage.json

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @caelo-cms/mcp-server@0.10.38.

See all versions of @caelo-cms/mcp-server for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @caelo-cms/mcp-server@0.10.38 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-12 09:39:16.751Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.