registry / Malware / @caelo-cms/mcp-server / 0.10.40

@caelo-cms/mcp-server@0.10.40

MCP servers for Caelo CMS: `caelo_chat` (talk to Caelo's own AI) and the admin-scoped Power-MCP (the full chat-runner tool catalogue, driven by your own agent). Lets Claude Code (or any MCP-aware client) drive a Caelo install from outside the browser.

AI Security Review

scanned 11d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The runtime behavior inspected is consistent with explicit export and configured Google IAP authentication, and no credential theft or install-time attack was established. However, the source comment explicitly invokes a scanner finding and asserts benignness, which the review policy treats as evidence of reviewer manipulation and malicious intent.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

A reviewer or static scanner inspects dist/export.js.

Impact

It may steer reviewers toward dismissing a finding based on package-authored reassurance.

Mechanism

The comment uses the scanner finding and a benignness assertion to influence the review of reachable network-to-file behavior.

Attack narrative

The package includes reviewer-directed reassurance about a real network-to-file flow. The export operation itself requires an explicit user command, but that does not make the comment independent evidence that the behavior is safe.

AI rationale

Evidence

dist/export.js

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Malicious at 88.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for block

dist/export.js contains a comment that calls out CodeQL's network-to-file finding and asserts the flow is a feature, attempting to reassure reviewers about a flagged behavior.
The discussed flow is real: the export command fetches live context from the configured admin service before writing generated files.
Ingress authentication is opt-in through an operator-set service account, and its signing request sends the application-default token to Google's IAM Credentials endpoint.

Evidence against

The export runs only when the user invokes the export command; the inspected manifest has no install hook.
The inspected credential transfer supports Google IAP signing, and admin requests use the configured admin URL.

Behavioral surface

Source

EnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

Manifest

CopyleftLicense

scanned 10 file(s), 47.6 KB of source, external domains: admin.example.com, iamcredentials.googleapis.com, www.googleapis.com

Source & flagged code

3 flagged

dist/ingress-auth.jsView file

Lines 8-48javascript

8 * runs, so the shim has to satisfy both gates: IAP first, Caelo second

9 * (CLAUDE.md §11.B — IAP stays the first line of defense).

10 *

11 * Cloud Run native IAP uses a Google-managed OAuth client, which does not

12 * allow programmatic access with user tokens. What it does accept is a

13 * JWT signed by an allowlisted service account (Google's documented

14 * "service account JWT" path): `iss`/`sub` = the SA, `aud` = the admin

15 * origin with a path wildcard, signed via the IAM Credentials `signJwt`

16 * API. The provisioner creates that SA (`caelo-mcp@<project>`), allowlists

17 * it on IAP and lets every IAP-allowlisted operator impersonate it, so the

18 * operator's own `gcloud auth application-default login` is all the shim

19 * needs — no service-account keys on laptops (CLAUDE.md §11.C).

20 *

21 * Active only when `CAELO_IAP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT` is set (the admin's

22 * /security/mcp page puts it into the `claude mcp add` command on IAP

23 * installs); otherwise requests go out exactly as before.

24 */

25import { GoogleAuth } from "google-auth-library";

26/** Signed JWTs live at most 1 hour; refresh a minute before expiry. */

27const TOKEN_LIFETIME_S = 3600;

28const REFRESH_MARGIN_S = 60;

29/** `https://admin.example.com/anything` → `https://admin.example.com/*` (the JWT `aud`). */

30export function iapAudience(adminUrl) {

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

dist/ingress-auth.jsView on unpkg · L28

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

dist/ingress-auth.jsView on unpkg · L28

31 return `${new URL(adminUrl).origin}/*`;

32}

33async function adcAccessToken() {

34 const auth = new GoogleAuth({ scopes: ["https://www.googleapis.com/auth/cloud-platform"] });

35 const token = await auth.getAccessToken();

36 if (!token)

37 throw new Error("Application Default Credentials returned no access token");

38 return token;

39}

40export function createIngressAuth(env, deps = {}) {

41 const configured = env.CAELO_IAP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT?.trim();

42 if (!configured)

43 return null;

44 const serviceAccount = configured;

45 if (!env.CAELO_ADMIN_URL)

46 throw new Error("CAELO_IAP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT is set but CAELO_ADMIN_URL is not");

47 const audience = iapAudience(env.CAELO_ADMIN_URL);

48 const getAccessToken = deps.getAccessToken ?? adcAccessToken;

dist/export.jsView file

Lines 2-42javascript

2/**

3 * Issue #376 — `caelo-mcp-server export`: writes a CLAUDE.md + one

4 * `.claude/skills/<slug>/SKILL.md` per active skill into a working

5 * directory, generated from the install's live context

6 * (`/api/mcp/context` with skill bodies included). Check the files into

7 * the repo an external agent (Claude Code) works from so the site

8 * context loads automatically at session start; re-run after skills or

9 * site memory change.

10 *

11 * The renderers are pure and exported for tests; `runExport` does the

Source & flagged code

3 flagged · loading source

dist/ingress-auth.jsView file

28const REFRESH_MARGIN_S = 60; L29: /** `https://admin.example.com/anything` → `https://admin.example.com/*` (the JWT `aud`). */ L30: export function iapAudience(adminUrl) { ... L66: headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${accessToken}`, "content-type": "application/json" }, L67: body: JSON.stringify({ L68: payload: JSON.stringify({ ... L77: if (!res.ok) { L78: const detail = await res.text().catch(() => ""); L79: throw new Error(`IAP: could not sign an access token as ${serviceAccount} (HTTP ${res.status}). ` + ... L103: let processIngress; L104: /** Ingress headers for this process, configured from `process.env` on first use. */ L105: export async function ingressHeaders() {

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

dist/ingress-auth.jsView on unpkg · L28

28Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> dist/index.js -> dist/admin-server.js -> dist/http.js -> dist/ingress-auth.js L28: const REFRESH_MARGIN_S = 60; L29: /** `https://admin.example.com/anything` → `https://admin.example.com/*` (the JWT `aud`). */ L30: export function iapAudience(adminUrl) { ... L66: headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${accessToken}`, "content-type": "application/json" }, L67: body: JSON.stringify({ L68: payload: JSON.stringify({ ... L77: if (!res.ok) { L78: const detail = await res.text().catch(() => ""); L79: throw new Error(`IAP: could not sign an access token as ${serviceAccount} (HTTP ${res.status}). ` + ... L103: let processIngress; L104: /** Ingress headers for this process, configured from `process.env` on first use. */ L105: export async function ingressHeaders

Findings

2 Critical1 High3 Medium6 Low

CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/ingress-auth.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/ingress-auth.js

HighAi Review Evidencedist/export.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts

LowScripts Present

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

LowCopyleft License

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @caelo-cms/mcp-server@0.10.40.

See all versions of @caelo-cms/mcp-server for other recorded verdicts.

Avoid installing @caelo-cms/mcp-server@0.10.40. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-12 14:31:23.714Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Related packages

Other malware packages

Behavioral surface

Source & flagged code

Related packages

Other malware packages