registry / @caelo-cms/mcp-server / 0.10.48

@caelo-cms/mcp-server@0.10.48

MCP servers for Caelo CMS: `caelo_chat` (talk to Caelo's own AI) and the admin-scoped Power-MCP (the full chat-runner tool catalogue, driven by your own agent). Lets Claude Code (or any MCP-aware client) drive a Caelo install from outside the browser.

AI Security Review

scanned 9d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Source inspection shows no concrete attack behavior. The scanner's credential-transfer concern resolves to conditional Google IAP signing for requests to the operator-configured admin service, and agent context files are written only through the explicit export command.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

The file export runs when the caller supplies the export command; IAP signing activates only when its service-account setting is configured.

Impact

The inspected source shows no unconsented credential disclosure or malicious agent configuration change.

Mechanism

Export fetches context from the configured admin service and writes files to the selected output directory. IAP mode sends a Google access token to Google's IAM signing API and uses a short-lived JWT for requests to the configured admin service.

AI rationale

Evidence

CLAUDE.md.claude/skills/<slug>/SKILL.md

Network endpoints1

iamcredentials.googleapis.com/v1/projects/-/serviceAccounts/{serviceAccount}:signJwt

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Clean at 94.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for AI clean decision

The package entrypoints are its main module and two binaries; its only lifecycle script is prepublishOnly, which runs the build.
Export fetches context from the configured admin install and writes CLAUDE.md and skill files; the requested export location is part of that documented feature.
The export runs only when the caller selects the export command, and the output directory is caller-selected or the current directory by default.
IAP signing is disabled unless the service-account environment setting is present, and configuration requires an admin URL.
When enabled, the operator's Google access token is sent to Google's IAM signing API; the resulting JWT audience is derived from the configured admin URL, and requests carry the Caelo token to that configured URL.

Evidence against

The scanner's external credential-transfer hint does not match the inspected flow: the access token goes to Google's IAM signing API for JWT creation, while Caelo requests target the configured admin URL.

Behavioral surface

Source

EnvironmentVars

Source & flagged code

3 flagged

dist/ingress-auth.jsView file

Lines 8-48javascript

8 * runs, so the shim has to satisfy both gates: IAP first, Caelo second

9 * (CLAUDE.md §11.B — IAP stays the first line of defense).

10 *

11 * Cloud Run native IAP uses a Google-managed OAuth client, which does not

12 * allow programmatic access with user tokens. What it does accept is a

13 * JWT signed by an allowlisted service account (Google's documented

14 * "service account JWT" path): `iss`/`sub` = the SA, `aud` = the admin

15 * origin with a path wildcard, signed via the IAM Credentials `signJwt`

16 * API. The provisioner creates that SA (`caelo-mcp@<project>`), allowlists

17 * it on IAP and lets every IAP-allowlisted operator impersonate it, so the

18 * operator's own `gcloud auth application-default login` is all the shim

19 * needs — no service-account keys on laptops (CLAUDE.md §11.C).

20 *

21 * Active only when `CAELO_IAP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT` is set (the admin's

22 * /settings/mcp page puts it into the `claude mcp add` command on IAP

23 * installs); otherwise requests go out exactly as before.

24 */

25import { GoogleAuth } from "google-auth-library";

26/** Signed JWTs live at most 1 hour; refresh a minute before expiry. */

27const TOKEN_LIFETIME_S = 3600;

28const REFRESH_MARGIN_S = 60;

29/** `https://admin.example.com/anything` → `https://admin.example.com/*` (the JWT `aud`). */

30export function iapAudience(adminUrl) {

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

dist/ingress-auth.jsView on unpkg · L28

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

dist/ingress-auth.jsView on unpkg · L28

31 return `${new URL(adminUrl).origin}/*`;

32}

33async function adcAccessToken() {

34 const auth = new GoogleAuth({ scopes: ["https://www.googleapis.com/auth/cloud-platform"] });

35 const token = await auth.getAccessToken();

36 if (!token)

37 throw new Error("Application Default Credentials returned no access token");

38 return token;

39}

40export function createIngressAuth(env, deps = {}) {

41 const configured = env.CAELO_IAP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT?.trim();

42 if (!configured)

43 return null;

44 const serviceAccount = configured;

45 if (!env.CAELO_ADMIN_URL)

46 throw new Error("CAELO_IAP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT is set but CAELO_ADMIN_URL is not");

47 const audience = iapAudience(env.CAELO_ADMIN_URL);

48 const getAccessToken = deps.getAccessToken ?? adcAccessToken;

package.jsonView file

Lines 1-34json

2 "name": "@caelo-cms/mcp-server",

3 "version": "0.10.48",

4 "private": false,

5 "license": "MPL-2.0",

Source & flagged code

3 flagged · loading source

dist/ingress-auth.jsView file

28const REFRESH_MARGIN_S = 60; L29: /** `https://admin.example.com/anything` → `https://admin.example.com/*` (the JWT `aud`). */ L30: export function iapAudience(adminUrl) { ... L66: headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${accessToken}`, "content-type": "application/json" }, L67: body: JSON.stringify({ L68: payload: JSON.stringify({ ... L77: if (!res.ok) { L78: const detail = await res.text().catch(() => ""); L79: throw new Error(`IAP: could not sign an access token as ${serviceAccount} (HTTP ${res.status}). ` + ... L103: let processIngress; L104: /** Ingress headers for this process, configured from `process.env` on first use. */ L105: export async function ingressHeaders() {

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

dist/ingress-auth.jsView on unpkg · L28

28Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> dist/index.js -> dist/admin-server.js -> dist/http.js -> dist/ingress-auth.js L28: const REFRESH_MARGIN_S = 60; L29: /** `https://admin.example.com/anything` → `https://admin.example.com/*` (the JWT `aud`). */ L30: export function iapAudience(adminUrl) { ... L66: headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${accessToken}`, "content-type": "application/json" }, L67: body: JSON.stringify({ L68: payload: JSON.stringify({ ... L77: if (!res.ok) { L78: const detail = await res.text().catch(() => ""); L79: throw new Error(`IAP: could not sign an access token as ${serviceAccount} (HTTP ${res.status}). ` + ... L103: let processIngress; L104: /** Ingress headers for this process, configured from `process.env` on first use. */ L105: export async function ingressHeaders

Findings

2 Critical3 Medium7 Low

CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/ingress-auth.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/ingress-auth.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts

LowScripts Present

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

LowCopyleft License

LowSuspicious Lifecycle Evidencepackage.json

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @caelo-cms/mcp-server@0.10.48.

See all versions of @caelo-cms/mcp-server for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @caelo-cms/mcp-server@0.10.48 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-14 08:17:44.697Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.