registry / @caelo-cms/mcp-server / 0.10.51

@caelo-cms/mcp-server@0.10.51

MCP servers for Caelo CMS: `caelo_chat` (talk to Caelo's own AI) and the admin-scoped Power-MCP (the full chat-runner tool catalogue, driven by your own agent). Lets Claude Code (or any MCP-aware client) drive a Caelo install from outside the browser.

AI Security Review

scanned 7d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The flagged credentials go to Google IAM for a short-lived token scoped to the configured admin, then to that admin. The agent export requires an explicit command and writes generated context locally, so the inspected findings do not establish malicious behavior.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

The export runs only when an operator invokes the export command; IAP signing requires its service-account setting.

Impact

The inspected source establishes no unauthorized disclosure, account change, or consumer-project mutation.

Mechanism

The network calls authenticate to Google IAM and the configured admin. Export writes generated site context locally after explicit invocation.

AI rationale

Network endpoints1

iamcredentials.googleapis.com

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Clean at 94.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for AI clean decision

package.json lists only a prepublishOnly compile command and has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
The export flow is invoked only by the explicit export command; it fetches context from the configured admin and writes generated files to the chosen directory, validating skill slugs.
IAP signing is inactive unless CAELO_IAP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT is configured; when active, Google credentials are sent to Google IAM to sign a JWT for the configured admin.
The shared request helper sends the Caelo token and IAP authorization header to the configured admin URL.
On a version mismatch, the shim re-executes the same package at the exact version returned by the admin, and requires HTTPS except for loopback.

Evidence against

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

Manifest

Source & flagged code

4 flagged

dist/ingress-auth.jsView file

Lines 8-48javascript

8 * runs, so the shim has to satisfy both gates: IAP first, Caelo second

9 * (CLAUDE.md §11.B — IAP stays the first line of defense).

10 *

11 * Cloud Run native IAP uses a Google-managed OAuth client, which does not

12 * allow programmatic access with user tokens. What it does accept is a

13 * JWT signed by an allowlisted service account (Google's documented

14 * "service account JWT" path): `iss`/`sub` = the SA, `aud` = the admin

15 * origin with a path wildcard, signed via the IAM Credentials `signJwt`

16 * API. The provisioner creates that SA (`caelo-mcp@<project>`), allowlists

17 * it on IAP and lets every IAP-allowlisted operator impersonate it, so the

18 * operator's own `gcloud auth application-default login` is all the shim

19 * needs — no service-account keys on laptops (CLAUDE.md §11.C).

20 *

21 * Active only when `CAELO_IAP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT` is set (the admin's

22 * /settings/mcp page puts it into the `claude mcp add` command on IAP

23 * installs); otherwise requests go out exactly as before.

24 */

25import { GoogleAuth } from "google-auth-library";

26/** Signed JWTs live at most 1 hour; refresh a minute before expiry. */

27const TOKEN_LIFETIME_S = 3600;

28const REFRESH_MARGIN_S = 60;

29/** `https://admin.example.com/anything` → `https://admin.example.com/*` (the JWT `aud`). */

30export function iapAudience(adminUrl) {

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

dist/ingress-auth.jsView on unpkg · L28

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

dist/ingress-auth.jsView on unpkg · L28

31 return `${new URL(adminUrl).origin}/*`;

32}

33async function adcAccessToken() {

34 const auth = new GoogleAuth({ scopes: ["https://www.googleapis.com/auth/cloud-platform"] });

35 const token = await auth.getAccessToken();

36 if (!token)

37 throw new Error("Application Default Credentials returned no access token");

38 return token;

39}

40export function createIngressAuth(env, deps = {}) {

41 const configured = env.CAELO_IAP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT?.trim();

42 if (!configured)

43 return null;

44 const serviceAccount = configured;

45 if (!env.CAELO_ADMIN_URL)

46 throw new Error("CAELO_IAP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT is set but CAELO_ADMIN_URL is not");

47 const audience = iapAudience(env.CAELO_ADMIN_URL);

48 const getAccessToken = deps.getAccessToken ?? adcAccessToken;

dist/version-handshake.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 1

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/version-handshake.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

dist/version-handshake.jsView file

•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @caelo-cms/mcp-server@0.10.50 matchedIdentity = npm:QGNhZWxvLWNtcy9tY3Atc2VydmVy:0.10.50 similarity = 0.750 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file

Critical

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

dist/version-handshake.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

4 flagged · loading source

dist/ingress-auth.jsView file

28const REFRESH_MARGIN_S = 60; L29: /** `https://admin.example.com/anything` → `https://admin.example.com/*` (the JWT `aud`). */ L30: export function iapAudience(adminUrl) { ... L66: headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${accessToken}`, "content-type": "application/json" }, L67: body: JSON.stringify({ L68: payload: JSON.stringify({ ... L77: if (!res.ok) { L78: const detail = await res.text().catch(() => ""); L79: throw new Error(`IAP: could not sign an access token as ${serviceAccount} (HTTP ${res.status}). ` + ... L103: let processIngress; L104: /** Ingress headers for this process, configured from `process.env` on first use. */ L105: export async function ingressHeaders() {

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

dist/ingress-auth.jsView on unpkg · L28

28Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> dist/index.js -> dist/admin-server.js -> dist/http.js -> dist/ingress-auth.js L28: const REFRESH_MARGIN_S = 60; L29: /** `https://admin.example.com/anything` → `https://admin.example.com/*` (the JWT `aud`). */ L30: export function iapAudience(adminUrl) { ... L66: headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${accessToken}`, "content-type": "application/json" }, L67: body: JSON.stringify({ L68: payload: JSON.stringify({ ... L77: if (!res.ok) { L78: const detail = await res.text().catch(() => ""); L79: throw new Error(`IAP: could not sign an access token as ${serviceAccount} (HTTP ${res.status}). ` + ... L103: let processIngress; L104: /** Ingress headers for this process, configured from `process.env` on first use. */ L105: export async function ingressHeaders

Findings

3 Critical1 High3 Medium6 Low

CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/ingress-auth.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/ingress-auth.js

CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/version-handshake.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/version-handshake.js#virtual:normalized:round1

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts

LowScripts Present

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

LowCopyleft License

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @caelo-cms/mcp-server@0.10.51.

See all versions of @caelo-cms/mcp-server for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @caelo-cms/mcp-server@0.10.51 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-15 18:52:43.009Z (UTC).

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