registry / @caelo-cms/mcp-server / 0.10.57

@caelo-cms/mcp-server@0.10.57

⚠ Under review

MCP servers for Caelo CMS: `caelo_chat` (talk to Caelo's own AI) and the admin-scoped Power-MCP (the full chat-runner tool catalogue, driven by your own agent). Lets Claude Code (or any MCP-aware client) drive a Caelo install from outside the browser.

AI Security Review

scanned 3d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The inspected flagged code describes an operator-configured Google IAP authentication flow, and the package manifest shows no install hook. The required clean citation set exceeds the 256-citation limit, so the result is manual review rather than a clean verdict.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

The IAP helper runs when an operator configures the service account and a request needs IAP authorization.

Impact

The inspected flow appears consistent with authenticated access to the operator’s Caelo admin, but the required clean-source citation coverage is incomplete.

Mechanism

It asks Google IAM to sign a JWT for the configured service account, then sends that JWT with requests to the configured admin URL.

AI rationale

Network endpoints1

iamcredentials.googleapis.com

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Manual Review at 76.0% confidence as Unknown with low false-positive risk.

AI review observations

The manifest points to CLI entrypoints and has no install lifecycle hook; `prepublishOnly` only builds the package.
The flagged authentication code activates only when an operator configures `CAELO_IAP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT` and obtains a signing token from Google IAM.
The IAP signing request uses Google’s IAM Credentials endpoint, while normal API requests go to the configured Caelo admin URL.
The required clean-review citation set exceeds the schema’s 256-citation limit.

Evidence against

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

Manifest

CopyleftLicense

scanned 18 file(s), 85.7 KB of source, external domains: iamcredentials.googleapis.com, www.googleapis.com

Source & flagged code

3 flagged

dist/ingress-auth.jsView file

Lines 8-48javascript

8 * runs, so the shim has to satisfy both gates: IAP first, Caelo second

9 * (CLAUDE.md §11.B — IAP stays the first line of defense).

10 *

11 * Cloud Run native IAP uses a Google-managed OAuth client, which does not

12 * allow programmatic access with user tokens. What it does accept is a

13 * JWT signed by an allowlisted service account (Google's documented

14 * "service account JWT" path): `iss`/`sub` = the SA, `aud` = the admin

15 * origin with a path wildcard, signed via the IAM Credentials `signJwt`

16 * API. The provisioner creates that SA (`caelo-mcp@<project>`), allowlists

17 * it on IAP and lets every IAP-allowlisted operator impersonate it, so the

18 * operator's own `gcloud auth application-default login` is all the shim

19 * needs — no service-account keys on laptops (CLAUDE.md §11.C).

20 *

21 * Active only when `CAELO_IAP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT` is set (the admin's

22 * /settings/mcp page puts it into the `claude mcp add` command on IAP

23 * installs); otherwise requests go out exactly as before.

24 */

25import { GoogleAuth } from "google-auth-library";

26/** Signed JWTs live at most 1 hour; refresh a minute before expiry. */

27const TOKEN_LIFETIME_S = 3600;

28const REFRESH_MARGIN_S = 60;

29/** `https://admin.example.com/anything` → `https://admin.example.com/*` (the JWT `aud`). */

30export function iapAudience(adminUrl) {

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

dist/ingress-auth.jsView on unpkg · L28

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

dist/ingress-auth.jsView on unpkg · L28

31 return `${new URL(adminUrl).origin}/*`;

32}

33async function adcAccessToken() {

34 const auth = new GoogleAuth({ scopes: ["https://www.googleapis.com/auth/cloud-platform"] });

35 const token = await auth.getAccessToken();

36 if (!token)

37 throw new Error("Application Default Credentials returned no access token");

38 return token;

39}

40export function createIngressAuth(env, deps = {}) {

41 const configured = env.CAELO_IAP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT?.trim();

42 if (!configured)

43 return null;

44 const serviceAccount = configured;

45 if (!env.CAELO_ADMIN_URL)

46 throw new Error("CAELO_IAP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT is set but CAELO_ADMIN_URL is not");

47 const audience = iapAudience(env.CAELO_ADMIN_URL);

48 const getAccessToken = deps.getAccessToken ?? adcAccessToken;

dist/version-handshake.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 1

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/version-handshake.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

Source & flagged code

3 flagged · loading source

dist/ingress-auth.jsView file

28const REFRESH_MARGIN_S = 60; L29: /** `https://admin.example.com/anything` → `https://admin.example.com/*` (the JWT `aud`). */ L30: export function iapAudience(adminUrl) { ... L66: headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${accessToken}`, "content-type": "application/json" }, L67: body: JSON.stringify({ L68: payload: JSON.stringify({ ... L77: if (!res.ok) { L78: const detail = await res.text().catch(() => ""); L79: throw new Error(`IAP: could not sign an access token as ${serviceAccount} (HTTP ${res.status}). ` + ... L103: let processIngress; L104: /** Ingress headers for this process, configured from `process.env` on first use. */ L105: export async function ingressHeaders() {

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

dist/ingress-auth.jsView on unpkg · L28

28Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> dist/index.js -> dist/admin-server.js -> dist/http.js -> dist/ingress-auth.js L28: const REFRESH_MARGIN_S = 60; L29: /** `https://admin.example.com/anything` → `https://admin.example.com/*` (the JWT `aud`). */ L30: export function iapAudience(adminUrl) { ... L66: headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${accessToken}`, "content-type": "application/json" }, L67: body: JSON.stringify({ L68: payload: JSON.stringify({ ... L77: if (!res.ok) { L78: const detail = await res.text().catch(() => ""); L79: throw new Error(`IAP: could not sign an access token as ${serviceAccount} (HTTP ${res.status}). ` + ... L103: let processIngress; L104: /** Ingress headers for this process, configured from `process.env` on first use. */ L105: export async function ingressHeaders

Findings

2 Critical1 High3 Medium6 Low

CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/ingress-auth.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/ingress-auth.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/version-handshake.js#virtual:normalized:round1

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts

LowScripts Present

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

LowCopyleft License

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @caelo-cms/mcp-server@0.10.57.

See all versions of @caelo-cms/mcp-server for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @caelo-cms/mcp-server@0.10.57 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-20 13:42:33.961Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.