registry / @canonry/canonry / 7.51.1
@canonry/canonry@7.51.1
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AI Security Review
scanned 14d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection found automatic first-party skill installation during CLI initialization in project directories, which creates a real agent-configuration change. The manifest shows no npm install hook, and the inspected behavior does not establish a concrete attack; downgrade to a warning for the agent extension lifecycle risk.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
A user runs the initialization CLI in a project directory without skipping skill setup.
Impact
The installed skill files become available as agent instructions in that project; no credential transfer or other active attack was established in the inspected behavior.
Mechanism
The initialization flow calls the skill installer, which creates and reconciles files under the project's Claude skills directory.
AI rationale
Source inspection found automatic first-party skill installation during CLI initialization in project directories, which creates a real agent-configuration change. The manifest shows no npm install hook, and the inspected behavior does not establish a concrete attack; downgrade to a warning for the agent extension lifecycle risk.
Evidence
dist/chunk-W3BVUYOR.jsdist/chunk-GZPJ7TSE.js.claude/skills/<skill-name>
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 86.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The initialization path automatically installs bundled skills when skill setup is not skipped and the target is a project directory.
- The installer creates and reconciles skill files under the project's Claude skills directory.
- The package exposes the initialization CLI; this agent-configuration change is part of the first-party setup flow.
Evidence against
- The manifest lists no npm install lifecycle hook; the skill installation is reached through CLI initialization.
- The inspected behavior installs package-bundled skills and does not show credential collection or transmission.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedPossibleObfuscationTelemetryUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
8 flaggeddist/chunk-W3BVUYOR.jsView file
7624// src/cloudflare-worker-deploy.ts
L7625: import { spawn } from "child_process";
L7626: import { randomUUID } from "crypto";
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
dist/chunk-W3BVUYOR.jsView on unpkg · L7624169Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/chunk-W3BVUYOR.js spawns dist/chunk-YOGHHIGE.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution.
L169: URL_PATH_NORMALIZATION_VERSION,
L170: USER_PASSWORD_MIN_LENGTH,
L171: UserRoles,
...
L562: if (!/^\d+$/.test(rawPort) || !Number.isSafeInteger(port) || port < 1 || port > 65535) {
L563: throw new CliError({ code: "INVALID_PORT", message: "Demo port must be an integer between 1 and 65535.", exitCode: 1 });
L564: }
...
L610: }
L611: const url = `http://${host.includes(":") ? `[${host}]` : host}:${port}`;
L612: const result = { status: "ready", mode: "view-only", sampleData: true, url };
L613: if (isMachineFormat(options.format ?? "text")) console.log(JSON.stringify(result));
...
L1055: try {
L1056: diff = ev.diff ? JSON.parse(ev.diff) : {}
High
Cross File Remote Execution Context
Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.
dist/chunk-W3BVUYOR.jsView on unpkg · L169Findings
3 Critical5 High3 Medium6 Low
CriticalBrowser Credential Phishingdist/chunk-YOGHHIGE.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/chunk-YOGHHIGE.js
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/chunk-QQP7OQTW.js
HighChild Processdist/chunk-W3BVUYOR.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/chunk-J6WFXMTX.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/chunk-QQP7OQTW.js
HighCross File Remote Execution Contextdist/chunk-W3BVUYOR.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/chunk-QQP7OQTW.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
Low
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @canonry/canonry@7.51.1.
See all versions of @canonry/canonry for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @canonry/canonry@7.51.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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