registry / @canonry/canonry / 7.63.0
@canonry/canonry@7.63.0
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AI Security Review
scanned 11d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package has no npm install lifecycle hook, and the flagged agent skill setup is part of an invoked CLI workflow. Credential and process indicators resolve to configured service use, redaction, and scoped utilities; no attack behavior was identified.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
No malicious trigger was found; agent skill setup runs through the CLI init or skills installation flow.
Impact
No unauthorized credential collection, persistence, or account change was established.
Mechanism
The sentiment flow restricts requests to its configured OpenRouter endpoint, while diagnostic code redacts sensitive fields.
AI rationale
The package has no npm install lifecycle hook, and the flagged agent skill setup is part of an invoked CLI workflow. Credential and process indicators resolve to configured service use, redaction, and scoped utilities; no attack behavior was identified.
Network endpoints1
openrouter.ai/api/v1/systemone
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 89.0% confidence as Benign with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- The manifest exposes CLI and module entrypoints and lists build, typecheck, test, and lint scripts; it has no npm install lifecycle hook.
- The inspected dependency manifests show no install hook for the prepared Fastify and agent packages; their source entrypoints serve rate limiting, static files, or agent APIs.
- Agent skills are installed by the CLI setup command or during an explicitly invoked init flow, into project or user skill directories.
- Sentiment classification reads the configured OpenRouter key and pins requests to the OpenRouter endpoint, rejecting other endpoints and redirects.
- Credential-like fields are redacted by the diagnostic helper rather than collected from browser credential stores.
- Other flagged excerpts show event handlers, UI and type bundles, YAML parsing, and scoped process utilities; no attack behavior was established.
Evidence against
- Scanner labels suggest browser credential collection and Trojan Source code, but the inspected credential logic redacts sensitive fields and the YAML excerpt is parser code.
Behavioral surface
Source & flagged code
9 flaggeddist/traffic-XACOSYYM.jsView file
43// src/cloudflare-worker-deploy.ts
L44: import { spawn } from "child_process";
L45: import { randomUUID } from "crypto";
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
dist/traffic-XACOSYYM.jsView on unpkg · L43dist/chunk-DBA374EM.jsView file
•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration.
dist/chunk-DBA374EM.js:
let sanitized = value.replace(/(authorization\s*:\s*bearer\s+)[^\s,"'}]+/gi, "$1***").replace(/((?:developer|access)[_-]?token\s*[:=]\s*["']?)[^\s,"'}]+/gi, "$1***");
Authorization: `Bearer ${this.#accessToken}`,
authorization: `Bearer ${accessToken}`,
Authorization: `Basic ${Buffer.from(`${credentials.login}:${credentials.password}`).toString("base64")}`,
headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${options.apiKey}`, "content-type": "application/json" },
const code = response.status === 401 || response.status === 403 ? "provider-authorization" : response.status === 413 ? "provider-context-limit" : response.status === 42
High
Credential Redirect Persistence
Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.
Findings
4 Critical5 High3 Medium5 Low
CriticalBrowser Credential Phishingdist/chunk-TKLE2Y6H.js
CriticalTrojan Source Unicodeassets/assets/vendor-yaml-Y43rmNgW.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/chunk-TKLE2Y6H.js
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/chunk-Q4U2GJME.js
HighChild Processdist/traffic-XACOSYYM.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/chunk-DBA374EM.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/chunk-Q4U2GJME.js
HighCross File Remote Execution Contextdist/chunk-I5QSS3CY.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/chunk-Q4U2GJME.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
Medium
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @canonry/canonry@7.63.0.
See all versions of @canonry/canonry for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @canonry/canonry@7.63.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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