registry / @canonry/canonry / 7.64.1

@canonry/canonry@7.64.1

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AI Security Review

scanned 11d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Source inspection resolved the prominent scanner flags as package functionality: the provider request targets its named service, and the apparent credential collection code performs redaction. The manifest contains no install lifecycle hook, and the inspected agent code does not establish automatic control-surface mutation.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

Provider requests and agent skill setup occur during their respective product operations.

Impact

No malicious effect was established.

Mechanism

The reviewed source sends the provider request to its named endpoint, redacts sensitive diagnostic values, and installs bundled skills through a CLI operation.

AI rationale

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Clean at 90.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for AI clean decision

package.json lists CLI entrypoints and build scripts, with no install lifecycle hook.
The TypeSafe integration targets its named provider endpoint; the source describes it as a direct evaluator using a pinned model.
The flagged browser credential pattern is part of diagnostic redaction logic that masks secret-like values.
The agent skill file writes a skill manifest and supports user-triggered skill installation; the reviewed code does not establish install-hook mutation.
The runtime-operation excerpts implement tool-call limits and assistant-turn telemetry filtering.
The reviewed dependency manifests and entrypoint excerpts show ordinary library exports and product modules.

Evidence against

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetwork

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsMinifiedPossibleObfuscation

Source & flagged code

9 flagged

dist/google-QU5M737H.jsView file

89try { L90: const { spawn } = await import("child_process"); L91: const platform = process.platform;

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/google-QU5M737H.jsView on unpkg · L89

dist/chunk-7U2SFOJN.jsView file

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/chunk-7U2SFOJN.js: let sanitized = value.replace(/(authorization\s*:\s*bearer\s+)[^\s,"'}]+/gi, "$1***").replace(/((?:developer|access)[_-]?token\s*[:=]\s*["']?)[^\s,"'}]+/gi, "$1***"); Authorization: `Bearer ${this.#accessToken}`, authorization: `Bearer ${accessToken}`, Authorization: `Basic ${Buffer.from(`${credentials.login}:${credentials.password}`).toString("base64")}`, headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${options.apiKey}`, "content-type": "application/json" }, const code = response.status === 401 || response.status === 403 ? "provider-authorization" : response.status === 413 ? "provider-context-limit" : response.status === 42

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

Findings

4 Critical5 High3 Medium5 Low

CriticalBrowser Credential Phishingdist/chunk-4PRXS5JH.js

CriticalTrojan Source Unicodeassets/assets/vendor-yaml-Y43rmNgW.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/chunk-4PRXS5JH.js

CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/chunk-TX4HBLFP.js

HighChild Processdist/google-QU5M737H.js

HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/chunk-7U2SFOJN.js

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/chunk-TX4HBLFP.js

HighCross File Remote Execution Contextdist/chunk-K5S5HXAK.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/chunk-TX4HBLFP.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

Medium

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @canonry/canonry@7.64.1.

See all versions of @canonry/canonry for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @canonry/canonry@7.64.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-25 12:42:33.962Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

registry / @canonry/canonry / 7.64.1

@canonry/canonry@7.64.1

AI Security Review

scanned 11d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

Provider requests and agent skill setup occur during their respective product operations.

Impact

No malicious effect was established.

Mechanism

The reviewed source sends the provider request to its named endpoint, redacts sensitive diagnostic values, and installs bundled skills through a CLI operation.

AI rationale

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Clean at 90.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for AI clean decision

package.json lists CLI entrypoints and build scripts, with no install lifecycle hook.
The TypeSafe integration targets its named provider endpoint; the source describes it as a direct evaluator using a pinned model.
The flagged browser credential pattern is part of diagnostic redaction logic that masks secret-like values.
The agent skill file writes a skill manifest and supports user-triggered skill installation; the reviewed code does not establish install-hook mutation.
The runtime-operation excerpts implement tool-call limits and assistant-turn telemetry filtering.
The reviewed dependency manifests and entrypoint excerpts show ordinary library exports and product modules.

Evidence against

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetwork

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsMinifiedPossibleObfuscation

Source & flagged code

9 flagged

dist/google-QU5M737H.jsView file

89try { L90: const { spawn } = await import("child_process"); L91: const platform = process.platform;

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/google-QU5M737H.jsView on unpkg · L89

dist/chunk-7U2SFOJN.jsView file

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

Findings

4 Critical5 High3 Medium5 Low

CriticalBrowser Credential Phishingdist/chunk-4PRXS5JH.js

CriticalTrojan Source Unicodeassets/assets/vendor-yaml-Y43rmNgW.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/chunk-4PRXS5JH.js

CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/chunk-TX4HBLFP.js

HighChild Processdist/google-QU5M737H.js

HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/chunk-7U2SFOJN.js

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/chunk-TX4HBLFP.js

HighCross File Remote Execution Contextdist/chunk-K5S5HXAK.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/chunk-TX4HBLFP.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

Medium

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @canonry/canonry@7.64.1.

See all versions of @canonry/canonry for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @canonry/canonry@7.64.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-25 12:42:33.962Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.