--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@canonry/canonry/v/7.8.0" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@canonry/canonry/v/7.8.0.md" package: "@canonry/canonry" report_status: "published" title: "@canonry/canonry@7.8.0 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "7.8.0" --- # @canonry/canonry@7.8.0 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged as agent extension risk** — Allowed by default with warning: install-time first-party agent extension setup was detected. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Warn-only agent extension risk - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Agent extension lifecycle risk - **Selected version:** 7.8.0 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. The source supports a warning for automatic updates to first-party agent skills, not the scanner’s stronger exfiltration and phishing claims. The package has no install lifecycle hook in its manifest, and the inspected agent paths show no concrete malicious behavior. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 82.0% - **Started:** 2026-10-08T00:23:44.387Z - **Finished:** 2026-10-08T00:24:40.547Z - **Download time:** 780 ms - **Static scan time:** 15452 ms - **AI review time:** 39927 ms - **Total time:** 56160 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** The CLI automatically checks and may synchronize Canonry-owned agent skills on command startup. This creates a guarded first-party agent extension update capability, but the inspected source does not establish a malicious attack. - **Trigger:** Running a CLI command that reaches the command handler, unless auto-sync is disabled or its version and interval checks skip it. - **Impact:** An existing Canonry skill may be updated automatically, affecting instructions available to an agent; the inspected paths do not show credential theft or a foreign control-surface write. - **Evidence paths:** dist/chunk-AAMKTL6B.js, dist/chunk-LO56QXPO.js, dist/cli.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-10-08T00:24:40.547Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** The sync checks for existing Canonry skill manifests in the home or current directory and installs or updates those skills under \`.claude/skills\`. - **Rationale:** The source supports a warning for automatic updates to first-party agent skills, not the scanner’s stronger exfiltration and phishing claims. The package has no install lifecycle hook in its manifest, and the inspected agent paths show no concrete malicious behavior. - **Files touched:** .claude/skills ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 82.0% - **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn - **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability - **False-positive risk:** Medium - **Evidence for warning:** The CLI automatically checks and synchronizes existing Canonry skills when its command handler runs; sync can be disabled by an environment setting., Synchronization is limited to installed skill targets discovered in the home or current directory, and the skill installer writes under \`.claude/skills\`., The manifest exposes CLI commands and lists build, typecheck, test, and lint scripts, with no npm install lifecycle hook., The inspected plugin hint recommends updating the Canonry plugin; the inspected skill check only checks for expected installed skills., The CLI identifies local MCP configuration paths for Claude Code, Cursor, and Codex. - **Evidence against:** The inspected source shows no credential forwarding or malicious network operation in the reviewed agent-integration locations. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @canonry/canonry@7.8.0. - Review the evidence and your use of @canonry/canonry@7.8.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 2. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/chunk-KRFTA4I7.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L60119: // ../integration-commoncrawl/src/plugin-installer.ts L60120: import { spawn } from "child_process"; L60121: import fs4 from "fs/promises"; ``` ### 3. Low: Eval - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 45.0% Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern. ### 4. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 5. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 6. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 7. Critical: Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/chunk-KRFTA4I7.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L885: gscQueryDailyTotals: () => gscQueryDailyTotals, L886: gscSearchData: () => gscSearchData, L887: gscUrlInspections: () => gscUrlInspections, ... L3872: try { L3873: return JSON.parse(value); L3874: } catch { ... L4406: // ga_connections L4407: // WARNING: private_key is authentication material; consider storing in config.yaml per AGENTS.md L4408: `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS ga_connections ( ... L11570: try { L11571: const parsed = new URL(/^https?:\/\//i.test(trimmed) ? trimmed : `https://${trimmed}`); L11572: return parsed.hostname.toLowerCase().replace(/\.$/, "") || null; ``` ### 8. High: Credential Redirect Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/chunk-KRFTA4I7.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/chunk-KRFTA4I7.js: oauthAuthorizationCodes: () => oauthAuthorizationCodes, // are untrusted correlation metadata, never authorization identities. var oauthAuthorizationCodes = sqliteTable("oauth_authorization_codes", { * replay, plus each attempt the provider refused for rate limit or authorization. // Opt-in single-project scoping for API keys. NULL = full-instance access // there is no account to infer from an API key, and inventing one would name: "oauth-authorization-server", // Enterprise) cannot present an API key, so this is the only way they can ``` ### 9. High: Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 82.0% - **Path:** dist/chunk-KRFTA4I7.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L885: gscQueryDailyTotals: () => gscQueryDailyTotals, L886: gscSearchData: () => gscSearchData, L887: gscUrlInspections: () => gscUrlInspections, ... L3872: try { L3873: return JSON.parse(value); L3874: } catch { ... L4406: // ga_connections L4407: // WARNING: private_key is authentication material; consider storing in config.yaml per AGENTS.md L4408: `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS ga_connections ( ... L11570: try { L11571: const parsed = new URL(/^https?:\/\//i.test(trimmed) ? trimmed : `https://${trimmed}`); L11572: return parsed.hostname.toLowerCase().replace(/\.$/, "") || null; ``` ### 10. Critical: Browser Credential Phishing - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/chunk-DO7XPDG5.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source appears to collect browser login credentials for exfiltration. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L449: * L450: * See [twitter mentions example](https://github.com/markdown-it/linkify-it/blob/master/examples/twitter.mjs). L451: */ ... L2195: const length = colonIndex - schemeStart; L2196: const c0 = url.charCodeAt(schemeStart) | 32; L2197: if (length === 2) { ... L2227: if (!urlIsValidHostname) { L2228: if (url.startsWith("data:")) { L2229: return null; ... L2607: // ../../node_modules/.pnpm/tldts-core@7.4.9/node_modules/tldts-core/dist/es6/src/options.js L2608: function setDefaultsImpl({ allowIcannDomains = true, allowPrivateDomains = false, detectIp = true, detectSpecialUse = false, extractHostname: extractHostname2 = true, mixedInputs =... L2609: return { ``` ### 11. High: Cross File Remote Execution Context - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 72.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/cli.js spawns dist/chunk-DO7XPDG5.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L137: URL_PATH_NORMALIZATION_VERSION, L138: USER_PASSWORD_MIN_LENGTH, L139: UserRoles, ... L364: if (values.trace === true) { L365: process.env.CANONRY_TRACE = "1"; L366: } ... L475: } L476: if (out) process.stdout.write(out); L477: } ... L803: } L804: const url = `http://${host.includes(":") ? `[${host}]` : host}:${port}`; L805: const result = { status: "ready", mode: "view-only", sampleData: true, url }; ``` ### 12. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/chunk-DO7XPDG5.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.exports -> dist/index.js -> dist/chunk-DO7XPDG5.js L449: * L450: * See [twitter mentions example](https://github.com/markdown-it/linkify-it/blob/master/examples/twitter.mjs). L451: */ ... L2195: const length = colonIndex - schemeStart; L2196: const c0 = url.charCodeAt(schemeStart) | 32; L2197: if (length === 2) { ... L2227: if (!urlIsValidHostname) { L2228: if (url.startsWith("data:")) { L2229: return null; ... L2607: // ../../node_modules/.pnpm/tldts-core@7.4.9/node_modules/tldts-core/dist/es6/src/options.js L2608: function setDefaultsImpl({ allowIcannDomains = true, allowPrivateDomains = false, detectIp = true, detectSpecialUse = false, extractHostname: extractHostname2 = true, mixedInputs =... L2609: return { ``` ### 13. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 14. Low: Telemetry - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references telemetry or analytics APIs. ### 15. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 16. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 17. High: Semantic Analysis Limited - **Category:** Scanner Coverage - **Confidence:** 100.0% - **Path:** dist/chunk-KRFTA4I7.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_path_work_budget_exceeded; limitedFiles = 1 ``` ### 18. Critical: Previous Version Dangerous Delta - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 93.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.js - **Public source:** [View source]() This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @canonry/canonry@7.2.0 matchedIdentity = npm:QGNhbm9ucnkvY2Fub25yeQ:7.2.0 similarity = 0.703 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** No - **Dependencies:** 23 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 32 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 23 ### Published dependency entries - @anthropic-ai/sdk ^0.91.1 (Dependency) - @canonry/aeo-audit 7.2.0 (Dependency) - @earendil-works/pi-agent-core 1.0.0 (Dependency) - @earendil-works/pi-ai 1.0.0 (Dependency) - @fastify/rate-limit ^11.2.0 (Dependency) - @fastify/static ^9.1.1 (Dependency) - @google/genai ^1.46.0 (Dependency) - @modelcontextprotocol/sdk ^1.29.0 (Dependency) - better-sqlite3 ^12.11.1 (Dependency) - chrome-remote-interface ^0.33.2 (Dependency) - cron-parser ^5.5.0 (Dependency) - drizzle-orm ^0.45.2 (Dependency) - fastify ^5.8.5 (Dependency) - graphology 0.26.0 (Dependency) - graphology-layout-forceatlas2 0.10.1 (Dependency) - graphology-layout-noverlap 0.4.2 (Dependency) - node-cron ^4.2.1 (Dependency) - openai ^6.0.0 (Dependency) - pdf-lib ^1.17.1 (Dependency) - pino-pretty ^13.1.3 (Dependency) - undici ^7.24.2 (Dependency) - yaml ^2.7.1 (Dependency) - zod ^4.1.12 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @canonry/canonry - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 7.8.0 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-10-08T00:21:52.598Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-02T17:18:01.598Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-11-04T16:41:58.278Z - **Known versions:** 189 - **Latest version:** 7.90.0 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Self-hosted AI visibility (AEO) platform: track how ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini, and Perplexity cite your domain, join it with Search Console, GA4, server-side traffic, and paid media, and fix what you find through agent tools (CLI, REST, MCP). Local SQLite. - **Maintainers:** arberx - **Keywords:** aeo, answer-engine-optimization, geo, generative-engine-optimization, ai-visibility, citation-tracking, seo, mcp, chatgpt, claude, gemini, perplexity - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=22.19.0 \<27 - **Artifact files:** 79 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 11,337,233 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 2 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()