registry / @cdnshell/loader / 0.0.15

@cdnshell/loader@0.0.15

Static assets distribution

AI Security Review

scanned 2d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

When the bundled browser asset is loaded, it fetches module source from a configurable remote base and evaluates it. The fetched code can run in the consuming page's origin.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.

Trigger

Loading a140ulh5.js in a browser

Impact

Remote operator-controlled JavaScript executes in the host web page context.

Mechanism

remote module fetch followed by dynamic Function execution

Attack narrative

The obfuscated loader exposes configuration for a module base, fetches module text, and immediately evaluates that text with new Function. Its bootstrap executes automatically in browser environments, making a consumer that includes this asset execute subsequently retrieved remote code in its own page context. The package does not need an npm lifecycle hook for this runtime payload chain.

Rationale

The source implements an obfuscated remote-code loader with automatic browser activation. Absence of lifecycle hooks limits install-time impact but does not remove the concrete runtime RCE behavior.

Evidence

package.jsona140ulh5.js

OSV Corroboration

OpenSSF/OSV

Advisory

MAL-2026-14039

Source

OpenSSF Malicious Packages via OSV

Summary

Malicious code in @cdnshell/loader (npm)

Package presents itself as a CDN static-asset distribution library but ships 19 pre-compiled arm64 Mach-O binaries under 03_payloads/ (stager, kbridge, agent variants for iOS 13–19, including a64e/PAC variants). The binaries reference WebKit GPU-process IPC symbols (GPUConnectionToWebProcess_CreateRenderingBackend, RemoteRenderingBackend_GetPixelBufferForImageBufferWithNewMemory), private iOS entitlements (com.apple.private.webbookmarks.settings, DiagnosticReports.read-write), and mach_vm_/mach_port_ primitives consistent with a WebKit renderer-to-kernel exploit chain. The shipped JS entrypoint a12i5u6l.js is obfuscated with an obfuscator.io string-array/rotation scheme; after decoding, ModuleLoader.fetchModule fetches a manifest-selected module from a caller-configurable base URL and evaluates the response body via `new Function(await response.text())()` — a dynamic remote-code-execution sink. The surrounding orchestrator reads navigator.userAgent/platform and selects a payload variant from a hardcoded table that lines up with the shipped Mach-O stager/kbridge/agent set. There are no npm lifecycle hooks and no `main`, so the package does not execute on `npm install` or `require()`; the harm materializes when the loader is embedded in a webpage and served to iOS/macOS visitors, whose devices are then targeted by the WebKit exploit chain. The declared 'Static assets distribution' purpose, obfuscated loader, and prepositioned multi-version iOS Safari exploit payloads together are inconsistent with a legitimate static-asset library.

@cdnshell/loader@0.0.15

AI Security Review

OSV Corroboration

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Source & flagged code