registry / @cdnshell/loader / 0.0.18

@cdnshell/loader@0.0.18

superseded

Static assets distribution

AI Security Review

scanned 2d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

When the bundled browser script is loaded in a document, it retrieves JavaScript modules from an obfuscated configured base and executes their text. This is arbitrary remote code execution in the hosting page.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.

Trigger

Loading a12i5u6l.js in a browser document.

Impact

A remote operator can run arbitrary JavaScript in the hosting page's origin.

Mechanism

fetches remote module text and evaluates it with Function

Attack narrative

A browser load triggers the obfuscated bootstrap. Its module loader fetches code from a configured remote base, passes the response text to Function, and caches the result. The code also installs a periodic reload loop, enabling continued retrieval of remotely supplied behavior. No npm lifecycle hook activates this on installation, but inclusion of the shipped script exposes the page to remote code execution.

Rationale

The package deliberately hides an auto-running browser loader that remotely retrieves and evaluates code. Its lack of an install hook reduces install-time scope but does not remove the concrete runtime attack surface.

Evidence

a12i5u6l.jspackage.json04_c2/old/legacy.dylib04_c2/new/seg0.dylib

OSV Corroboration

OpenSSF/OSV

Advisory

MAL-2026-14039

Source

Package presents itself as a CDN static-asset distribution library but ships 19 pre-compiled arm64 Mach-O binaries under 03_payloads/ (stager, kbridge, agent variants for iOS 13–19, including a64e/PAC variants). The binaries reference WebKit GPU-process IPC symbols (GPUConnectionToWebProcess_CreateRenderingBackend, RemoteRenderingBackend_GetPixelBufferForImageBufferWithNewMemory), private iOS entitlements (com.apple.private.webbookmarks.settings, DiagnosticReports.read-write), and mach_vm_/mach_port_ primitives consistent with a WebKit renderer-to-kernel exploit chain. The shipped JS entrypoint a12i5u6l.js is obfuscated with an obfuscator.io string-array/rotation scheme; after decoding, ModuleLoader.fetchModule fetches a manifest-selected module from a caller-configurable base URL and evaluates the response body via `new Function(await response.text())()` — a dynamic remote-code-execution sink. The surrounding orchestrator reads navigator.userAgent/platform and selects a payload variant from a hardcoded table that lines up with the shipped Mach-O stager/kbridge/agent set. There are no npm lifecycle hooks and no `main`, so the package does not execute on `npm install` or `require()`; the harm materializes when the loader is embedded in a webpage and served to iOS/macOS visitors, whose devices are then targeted by the WebKit exploit chain. The declared 'Static assets distribution' purpose, obfuscated loader, and prepositioned multi-version iOS Safari exploit payloads together are inconsistent with a legitimate static-asset library.

@cdnshell/loader@0.0.18

AI Security Review

OSV Corroboration

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Source & flagged code