@cdnshell/loader@0.0.20

Package presents itself as a CDN static-asset distribution library but ships 19 pre-compiled arm64 Mach-O binaries under 03_payloads/ (stager, kbridge, agent variants for iOS 13–19, including a64e/PAC variants). The binaries reference WebKit GPU-process IPC symbols (GPUConnectionToWebProcess_CreateRenderingBackend, RemoteRenderingBackend_GetPixelBufferForImageBufferWithNewMemory), private iOS entitlements (com.apple.private.webbookmarks.settings, DiagnosticReports.read-write), and mach_vm_/mach_port_ primitives consistent with a WebKit renderer-to-kernel exploit chain. The shipped JS entrypoint a12i5u6l.js is obfuscated with an obfuscator.io string-array/rotation scheme; after decoding, ModuleLoader.fetchModule fetches a manifest-selected module from a caller-configurable base URL and evaluates the response body via `new Function(await response.text())()` — a dynamic remote-code-execution sink. The surrounding orchestrator reads navigator.userAgent/platform and selects a payload variant from a hardcoded table that lines up with the shipped Mach-O stager/kbridge/agent set. There are no npm lifecycle hooks and no `main`, so the package does not execute on `npm install` or `require()`; the harm materializes when the loader is embedded in a webpage and served to iOS/macOS visitors, whose devices are then targeted by the WebKit exploit chain. The declared 'Static assets distribution' purpose, obfuscated loader, and prepositioned multi-version iOS Safari exploit payloads together are inconsistent with a legitimate static-asset library.