--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@cgh567/agent" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@cgh567/agent/report.md" package: "@cgh567/agent" report_status: "published" title: "@cgh567/agent@2.6.47 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "2.6.47" --- # @cgh567/agent@2.6.47 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged as agent extension risk** — Allowed by default with warning: install-time first-party agent extension setup was detected. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Warn-only agent extension risk - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Agent extension lifecycle risk - **Selected version:** 2.6.47 - **Selected version is latest:** Yes - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. LPM treats this as warn-only first-party agent extension lifecycle risk. No confirmed attack was established. The package includes first-party agent extension behavior that can start its Atlas daemon when the integration initializes. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 78.0% - **Started:** 2026-10-07T04:34:49.478Z - **Finished:** 2026-10-07T04:36:45.671Z - **Download time:** 2055 ms - **Static scan time:** 20615 ms - **AI review time:** 93521 ms - **Total time:** 116193 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** No confirmed attack was established. The package includes first-party agent extension behavior that can start its Atlas daemon when the integration initializes. - **Trigger:** The Atlas extension initializes in an agent session. - **Impact:** This provides automatic package-owned agent integration setup, without source evidence here of credential theft or broad control-surface modification. - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-10-07T04:36:45.671Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** It starts the configured daemon script in the background if that daemon is not already running; indexing separately checks user consent. - **Rationale:** The inspected Atlas integration supports a warning for package-owned agent extension setup. The install hook runs native preparation, and the inspected updater only checks and reports versions; the source does not establish a blocking attack chain. - **Files touched:** extensions/atlas-integration.ts, package.json ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 78.0% - **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn - **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability - **False-positive risk:** Medium - **Evidence for warning:** The package defines a postinstall hook that runs its native preparation script., When the Atlas integration initializes, it can start a daemon script in the background., The Atlas integration checks project indexing consent before indexing; it skips when consent is declined or pending., The npm update check observes and reports available updates; it does not itself establish an automatic install. - **Evidence against:** The inspected source does not show the postinstall hook modifying a foreign or broad AI-agent control surface. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @cgh567/agent@2.6.47. - Review the evidence and your use of @cgh567/agent@2.6.47 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node postinstall.cjs ``` ### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node postinstall.cjs ``` ### 3. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs. ### 4. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 5. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** bin/elyntic-ollama-models.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L25: L26: const { spawnSync } = require('child_process'); L27: // BROKER-ISOLATION-1: every process.execPath spawn below builds its child env here. ``` ### 6. High: Shell - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** extensions/upgrade-reviewer.ts - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references shell execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```typescript L746: const declRegex = /export\s+(?:declare\s+)?(?:interface|type|function|class|const|let|var|enum)\s+(\w+)/g; L747: let match: RegExpExecArray | null; L748: while ((match = declRegex.exec(dtsContent)) !== null) { ``` ### 7. Medium: Dynamic Require - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** brainv2/task-context-strategy.ts - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic require/import behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```typescript L35: try { L36: const { shannonEntropy } = require('../lib/graph/analytics/quantum-entropy-detector.js'); L37: // If task text itself contains error-like keywords, boost governance context ``` ### 8. Low: Weak Crypto - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 64.0% - **Path:** extensions/design-elevation/index.ts - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```typescript L21: L22: const HOME = homedir(); L23: const LOG_DIR = join(HOME, ".pi", "agent", "governance"); ... L101: appendFileSync(EVENTS_FILE, JSON.stringify({ ts: new Date().toISOString(), type, ...data }) + "\n"); L102: } catch (e) { process.stderr.write(`[design-elevation] never crash: ${String(e)}\n`); } L103: } ... L343: L344: // Scan package.json for framework L345: const pkgPath = join(projectPath, 'package.json'); ... L347: try { L348: const pkg = JSON.parse(readFileSync(pkgPath, 'utf-8')); L349: const deps = { ...pkg.dependencies, ...pkg.devDependencies }; ``` ### 9. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 10. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 11. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 12. High: Same File Env Network Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** daemon/lib/headroom-proxy-manager.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L5: const fs = require('node:fs'); L6: const net = require('node:net'); L7: const { spawn } = require('node:child_process'); L8: const { nodeChildEnv } = require('../../lib/child-node-env.js'); ... L15: const LOG_FILE = path.join(require('./paths').AGENT_DATA_ROOT, 'logs', 'headroom-proxy.log'); L16: const PORT_START = parseInt(process.env.HEADROOM_PORT_START || '8787', 10); L17: function appendLog(obj) { ``` ### 13. High: Credential Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 82.0% - **Path:** extensions/email/commands/compose.ts - **Public source:** [View source]() Source combines credential-like environment material and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```typescript L22: subject?: string; L23: body: string; L24: }; ... L135: try { L136: const config = JSON.parse(readFileSync(configPath, 'utf-8')); L137: botToken = config.botToken; ... L141: } L142: botToken ||= process.env.SLACK_BOT_TOKEN; L143: if (!botToken) return { sent: false, error: 'Slack not configured' }; ... L145: L146: const response = await fetch('https://slack.com/api/chat.postMessage', { L147: method: 'POST', ``` ### 14. High: Hidden Inline Dependency Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 86.0% - **Path:** backfill-dashboard.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source silently spawns a Node process to execute an inline dependency payload. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L10: * - Metrics panel (right): emails, edges, episodes, deltas, memory, triage counts L11: * - Live log panel (bottom): rolling stderr/stdout stream, color-coded by severity L12: * - Header bar: status, account, elapsed time ... L29: const fs = require('fs'); L30: const { spawn } = require('child_process'); L31: ... L45: // ── Config ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── L46: const REPO = __dirname; L47: const LOG_FILE = path.join(path.dirname(REPO), 'backfill-run.log'); ... L472: const startTimestamp = new Date().toISOString().replace('T', ' ').slice(0, 19); L473: logStream.write(`\n=== Backfill dashboard started: ${startTimestamp} args: ${ARGS.join(' ')} ===\n`); L474: ``` ### 15. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 84.0% - **Path:** daemon/scripts/send-queue.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L13: * 3. On success → move to `completed`. On permanent failure → move to `failed`. L14: * 4. Prints a JSON summary on stdout when done. L15: * ... L55: try { L56: return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(queuePath, 'utf8')); L57: } catch (_) { ... L77: if (!account || !account.tokenPath) throw new Error('no_gmail_token'); L78: const tokenPath = account.tokenPath.replace(/^~/, os.homedir()); L79: if (!fs.existsSync(tokenPath)) throw new Error('no_gmail_token'); ... L114: } catch (err) { L115: process.stderr.write(`[send-queue] Gmail token refresh failed (using existing token): ${err.message}\n`); L116: return token; ``` ### 16. Critical: Trojan Source Unicode - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** lib/triage-core/mental-model/metadata-recompute.ts - **Public source:** [View source]() Source contains bidi control or invisible Unicode characters associated with Trojan Source attacks. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```typescript L2: contains invisible/control Unicode U+FEFF (zero width no-break space) // ============================================================================ ``` ### 17. High: Cross File Remote Execution Context - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 72.0% - **Path:** daemon/daemon-manager.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Cross-file remote execution chain: daemon/daemon-manager.js spawns daemon/elyntic-company-daemon.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L21: const fs = require('fs'); L22: const { spawn } = require('child_process'); L23: L24: const DEFAULT_PORT = parseInt(process.env.ELYNTIC_DAEMON_PORT || '9093', 10); L25: const DAEMON_SCRIPT = path.join(__dirname, 'elyntic-company-daemon.js'); L26: // AGENT-DAEMON-INSTANCE-1: the lease this manager inspects must be the SAME file ... L43: async function isHealthy(port = DEFAULT_PORT) { L44: const url = `http://localhost:${port}/api/health`; L45: try { ... L111: if (!pidAlive) { L112: // Write daemon stderr to a log file so crashes are visible for diagnosis. L113: // stdout is ignored (daemon uses log() internally ``` ### 18. High: Runtime Package Install - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 86.0% - **Path:** backfill-dashboard.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L715: } else { L716: child = spawn('npx', ['tsx', scriptPath, ...ARGS], { L717: cwd: __dirname, stdio: ['inherit', 'pipe', 'pipe'], env: { ...process.env } ``` ### 19. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 20. Low: Telemetry - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references telemetry or analytics APIs. ### 21. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 22. Medium: Ships Native Binary - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** bin/fd - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships native binary artifacts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text path = bin/fd kind = native_binary sizeBytes = 2953808 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 23. Medium: Ships Build Helper - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** run-backfill.ps1 - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text path = run-backfill.ps1 kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 2469 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 24. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 25. Medium: Wildcard Dependency - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package manifest contains a wildcard dependency. ### 26. Low: No License - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package manifest does not declare a clear license. ### 27. High: Semantic Analysis Limited - **Category:** Scanner Coverage - **Confidence:** 100.0% - **Path:** backfill-dashboard.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 100 ``` ### 28. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** extensions/auto-update.ts - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```typescript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @cgh567/agent@2.6.22 matchedPath = extensions/auto-update.ts matchedIdentity = npm:QGNnaDU2Ny9hZ2VudA:2.6.22 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 29. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** daemon/lib/task-history-store.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @cgh567/agent@2.6.22 matchedPath = daemon/lib/task-history-store.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGNnaDU2Ny9hZ2VudA:2.6.22 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 30. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** extensions/atlas-integration.ts - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```typescript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @cgh567/agent@2.6.22 matchedPath = extensions/atlas-integration.ts matchedIdentity = npm:QGNnaDU2Ny9hZ2VudA:2.6.22 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 31. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** extensions/btw-sidebar.ts - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```typescript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @cgh567/agent@2.6.22 matchedPath = extensions/btw-sidebar.ts matchedIdentity = npm:QGNnaDU2Ny9hZ2VudA:2.6.22 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 32. Critical: Previous Version Dangerous Delta - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 93.0% - **Path:** daemon/elyntic-company-daemon.js - **Public source:** [View source]() This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @cgh567/agent@2.6.44 matchedIdentity = npm:QGNnaDU2Ny9hZ2VudA:2.6.44 similarity = 0.350 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall, prepublishOnly - **Dependencies:** 44 - **Optional dependencies:** 2 - **Peer dependencies:** 7 - **Development dependencies:** 17 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 53 ### Published dependency entries - @googleapis/calendar ^16.0.0 (Dependency) - @googleapis/gmail ^18.0.0 (Dependency) - @helios-agent/pi-agent-core npm:@cgh567/pi-agent-core@0.84.5 (Dependency) - @helios-agent/pi-ai npm:@cgh567/pi-ai@0.84.5 (Dependency) - @helios-agent/pi-coding-agent npm:@cgh567/cli@0.84.5 (Dependency) - @helios-agent/pi-tui npm:@cgh567/pi-tui@0.84.5 (Dependency) - @ladybugdb/core 0.19.1 (Dependency) - @modelcontextprotocol/sdk ^1.30.0 (Dependency) - @parseaple/typedstream ^2.0.2 (Dependency) - @sinclair/typebox \* (Dependency) - @whatsmeow-node/whatsmeow-node ^0.6.0 (Dependency) - awilix ^13.0.3 (Dependency) - better-sqlite3 ^12.9.0 (Dependency) - cheerio ^1.2.0 (Dependency) - chokidar ^5.0.0 (Dependency) - croner ^10.0.1 (Dependency) - express ^5.2.1 (Dependency) - google-auth-library ^10.6.2 (Dependency) - headroom-ai ^0.22.4 (Dependency) - httpsms ^0.0.4 (Dependency) - imapflow ^1.6.5 (Dependency) - ioredis ^5.10.1 (Dependency) - jiti ^2.7.0 (Dependency) - js-tiktoken ^1.0.21 (Dependency) - js-yaml ^5.2.3 (Dependency) - jsonrepair ^3.15.0 (Dependency) - node-fetch ^3.3.2 (Dependency) - node-llama-cpp 3.19.0 (Dependency) - nodemailer ^9.0.3 (Dependency) - onnxruntime-node 1.24.3 (Dependency) - p-queue ^9.3.3 (Dependency) - pino ^10.3.1 (Dependency) - playwright-core ^1.52.0 (Dependency) - qrcode-terminal ^0.12.0 (Dependency) - signal-sdk ^0.2.4 (Dependency) - sonic-boom ^5.0.0 (Dependency) - sqlite-vec 0.1.9 (Dependency) - tree-sitter-javascript ^0.25.0 (Dependency) - tree-sitter-python ^0.25.0 (Dependency) - tree-sitter-typescript ^0.23.2 (Dependency) - tsx 4.22.5 (Dependency) - uuid ^14.0.1 (Dependency) - web-tree-sitter 0.26.11 (Dependency) - yaml 2.9.0 (Dependency) - @esbuild/linux-x64 ^0.28.0 (OptionalDependency) - @nut-tree-fork/nut-js ^4.2.6 (OptionalDependency) - @helios-agent/pi-agent-core \* (PeerDependency) - @helios-agent/pi-ai \* (PeerDependency) - @helios-agent/pi-coding-agent \* (PeerDependency) - @helios-agent/pi-tui \* (PeerDependency) - @sinclair/typebox \* (PeerDependency) - electron \>=30 (PeerDependency) - react ^18.3.1 || ^19.0.0 (PeerDependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @cgh567/agent - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 2.6.47 - **Version published:** 2026-10-07T00:48:39.762Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-01T02:02:11.831Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-10-07T04:36:45.671Z - **Known versions:** 27 - **Latest version:** 2.6.47 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Elyntic self-improvement lab - **Maintainers:** cgh567 - **Keywords:** pi-package, pi-coding-agent, elyntic, ai-agent, graph-brain - **Artifact files:** 2316 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 47,491,279 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 2 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()